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Abstract 
 
The thesis aims primarily to analyse the communication strategies of radical right 
parties. More specifically, the research examines three cases of radical right parties in 
Western Europe during the first decade of the twenty-first century with particular 
emphasis on the political communication along with marketing and branding 
techniques used to engage with the electorate to gain and maintain electoral support. 
These case studies comprise the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LA.O.S.), the Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP) and the Italian National Alliance (AN).  Different forms of 
content analysis are used in order to pinpoint the characteristics that identify the 
parties as members of the radical right family. Through this approach the thesis 
provides evidence that the parties, in their effort to become more appealing to their 
audiences, avoid direct engagement with issues, which reflect traditional ideological 
tenets of the radical right issues such as fascism, racism or xenophobia. Rather, they 
attempt to present a more mainstream and competitive profile in the political arena. 
From a market-oriented perspective, the thesis addresses questions on marketing and 
related explanations which focus both on how the parties choose to communicate with 
the electorate, what is their message and, through comparative analysis, whether there 
are similarities in communication techniques among the three parties and whether it 
can be argued that parties in the radical right family project a common profile in 
terms of their communication strategies. Furthermore, the application of such an 
approach to the use of political communication techniques of the selected radical 
right parties can contribute to a wider understanding of how the concept of 
‘consumption’ has come to be applied increasingly in activities undertaken in the 
political arena.   
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[T]he message is a short, easily understood piece of communication, often no more than a few 
words that conveys information from and about a party, candidate or organisation. Messages in 
a political context are largely persuasive, so mirroring the majority of the marketing and 
promotional communication, which pervades modern consumerist society (Lilleker, 2006:122) 
  
 1 
1. Introduction 
The last forty years in Europe have seen a significant rise in support of radical 
right parties. The radical right was linked to the totalitarian regimes of fascism and 
Nazism, and after the end of the WWII, many believed that an end to such ideologies 
would come. However, in the years that followed, the radical right entered a period of 
adjustment whereby they transformed their ideology on the basis of a post-fascist 
agenda. Gradually, radical right parties managed to gain popularity among the 
electorate, and by the end of the 1970s managed to increase their presence in national 
political arenas. The emergence of these radical right parties constitutes a significant 
development of Western European political systems, in terms of ‘surging political 
support’, gaining ‘legislative seats’ and ‘entering the corridors of government power’ 
(Norris, 2004)  
Over the last two decades, radical right parties have experienced a growth in 
their electoral support and for what is worth, they have also managed to turn those 
who have voted for the party once (‘new voters’) into loyal voters (creating a new 
voter profile) (Rensmann, 2003). This raises the question as to how such parties 
communicate with voters and to what extent they use political communication and 
marketing strategies to increase their support. Expanding on the view of Newman and 
Sheth (1985), who claim that understanding political marketing strategies has become 
increasingly important in order to understand why voters behave in the ways they do, 
it can be argued that political communication strategies are not just minor influences in 
determining voter attitudes but rather, play a major role in contributing to the parties’ 
success. 
Following the work of Lilleker (2006), Lees-Marshment and Lilleker (2005), O’ 
Shaughnessy (2002), Norris (1999) and McNair (1995), it becomes clear that political 
communication tactics are well incorporated into the parties’ strategy and contributing 
to the aim of increasing their electorate. The current research thesis centres on the 
impact of political communication, and additionally of political marketing and 
branding, and focuses particularly on the case of the radical right family. Its aim is to 
analyse the parties’ communication tactics as a means of producing a wider appeal to 
sections of the electorate. Secondly, it seeks to build on a communication model which 
can be applied to European radical right parties as has been done by Moufahim (2007) 
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in the case of the political marketing of the Vlaams Blok in Belgium. Radical right 
parties in Greece, Switzerland, and Italy are the focal points of this research project. 
Although each party constitutes an individual case study, all three of them are used in 
a multiple-case design set within a comparative framework.  
In the following chapters a hypothesis is developed, regarding the ways in which 
radical right parties adopt political communication strategies to expose themselves to 
the public. Furthermore, I examine in particular political marketing as a specific aspect 
of communication strategies that radical right parties adopt to increase their vote share. 
This study also examines the possibility of a common approach among parties in 
different European countries. Original research is imperative to establish the 
connection between the communication strategies of these parties’ rise in support. The 
thesis addresses questions such as: What are the communication techniques the parties 
use in order to gain the wider support of the electorate? How do the radical right 
parties market themselves? The parties that have been selected are the Greek Popular 
Orthodox Rally (LA.O.S.), Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and the Italian National 
Alliance (AN). 
This research focuses on one fundamental question:  
 Is there a pattern, regarding communication approaches that parties from the 
same political family but in different countries follow? 
Having said that, the hypothesis of this thesis is that parties originating in the 
radical right family use comparable communication strategies in order to communicate 
with the electorate. The research examines similarities in these strategies in the cases 
of LA.O.S., SVP and AN, demonstrating that the parties adopt analogous  techniques 
in the ways in which they communicate their message to the electorate.  
Following Lin’s work (2004), which attempts to interpret radical right parties’ 
electoral strategy in marketing terms, and also, drawing on Moufahim’s (2007) critical 
discourse analysis of the marketing of a radical right party, I attempt to analyse in 
depth data related to the parties’ electoral campaigns and manifestos. The analysis is 
based on communication techniques and the market-oriented perspective that the 
parties’ use in their attempt to connect with the voters. The selected methodology 
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enables identification of a pattern of political communication techniques, and the 
comparison of similarities and differences among the parties, which have been 
selected. 
The choice of a comparative approach aims to clarify and examine possible 
patterns that are presented in marketing techniques used by the selected parties. 
Furthermore, emphasis is put on communication approaches, since the idea of this 
research argues that it is a significant tool used by parties in order to interest and 
attract a greater number of voters as well as to increase the share of votes.  
Likewise, findings from research on the European Radical Right by Norris et al. 
(1999) offer additional evidence regarding my research question. Whereby parties 
implement various communication techniques in order to recruit their voters. Some of 
various communication techniques adopted in order to recruit supporters, involve 
advertisements in various forms of media, such as press, as well as distribution of 
leaflets and posters in local communities. Additionally, it is also significantly common 
for parties to communicate with the electorate through daily press releases, where 
manifestos and policies are published. Therefore, for this research project, data 
collection in Greece, Switzerland, and Italy the collection of information in the form of 
official manifestos and speeches along with websites and electoral campaign materials 
is a priority, aiming at analysing the parties’ communication approaches. However, 
before examining the parties’ communication strategies in particular, understanding 
the nature of political communication as well as addressing the concepts of political 
marketing and political branding is important, and finally, to identify the identity of 
radical right parties: what are their characteristics and ideology and what are the 
reasons for their electoral success over recent decades. 
  The concepts and practices related to rhetoric, action, and power are of great 
importance for forming the basis of the field of political communication. The 
development of political communication combines communication technologies, 
media communities and extended public space occurring to consolidating its position 
in the political field. The role of communication in recent years, in addition, 
challenges the way we understand democracy and public space. In constant changes 
where multiculturalism, political identity crisis, the crisis of political institutions and 
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lack of money are taking place, communication appears to be a necessity in the 
discourse in the political field for its existence and efficient process.  
In the field of political communication, concepts and practices related to 
rhetoric, action, and power are central for the formation of the discipline. The vast 
array of available communication technologies, the availability and dispersion of 
media communities, as well as the expansion of public space in digital domains, 
advance the role of political communication in the general field of politics. 
Concomitantly, the rapid social and technological developments in communication 
practices, have affected the understanding of democracy and public space, at least in 
Western societies – and arguably, even beyond the boundaries of what we understand 
as ‘West’ in modernity. At a time when significant social changes have occurred, as a 
result the global economic crisis that affects both citizens (triggering, for example, 
emotions related to identity crisis) and political institutions, examining communication 
practices is necessary to understand issues and challenges that the electorate faces, and 
the ways political parties address them or even, respond.  
Generally, political parties have increasingly used marketing techniques and 
branding in order to approach the electorate. Moufahim and Lim (2009) similarly in 
their study suggest that political marketing is the consequence of implementing 
marketing concepts and strategies into the process that links political parties and their 
voters. The influence of marketing appears to have created a sense of consumption in 
politics that, according to Putnam (2000), ‘enables involvement in social life, and the 
creation and maintenance of social relationships enriched by this consumption 
representing values which consumers feel unable to express through traditional 
channels’ (Moufahim, 2007:14).  
In analysing politics in terms analogous to the marketplace, where advertising 
and selling are taking place, brands can help us understand the consumerist attitudes of 
the electorate. According to Lloyd’s (2006) theory, the political party or figure is 
supported by an ideology. Additionally, the brand functions to identify and 
comprehend the communication process that originates in offering a product to the 
public (Levy, 1999). 
As Marsh and Fawcett (2011) suggest, understanding brand as a promise leads to 
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the conclusion that branding techniques create consumer equity and thus contribute to 
the greater uptake of a product in the market place (ibid). Similarly in my work I focus 
on how this technique, along with political communication approaches, contributes to 
the evolution of radical right parties within European political arenas. In order to locate 
political communication strategies in radical right parties in Greece, Switzerland and 
Italy. I propose to use essentially qualitative and quantitative research methods, and 
where appropriate, descriptive statistics to analyse diverse forms of data (for example 
textual information, pictures, numbers). The qualitative and quantitative research 
methods will be used as combining research tools, as they are both successful methods 
for addressing the research question and aid in increasing the reliability of results. 
Regarding methodology, the selection of an approach as well as the methods 
employed to analyse the data, is highly important. Content analysis will be adopted to 
analyse the data. According to Harrison (2001) such analysis is always partly 
quantitative analysis, which mostly focuses on material published by parties across 
various media. Thus, data that will be analysed comprise of concepts, strategies, 
strategies, concerns and motifs, whereby their analysis enables us to examine further 
the language used by parties (ibid). Additionally, content analysis is employed to 
examine and interpret the essence of communication strategies in the case study of 
parties. This approach overviews the relationship between the parties, their ideology 
and their communication strategies and the media (Chapter 3). Data collection in this 
thesis encompasses a wide range of media: persuasive kinds of communication, such 
as political slogans, as well as posters and official documents, for example, party 
manifestos. As demonstrated in figure 1, the internet is widely embraced in the social 
life of citizens in Greece, Switzerland and Italy, considering that more than 40% of the 
population has internet access (2011 results). For this reason, I will also analyse digital 
information available online (Figure 1) (for example, material on official websites).  
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Figure 1.1: Internet Penetration: number of internet users in each country as well as the 
percentage of the population with internet access. 
Source: Oxford Internet Institute (2011) 
One of their main forms of direct and indirect communication between parties 
and the electorate is the internet. Moreover, the internet has become a primary source 
of information for citizens. For this reason, the parties aim at developing and updating 
regularly their official websites, through which they offer various material to the 
public.  
 7 
Organisation of the thesis 
 
Review of existing literature in the field  (Chapter 2) 
Chapter 2 is firstly an overview of appropriate written research on political 
communication, marketing and branding. Secondly, studies on the nature of the 
contemporary radical right in Western Europe are discussed. Finally, theories of 
communication, marketing and branding and their adaptation to the political arena are 
discussed. This encompasses a presentation of the radical right highlighting its 
complexity in terms of identification, ideology and degrees of success, which helps 
provide an outline of the theoretical framework of the thesis.  
 
Methodology (Chapter 3) 
This chapter discusses the methodological framework adopted for this project. 
Content analysis is the primary method by which the research questions as described in 
chapter 1 are addressed. In addition, the analysis is set within a comparative context in 
order to identify possible trends in behaviour in terms of the three parties’ choice of 
communication techniques. The chapter ends with an introduction to the selected case 
studies and demonstrates the reasons for their selection.   
 
Qualitative analysis of the case studies (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
These chapters concentrate on the individual case studies of LA.O.S., SVP and 
AN, by exploring the background of the parties along with their structure and ideology. 
A qualitative analysis of the manifestos and leaders’ speeches investigates how the 
parties may be designated as belonging to the radical right family. Along with the 
rhetoric of the manifestos, an analysis of electoral campaign posters and party logos is 
undertaken in order to understand the means used to reinforce the image of the parties 
and hence, contribute to their identity structure.  
 
Content analysis of the case studies (Chapter 7)  
In this chapter I offer a more quantitative approach to the data, by presenting a 
computer-mediated content analysis of textual materials. The aim here is to assess 
what ideas and policies LA.O.S., SVP and AN prioritise in their effort to attract the 
electorate. A comparison between the individual cases is also included. 
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Reflections on the analysis: Communication strategies and radical right 
parties  (Chapter 8) 
Chapter 8 addresses how the parties I examine apply the theories associated with 
political marketing and branding, as well as the ways they position themselves in the 
electoral market through their selected communication techniques. The chapter 
presents evidence of the market-oriented perspective of LA.O.S., SVP and AN that 
provides a more extensive understanding of how the parties adopt political 
communication strategies in order to approach and eventually achieve a connection 
with the electorate. By reprising major aspects of the literature review of Chapter 2, the 
findings from the empirical analysis in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and content analysis in Chapter 
7, the discussion concludes with a response to the research questions and the 
hypothesis.  
 
Conclusion (Chapter 9) 
The thesis concludes with an overview of the findings of this research and its 
contribution to the general discussion on communication strategies of parties of the 
radical right family. Limitations of the techniques and propositions for future research, 
in relation to the three case studies and beyond, are also discussed. 
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2.  Review of existing literature in the field  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Despite the different aims, markets and products they may have, the focus of all 
political parties remains access to political power. Hence, they not only attempt to 
acquire political power within government, but more importantly they use various 
communication techniques for its acquisition and maintenance. Lilleker and Lees-
Marshment (2005), who have written extensively on the subject of political marketing, 
emphasise a market-oriented perspective. According to such a viewpoint politicians 
must attend to the needs of political consumers in order to design a product that they 
desire and which can be easily communicated and offered to them. In this case the 
product is how a party behaves. The following section sets out the key themes of 
communication tactics used by parties of the radical right. Additionally, it examines 
issues that are closely related to political communication, including political marketing 
and political branding. The aim is to identify communication tactics and their 
applications, prior to moving on to a more detailed examination of branding. 
 
Radical right parties have managed not to distinguish themselves from what 
Fromm and Kernbach (1994) describe as ‘blowing for a general attack on the 
parliaments’ (in Mudde, 2007:1), and develop as a significant electoral force. Betz 
(1998), who worked for many years on the phenomenon of the emergence of radical 
right parties in Europe, explains their success as being due to their abandoning of 
traditional fascist ideology and the adoption of a more versatile profile combining 
rhetorical radicalism and figurative policies, together with a variety of political 
marketing techniques with which they communicate their ideas to the electorate.  
 
The chapter concludes with an overview of the radical right in terms of its 
characteristics and ideology, along with a definition of ‘specific’ parties or ‘type’ of 
parties which constitute the radical right family and the reasons for their electoral 
success during recent decades. This discussion reflects on issues regarding the 
emergence of the radical right and the nature of its constitution as a political party 
family. 
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2.2. Communicating politics 
 
2.2.1. Introducing political communication 
 
Communicating political messages and persuading the public while seeking the 
popular support is part of the general political process. Following the work of Denton 
and Woodward, where political communication is described as a ‘public discussion 
about the allocation of public resources, […] official authority […] and official 
sanctions’ (1990:14), the current research incorporates various manifestations of 
‘political language’, suggesting that it comprises not only verbal or written rhetoric but 
also incorporates images and symbols. From their point of view, ‘the crucial factor that 
makes communications ‘political’ is not the source of a message but its content and 
purpose’ (Denton and Woodward, 1990:11). McNair (1995), on the other hand, 
outlines political communication as a facilitated communication broadcast through 
media: ‘all forms of communications undertaken by politicians and other political 
actors […] for the purpose of achieving specific objectives; communication addressed 
to these actors by non-politicians such as voters and communication about these actors 
and their activities, as contained in […] forms of media discussion of politics’ 
(1995:4).  
 
Franklin highlights the problem of clarification that surrounds the conception of 
political communication and states that ‘the field of political communication studies 
the interactions between media and political systems, locally, nationally, and 
internationally’ (1995:225). As pointed out by Kolovos and Harris (2005), Franklin’s 
approach focuses on the analysis of five basic elements that create:  
 
a) the political content of the media, b) the actors and agencies involved in the production of that 
content, c) the impact of political media content on the audience and/or on policy development, d) the 
impact of the political system on the media system, e) the impact of the media system on the political 
system (Kolovos and Harris, 2005:8). 
 
Over the years the process of political communication has evolved in a 
competitive environment where the better the communication tactics the more the 
political actors are going to be heard. This, according to Mancini (1999) is responsible 
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for the professionalisation of political communication in its effort to be more effective 
and reach a wider range of the public or claims to win over others (Moloney, 2001). In 
other words, communication is a means by which political actors adopt a variety of 
communication tactics in their effort to target and attract their audiences and eventually 
win their support. Having said that, the form of direct political communication 
involving political speeches and electoral campaign materials, has been enriched by the 
contribution of technology, which allows mass communication through electronic 
media such as television, radio and the Internet.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Elements/Levels of Political Communication 
 
As noted in Figure 2.1, political communication can be described as a 
relationship between three actors: the political sphere, the media and the public. In 
theory, the lines of communication are open between each actor. As Lilleker (2006) 
suggests, the way communication is structured could depend on the identity of the 
political actor, its support or even the strategies that are used to transfer the message 
itself. In order to understand the purpose and the functions of communication several 
factors need to be examined, including the range of the messages, the content and the 
context of the message, and finally the nature of the communicator.  
 
The Political Sphere/Political Organisations
Parties
Pressure groups
Terrorist organisations
Governments 
The public (citizens 
and voters)
Media
(broadcast and print)
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Foster (2010) explores political communication and gives an extended overview 
of how politicians try to communicate their political message and how parties organise 
their internal communication process in order to realise their political goals. By 
providing examples from various political arenas in recent years, Foster attempts to 
create an integrated spectrum of the communication strategies of political parties. This 
research develops Foster’s approach but is specifically aimed at parties of the radical 
right family. 
 
Lilleker (2006) in his ‘textbook’ of political communication underlines the 
extended range and variety of concepts around the subject of communicating political 
messages and provides a methodical analysis of concepts, structures and applications 
of political communication.  According to him, some of these concepts are unique to 
political communication, but others can be ‘borrowed’ from different disciplines.  
Having said that, for many, political communication is a specific subject of analysis 
within the discipline of political marketing (Moloney et al., 2003; Dermody and 
Wring, 2001). However, Franklin stresses that despite examining political 
communication and its use in depth, it is not clear what, ultimately, distinguishes 
political communication from political marketing. 
 
Additionally, Scammell stresses that ‘the political communications literature 
tends to treat political marketing as only one aspect of broader processes’ and claims 
that political communicators accepts political marketing as ‘a response to 
developments in media and communication technologies’ (1999:720). For Scammell, 
this tactic responds to the idea that marketing is beyond the idea of just focusing on the 
needs and wishes of the electorate. As she puts it, ‘political marketing is no longer a 
subset of broader processes: political communications become subset of political 
marketing, tools of promotion within the overall marketing mix’ (Scammell, 
1999:723). The perspective she proposes also appears to be closer to how this project 
uses the terms political marketing and political communication. McNair (1995), 
however, argues that the difficulty in defining the nature of political marketing is not 
the only problem, which arises. He also point out that it is ambiguous and unclear how 
and by what means one should measure the impact of political marketing.  
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Within the last few decades, evidence points to more strategic communication 
tactics adopted by political actors, which provides a more professionally-oriented 
approach to the audience. The levels of communication point to a more focused 
market-oriented communication using advertising and campaigning tools. This leads 
to a marketing perspective with a strong sense of consumer orientation. As Lees-
Marshment (2001) suggests, political communication emphasises the importance of 
long-term communication, whereas political marketing is a broader tool ‘binding 
together campaigning, political communication, market intelligence, product design 
and product promotion’ (in Kolovos and Harris, 2005:9). Lees-Marshment’s argument 
supports how this project analyses political communication and political marketing. 
Although the theory on political communication often focuses on the analysis of mass 
media, this approach is not part of this thesis. My research, as mentioned earlier, seeks 
to identify and record the communication techniques of radical right parties within the 
period of 2000-2010. The results of the comparative analysis, whether they point to 
similarities or differences among the selected parties, contribute to understanding the 
specific ways in which the political parties choose to communicate with the electorate.  
 
For this project, political marketing is regarded as part of the communication 
strategy of the political parties, which aims to deliver certain messages to the audience. 
The key idea behind political marketing is the rise of political consumerism, which can 
influence the policy structure, the building of the campaign or even the internal 
relations within the system of a political actor. Consumption transforms ideologies, 
political parties and even politicians to ‘products’ and can provide an explanation to 
the developing professionalisation aspect of political communication.  
 
2.2.2.  Political marketing 
 
[A]lmost all politicians use marketing techniques and ideas, but very few wish to admit it openly 
(Mauser, 1983:3) 
 
As underlined by O’Shaughnessy (1990), the American Marketing Association 
(AMA) in 1960 defined marketing as ‘the performance of business activities that 
direct the flow of goods and services from producer to consumer or user’. In this 
application of marketing, the consumers are not being considered as a passive 
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audience but more as effective variables that manage to co-operate in the selling 
action, and this emphasis on the consumer focus is what, according to O’ Shaughnessy 
(2002), distinguishes the marketing concept above all. 
 
The consumer in the case of the political market concept is the voter who 
demands to be convinced by answers to questions like ‘Why should I vote?’ and ‘Why 
should I vote for you?’ (Lilleker, Jackson and Scullion, 2006:183-184). The notion of 
voting as political consumption according to Moufahim (2007), is based on the idea of 
Dermody and Scullion (2001) in which voting ‘represents among other things a form 
of political participation, a granting of authority and a feeling of freedom’ (Dermody 
and Scullion, 2001 in Moufahim, 2007:40). Lees-Marshment (2004) states that 
consumerism and politics ‘interconnect at the design phase’ of what is identified as the 
political product and ‘whether it reflects the demands of those it is produced for’ 
(2004:7). In addition, Scammell (1999) places the customer ‘at the beginning rather 
than the end of the production-consumption cycle’ (1999:725), since the satisfaction of 
the customer emerges if attention is brought to the customers’ needs from beginning to 
end of the production process.  
 
For Needham, being a consumer is equivalent to being a ‘user of goods and 
services’ (2007:29). In addition, Campbell (1987) states that consumerism offers the 
opportunity of a choice in the context of personalised experiences and locates personal 
identity in reactions towards the proposed products, arguing that ‘consumerism 
occupies the central place in fulfilling human desire’ (2004:32). Campbell believes 
that in the ‘process of wanting and desiring’ the consumer is affirming their place in 
society by placing the ‘authority for decision-making located firmly within the self’ 
(2004:28-29), despite the fact that desires are socially constructed. In these terms, the 
understanding of choice as an empowering consumer practice offers personal 
acknowledgement and understanding of someone’s nature by taking on ‘a moral and 
ethical dimension’ (Lilleker and Scullion, 2008:5).  
 
Consumerism at this stage contributes the understanding of political parties voter 
behaviour and consumer/voter orientation and is therefore an essential element of 
political marketing (Scammell, 1995). Furthermore, in order to establish strong 
connections with voters and achieve certain political goals, parties often make use of 
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the consumption of political products. Also, Brownlie et al. propose that such 
consumption is now very often carried out by means of a market-oriented approach, 
whereby is thought to be a ‘dominant force in society’ (Brownlie et al. 1999 in 
Dermody and Scullion 2001:1087). The essence of political consumption is that the 
electorate engages with, and chooses from, political parties in ways similar to those 
involving people’s interaction with commercial brands (Lilleker, Jackson and Scullion 
2006). The ‘emphasis on the consumer, the voter and the satisfaction of consumer 
wants’, is what, according to Scammell, marks out political marketing from ‘earlier 
forms of political salesmanship’ (1995:8). 
 
However, before I discuss in depth the phenomenon of political marketing, it is 
important first to understand what is actually meant by such a form of marketing, and 
how it relates to politics. In their introductory text on political marketing, 
O’Shaughnessy, Ormrod and Henneberg (2013) trace back the definition of of political 
marketing in Shama’s work (1976) where he defined it as ‘the process by which 
political candidates and their ideas are directed at voters in order to satisfy their 
potential needs and thus gain their support for the candidate and ideas in question’. 
This definition, according to O’Shaughnessy, Ormrod and Henneberg, failed to 
address political marketing as an organisational philosophy focusing more on the 
efforts of political candidates attempting to satisfy the needs of the voters rather than 
having an extended focus on relationships (2013:10-11).  
 
In a similar manner to Shama’s interpretation of political marketing, Lock and 
Harris (1996) have examined it according to two different perspectives, as a discipline 
and as an activity. Furthermore, in the extended version of Political marketing – vive 
la différence! Lock and Harris (1996) affirmed that political marketing as a discipline 
is ‘the study of the processes of exchanges between political entities and their 
environment and among themselves’, while as an activity ‘it is concerned with 
strategies for positioning and communications, and the methods through which these 
strategies may be realised’ (1996: 22). In other words, political marketing involves 
exchanges and alliances between political entities along with communication 
techniques, which originated in contemporary commercial marketing. This is 
equivalent to implementing utilisation of business marketing practices in politics, with 
the voter placed at the centre of such marketing strategies.  
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In addition, reflecting on the marketing definitions offered above, where 
identifying, comprehending, communicating and distributing accurately the needs of 
the customer is essential, political parties through the electoral process are aiming to 
persuade and mobilise a part of the electorate that will eventually manage to associate 
with their core ideas. Hence, the political market can be understood as analogous to a 
commercial one, where the election is the market, the political parties are the 
companies and the vote is the investment (Collins and Butler, 2003). In this modified 
market environment the parties offer representation to customers and the customers 
offer their support in the form of votes (O’Shaughnessy, 2002).  
 
Likewise, many researchers argue that the notion of political marketing is indeed 
susceptible to concepts of demand and supply. Hence, gaining voters’ trust not only 
requires development and distribution of the product but also its eventual consumption 
by the customers (Lilleker, Jackson and Scullion 2006; Lees-Marshment 2001; Collins 
and Butler 2002; Clarke et al 2004; Newman 1994; Bartle 2002). O’ Cass (1996) 
perceives the application of marketing as offering ‘political parties the ability to 
address diverse voter concerns and needs through marketing analyses, planning, 
implementation and control of political and electoral campaigns’ (1996:48). This 
application of common marketing techniques (tools, concepts, principles) to political 
campaigning, according to Kotler and Kotler (1999), provides for orderly, resourceful 
and voter-oriented planning of the campaign  
 
[t]he use of this marketing could promote the most effective use of scarce resources, generate valuable 
information for both the candidate and the voters, and promote greater responsiveness in the political 
processes (1999:17-18) 
 
Based on this central idea that political marketing is the use of marketing 
concepts and techniques in politics, my project identifies the use of concepts and 
techniques as part of the communication strategies adopted by parties of the radical 
right family through their effort to attract voters. In the frame of political marketing, 
the parties are in a way pursuing the electoral success that will occur through the 
connection they can establish with the voters (Clarke et al. 2004). The voters, on the 
other hand, will evaluate their selection on the basis of their own expectations and 
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wants. The parties, thus, need to work on the transferable information/message they 
communicate, for it appears to be the most valuable factor responding to the demand 
of satisfying the ‘needs and wants of the voter/consumer, or at the very least to satisfy 
them more than any other available alternative’ (Lilleker, Jackson and Scullion, 
2006:5). In other words their main approach is to comprehend the needs and wishes of 
voters and adjust their policies accordingly. The American Marketing Association first 
accepted the idea of political marketing in 1985 (Wring, 1997) and its latest definition 
states that: ‘marketing was designed to influence target audiences to vote for a 
particular person, party, or proposition’ (AMA, 20071) 
 
The theory of political marketing is based on a market-oriented perspective 
where political parties are being asked to respond to the needs and demands of society 
beyond a set period of time. This means that the parties should focus on the needs and 
wants of the voters not only during an election period but continuously, being in a so-
called ‘permanent campaign’ (Nimmo, 1999; Kotzaivazoglou, 2010, Henneberg, 2004, 
Needham, 2007). In these terms, the aim of political marketing is to influence party 
policies and political behaviours so that political parties establish long-term 
relationships with the electorate (Henneberg and O’ Shaughnessy, 2007). Beyond such 
theory, what is effectively experienced, as political marketing is the adaptation of 
politicians’ essential actions to a code of practice that ensures optimal communication 
between voters and political parties. (O’ Shaughnessy, 2001; Lees-Marshment, 2009a). 
Reflecting further on Lock and Harris’ work, ‘political marketing is concerned with 
communicating with party members, media and prospective sources of funding as well 
as the electorate’ (1996: 21), whereas Wring (1997) argues that  ‘the party or 
candidate’s the use of opinion research and environmental analysis to produce and 
promote a competitive offering which will help realise organisational aims and satisfy 
groups of electors in exchange for their votes’ (1997:653).  
 
In reaction to the disengagement of a large proportion of the electorate from 
political participation, the parties, according to Blumler and Kavanagh (1995), turn for 
help to professional campaigners in order to gain the attention of voters and maximise 
their influence. Reflecting on the idea of trading between voters and political parties, it 
                                                        
1 http://www.marketingpower.com/Community/ARC/Pages/Additional/Definition/default.aspx, last 
accessed December 2013 This should be in the bibliography rather than a footnote. 
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can be argued that the voters consider and measure their choice, based on how to 
increase their personal profit (Heath et al. 2001), while parties rely on their ability to 
react and provide a fulfilment and satisfaction on voters’ wants (Lilleker, Jackson and 
Scullion, 2006).  It is based on this principle, that the parties associate with marketing 
approaches in order to identify the concerns of the electorate and gradually modify 
their behaviour in a way that will lead them to effectively communicate their product 
under offer and meet the demands of the electorate (Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 
2005). For Farrell and Wortmann (1987) the exchange takes place during the election 
period when, the sellers ‘market their particular styles of representation and specific 
intentions for government as a product which comprises party image, leader image and 
manifesto proposals’ (Henneberg 2002:100).  
 
Similarly it can be argued that the parties choose to spend a considerable amount 
of their annual budget on political advertisements targeted at reversing the passiveness 
and apprehension of the voters, under the guidance of professional consultants with 
marketing expertise, in the procedural planning of their campaigns (Schneider, 2004; 
O'Shaughnessy, 1990, Moufahim, 2007). At this point, political marketing and 
political campaigning are undertaken as the techniques by the means of which the 
parties manage to reach, inform, communicate and, in the end, through persuade the 
electorate (Baines, Harris and Lewis, 2002). For Moufahim (2007), this need to react 
to the apathy and distrust towards the political system together with ‘the perceived 
success that marketers have had in connecting with fickle consumers’ (Moufahim, 
2007:44), could contribute to the utilisation of marketing techniques and perceptions 
in politics.  
 
Over and above this, Lees-Marshment (2001) emphasises that use of marketing 
in politics refers to the technique whereby political parties administer various business 
and marketing tools such as campaigning, in order to gain power. Along with this 
thought, political marketing ‘must replicate most of the processes involved in 
consumer marketing-research advertising personal selling product management’ 
(O’Shaughnessy, 1990:17). As Lilleker, Jackson and Scullion (2006) emphasise, the 
marketing approach has replaced political ideologies, and politics is being operated in 
a form of responding to the needs and the ‘wants’ of the electorate; the political 
‘product’ is the platform of the party, which can be located in parties’ manifestos, 
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where polices and consensual objectives are being included (Newman, 1994, Bartle 
2002, Lees-Marshment, 2001, Henneberg and Eghbalian, 2002:68), along with the 
‘image’ of the party (Bartle, 2002:41). Butler and Collins (1994, 1999) argue that the 
political product includes a ‘multicomponent’ offer (that includes party, person, 
ideology), a degree of loyalty and the ability to transform. In addition, for Lees-
Marshment (2003) the party’s product is its behaviour where the product can include a 
variety of segments, from leadership, to party members and even symbols. On the 
other hand, Kotler (1982) suggests, that the candidate or the political party should 
exhibit look and behaviour that the voters find attractive. In this project, this argument 
will play a significant role in directing the research, as the aim is to compare 
marketing techniques with the original ideology of the parties and where this ideology 
stands in terms of gaining the support of the electorate.  
 
In order to be able to respond to the marketing needs that a political party may 
have seeks the help of a marketing company in terms of ‘determining the needs and 
wants of target markets and delivering the desired satisfactions more effectively and 
efficiently than competitors’ (Kotler, 1991:17). Furthermore, for Lees-Marshment 
(2001) the political parties try to create and develop a product that can attract the 
attention of the voters. Having said that, the parties are required to provide a political 
programme that is committed to satisfying the needs of the electorate, both existing 
members and potential voters. This requires an awareness of the existing competition 
in the electoral market and the product offered by fellow competitors (Kohli, Jaworski 
and Kumar 1993; Narver and Slater 1996) and in the end, the quality of the product on 
offer becomes the decisive factor of the prosperity of the company.   
 
As expressed in O’ Shaughnessy’s book, The Idea of Political Marketing (1990), 
political marketing is seeking to create and establish long-term relationships with the 
electorate. This can be achieved through a shared trading and ‘fulfilment of promises’ 
(O’ Shaughnessy 2002; Henneberg and Eghbalian 2002). In other words, political 
marketing should reproduce practices that can be traced back to commercial 
marketing, e.g. market research, advertising and management, among others (Lilleker 
and Lees-Marshment, 2005; O’ Shaughnessy 1990; Henneberg 2002). 
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For Newman (1999), the main intention of a political party is to persuade votes to 
support it. In order to achieve that, a use of marketing research needs to be conducted 
with the objective to identify the wants of the voters. After this stage, the development 
of the product linked to the voters; concerns and wants, takes place before the final 
stage of promoting it in an appealing way in order to be consumed by the electorate. 
Therefore, political marketing ‘represents a qualitative change in the nature of "state of 
the art" campaigns’ (Harrop, 1990:286) and is more than just advertising and speeches. 
Rather it is a representative outline of the party’s placement in the electoral market. 
Kotler’s (1982) approach claims that ‘the new methodology is not just the introduction 
of marketing methods into politics but an increased sophistication and acceleration of 
their use’ (in Henneberg 2002:97), when Kavanagh (1995) proposes a more media-
oriented perspective. For Kavanagh, political marketing is a combination of strategies 
meant to understand the need of the electorate and create a campaign communication 
that will be assessed always in relation to the electorate’s reactions.  
 
Many definitions of political marketing have been attempted by different 
disciplines, but still it is considered a new topic theory, which is at an early 
development stage. Scammell (1999) underlines the difficulty of offering a consensus 
definition of political marketing, due to the fact that it ‘shares with history the desire to 
explain political leaders’ behaviour, shares with political science the desire to 
understand the political processes and shares with political communication an interest 
in the art of persuasion’ (in Kolovos and Harris, 2005:4). Lock and Harris, however 
summarise that political marketing is at a ‘craft’ stage and they conclude that the 
assumption that there is direct transferability of mainstream marketing theory to 
political marketing is ‘questionable’ (1996:16). Having said that, for Lock and Harris 
political marketing needs to embrace the existing commercial marketing literature and 
develop its own techniques, focusing on communication approaches, ‘the methods 
through which these strategies may be realised, including the search for information 
into attitudes, awareness and responses of target audiences’ (Lock and Harris, 
1996:22). This is, an approach that seems to focus on value trading.  
 
Additionally, Maarek describes political marketing as ‘a complex process, the 
outcome of a more global effort implicating all factors of the politician’s political 
communication’ (1995:2), and underlines that ‘political marketing’ is ‘the general 
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method of political communication’, ‘one of its means’ (1995:28); it ‘encompasses the 
entire marketing process, from preliminary market study to testing and targeting’ 
(Maarek, 1995:2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Commercial and political marketing: two parallel strategies (after Maarek, 
1995:28) 
 
A question that arises from this figure is the association of the consumer’s 
product to political communication. The product in the case of the political marketing 
is not the political communication itself but might be allocated in the party manifesto, 
where there is a grounded presentation of proposed policies. Alternatively, it can be 
recognized   in the figure of the party leadership or the political candidates in general 
(see Butler and Collins, 1994 and 1999).  
 
For Lilleker, Jackson and Scullion (2006) marketing cannot only be oriented 
around the identification of basic needs and wants, but should also be able to locate the 
factors that motivate voters in relation to politics. In addition to that, based on the 
argument of Lees-Marshment (2001) on the ad hoc adaptation of marketing techniques 
by the political parties and politicians, Moufahim argues that this form of application 
of political marketing reflects the ‘widely acknowledged problems of engagement with 
the formal political system (2007:43). 
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As seen above, for several researchers political marketing is examined as a 
merging between marketing and politics, predicated on the penetration of marketing 
into politics; an approach that helps in the wider understanding of the behaviour of 
political parties. And although several differences between commercial and political 
marketing can be easily spotted (see Lock and Harris, 1996), the similarities between 
the two cannot be over-emphasised  either (see Harrop 1990, Scammell, 1995, Lees-
Marchment, 2001). 
 
Henneberg (2004) identifies six main developments as an example of 
applications of political marketing.  According to him, political marketing can be 
found in the sophisticated approach of communication and spin’ (Kavanagh, 1995; 
Lees-Marshment, 2001); in strategies working on ‘product and image management’ 
(Scammell, 1995; Newman, 2001; Baines, Harris and Lewis, 2002); in ‘news-
management such as the access to free media’; in ‘more coherent and planned political 
marketing strategy development’ (Butler and Collins, 1999; Kotler and Kotler, 1999; 
Lees-Marshment, 2001; Henneberg, 2002); in an ‘intensified and integrated use of 
political market research’ and finally in the ‘emphasis on political marketing 
organisation and professionalization’ (Lees-Marshment, 2001 in Henneberg, 2004:6-
7). Following the work of numerous researchers over the years, Henneberg (2004) 
manages to outline a selection of works in order to provide a better understanding of 
the transformation of political marketing from theory to practice. 
 
2.3. Political Branding: A definition  
 
 Having identified the key themes of political communication and its 
relationship to the specific issue of marketing, this section of the chapter provides an 
examination of another aspect of political communication: the brand. Brands are 
recognised to be key elements in marketing, and increasingly are seen as being central 
to political parties’ appeal to the electorate. Although their significance to marketing is 
clear, the study of branding applied to the political context is something that has been 
developed only comparatively recently (Lock and Harris, 1996; Needham, 2006; 
Smith and French, 2009; Scammell, 2007). 
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The word brand literarily means a trademark, analogous to a mark of 
identification using a red-hot iron stamp in order to leave an indelible mark (see 
Oxford English Dictionary2). In commercial marketing the word ‘brand’ reflects the 
way companies emulate their trademark in the products they produce. But for 
McDivitt (2003) a brand is more than just an identifier. By comparing a brand to a 
seed McDivitt argues that the brand needs to ‘be designed, positioned and driven to 
grow’ (2003:13). Based on this thought, branding is recognised as a process of  
‘creating identity for a product; in other words, creating consumer equity and thus 
contributing to the greater uptake of a product in the market place’ (Basu and Wang, 
2009:78). In addition, Hart and Murphy (1998) suggest that branding highly depends 
on not only the development but also the preservation of various attributes and values 
of the product. Furthermore, they describe such values as coherent, appropriate, 
distinctive, supportable and appealing to consumers. In the end, the brand is the way 
through which a company tries to establish a trust and loyal relationship among its 
consumers and tries to communicate its values through any possible form of contact 
with consumers (Cleaver, 1999).  
 
Having said that, understanding and learning to identify the brands is not 
something simple. In the creative process of branding, several elements can combine 
to constitute a brand. As Clifton and Simmons (1996) note, the visual ‘distinctiveness’ 
of a brand can take many forms - a name, letter, number, symbol, signature, slogan, 
colour, particular typeface, or even more complex and abstract such as company, a 
means of identification or a service (1996:15-16). All these elements aim to identify 
the proposed services/goods of a company/seller and to ‘differentiate them from those 
of competitors’ (Kotler, 1991:442). Moreover, Keller (1993) detects brand knowledge 
in memory and as reversed by consumer’s ability to recognise the brand under 
different circumstances, an approach that reflects the production stage of the brand. 
 
Continuing his work on political communication, McNair (1995) proposes that 
effective communication always relies on strategy, such as a ‘positioning statement’. 
This approach approach mainly involves an analysis, which seeks to answer the 
questions of what is the purpose behind the creation of the brand, who is addressed by 
                                                        
2http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/brand, last accessed January 2014 
 24 
it, and what are the reasons that make it more attractive in comparison to the other 
existing ones. In politics, branding can be identified in different areas, such as 
electoral campaigning and party politics. For March and Fawcett (2011) branding and 
politics converge in these areas to include products and services that are used within 
government, countries and states, political parties and even public policies. Their work 
follows each different feature of branding and offer examples along with  theory, in 
order to produce an analysis of the relationship between politics and branding in 
context. When it comes to a brand several factors are involved in order to achieve a 
successful result. According to Holt and Douglas (2004), a brand comprises four 
primary types: companies, the culture industries, intermediaries and customers. In 
addition, a brand is constructed in order to motivate the imagination of the potential 
customer in an effort to create a bond between them.  
 
Consumers react to brands that embrace their ideals and correspondingly use the 
brands in order to express theirs wants and believes. The challenge for the producer of 
the brand is to manage to highlight the specific characteristics with which the 
consumer can identify. Clifton and Simmons give a broader explanation of how brands 
work. According to them, brands offer the consumers a choice among a wide variety 
of products while influencing customers’ choices at the same time.. Another 
explanation of how brands work can be found in the effect of psychology and 
economics..Choosing one brand among many can be justified by whatever sets of 
ideas, feelings and attitudes the consumers have before making their choice a specific 
product (Levy, 1999; Holt and Douglas, 2004). In short successful brands are the ones 
that meet the expectations of those who buy them, or the ones that 
 
[r]epresent a promise kept. As such they are a contract between a seller and a buyer: if the seller keeps 
to its side of the bargain, the buyer will be satisfied; if not, the buyer will in future look elsewhere 
(Clifton and Simmons 1996:18)  
 
 The idea is to create a unique brand in the eyes of the consumers since its 
success depends on how effectively the brand differentiates among others. (de 
Chernatony, 2001; Cwalina and Falkowski, 2008). 
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Political parties have increasingly used marketing techniques such as branding in 
order to influence the electorate. If we consider politics as analogous to the 
marketplace, where advertising and selling take place, brands can help in the 
understanding of the consumerist attitudes of the electorate. However, there is a need 
to identify and understand the communication process that goes on in offering a 
service to the public in the context of politics, ‘political parties thus embrace the 
importance of their brands for the relationship between themselves and voters’ 
(Schneider and Ferié forthcoming). Behind a political party or figure stands an 
ideology that is familiar to the voters. The study of branding techniques falls within 
research on the consumerisation of electoral behaviour, ultimately aiming at the 
professionalization of party campaigning.  For Lilleker (2006), brand in politicalvalues 
is primarily communicated through the name, which can be symbolic, or the logo that 
can represent what the party stands for; further to this, messages and behaviour can 
signify what the brand stands for. Similarly, Levy (1999) argues that the brand is 
beyond a name, a logo or a slogan. More like a complex combination that manages to 
represent a variety of ideas what the nature of the product is, and what it stands for 
(Levy, 1999).  
 
Furthermore, according to Keller (2002) ‘branding principles have been applied 
in virtually every setting where consumer choice of some kind is involved’ 
(2002:151). Following this thought, the author concludes that due to the emergence of 
the practice of branding in various cases, ‘brand theory and best practice guidelines 
need to be refined to reflect the unique realities of those settings’ (2002:171). Tactics 
originated in commercial marketing have been applied to politics as explained above 
(Lock and Harris, 1996; Butler and Collins, 1999; O’Shaugnessy, 2002; Henneberg, 
2004, Lees-Marshment 2001; Newman 1994). Organising political campaigns based 
on market orientation along with political advertising (Shah, McLeod, Friedland and 
Nelson, 2007), political branding offers an additional perspective about marketing 
practices and the application of consumerism in politics. ‘Differentiation between 
competing offerings’; as such, branding ‘can play a critical role in directing consumer 
preference and choice’. (Kapferer, 2004 in French and Smith, 2008:461). 
 
The way a brand performs is like a system of identification (Lloyd, 2006). As 
O’Shaughnessy and Henneberg argue, political brands have three distinctive features, 
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a so-called ‘trinity’ where the party is examined as the brand, the politician as its 
perceptible appearance, and policy as its provided service (see Marsh and Fawcett, 
2011). Understanding branding as a major communication technique, this dissertation 
works on classifying the brands being used by radical right parties, analyses their 
content and context and places them into the spectrum of political marketing and 
political communication strategies of these specific political families. The use of 
brands is what makes a crucial difference and distinguishes policies, politics and 
ideologies among political parties. In this case, the establishment of a model of 
communication could verify the presence and political success of the parties under 
examination 
 
Viewing political marketing theory and its principles in relation to political 
practice, this project applies a content analysis approach to the marketing of a specific 
political party family, the radical right. To understand and identify the communication 
techniques of the selected case studies, this project adopts a critical approach towards 
the nature of political rhetoricc and campaigning strategies. However, before 
presenting the proposed methodological approach used in this study and before 
analysing the data, it is necessary to define and characterise the nature of the radical 
right. This will be the focus of the ensuing section of the chapter. 
 
2.4.  Researching the radical right 
 
2.4.1.  The problem of definition  
 
The radical right appears to have strengthened after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the collapse of socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. After the 1980s 
and especially since the 2000s, radical right parties have achieved significant degrees 
of success in numerous European countries e.g. France, Belgium, Austria, 
Netherlands, and Italy. During this period radical right parties have managed to 
establish a position for themselves in their national political arenas, and participated in 
coalition governments i.e. in Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Italy. For Betz (1998) 
the radical right is ‘one of the most significant signals of a fundamental transformation 
of politics in advanced Western societies’ (1998:3).  
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Following the collapse of communism, the eternal enemy is replaced in the 
radical right rhetoric with a new ‘national risk’, the globalised and multicultural 
society (Tsiras, 2011:18). These changes have influenced the way the parties construct 
their arguments by creating new approaches based on xenophobia, and by 
appropriating slogans and concepts that were previously identified with left ideologies 
(e.g. welfare state), and by transforming them into new tropes (e.g. welfare 
chauvinism). The third wave of radical right parties (see historical background below) 
emphasises the importance of ‘external threats’ (e.g. the U.S., the world market) and 
‘old’ and ‘new’ enemies of the nation state (e.g. Muslims, immigrants, refugees) that 
threaten its national sovereignty and disturb its national-cultural homogeneity (see 
Georgiadou 2008, 89-90).  Camus (2002) determines the success of the parties 
according to their ability to reform and reinvent themselves, which defines them as a 
result of contemporary socio-political developments (Camus, 2002 in Moufahim, 
2007:22). 
 
One of the main characteristics of the third wave of the radical right, is their 
variety in terms of ideology (see Hainsworth (2004) ‘complex alchemy’ and the 
diversity that characterise the parties that compose the radical right party family, from 
nationalist and authoritarian parties like the Republikaner in Germany and the Belgian 
Vlaams Blok to more liberal ones in Scandinavia, or racist ones like the British 
National Party. The wide range of the political spectrum of the radical right contains 
parties that talk in favour of a liberal economic market and against income 
redistribution, but are in favour of welfare chauvinism (see Betz, 1994; Andersen and 
Bjorklund, 1990) and against the idea of a multi-cultural society.  
 
Furthermore, it is also important to mention that analysis of the radical right has 
several limitations, whereby it is troublesome to both define and identify which of the 
parties actually do belong to the radical right family. Therefore, it is crucial to 
recognise and understand the specific terminology that is used in the research of these 
parties, as each of the terms signifies the specific aspects of the parties’ programmes. 
Additionally, this reflects back to the general discussion about the on-going 
disagreement among scholars in relation to terminology and its definitions 
(Hainsworth, 2000; Anastasakis, 2000; Mudde, 1996).  Moreover, von Beyme was the 
first one to emphasise the difficulty in identifying a common ground for these parties 
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in 1988 (Ignazi, 2003). In the studies that followed, the majority of researchers pointed 
to this problem of definition and gave further explanations for the usage of the term.  
 
As Mair and Mudde (1998) underline, in order for someone to examine the party 
family two approaches should be followed; one based on societal cleavages following 
Rokkan’s framework, and the other on the ideological criteria suggested by Duverger 
(see Rokkan, 1970; Duverger, 1951; von Beyme; 1988). 
 
[T]hough formal definitions or derivations based on the history of ideas largely failed to provide a 
convincing concept for right-wing extremism research work on political parties of the right has not had 
serious problems in selecting appropriate cases (von Beyme, 1988:3) 
  
Following von Beyme’s (1988) argument, the elements in order to identify a 
party family identity can be detected in the name of the party or inter alia on the basis 
of the voter’s impression of manifestos, leader’s speeches, posters and press releases. 
In von Beyme’s classification, ideology appears to play an indirect role, mainly in the 
form of the voters’ perception of the party. Gallagher et al. (1995), however 
distinguish three criteria which can be used in the identification of a party family   
‘genetic origin, transnational federations and policies (1995:181). In practice, 
Gallagher et al.’s analysis, when applied to the radical right family, appears to be 
rather vague since a) despite the fact that there was a rise of numerous radical right 
parties in Western Europe in the 1980s, the parties were not simply an explicit 
characteristic of this period; b) the transnational federation criterion is more or less 
effective when applied to small parties, like the radical right parties in the 1980s; and 
finally c) although the criterion on policies seems the most applicable, care should be 
taken in order to avoid generalisations based on the assumption that a similarity in 
policies signifies a similarity in cross-national comparability (see Mudde, 2002).  
Correspondingly, for Ignazi (2003) some researchers in order to be able to examine the 
radical right family identify specific ‘traits’ so that parties that share these ‘traits’ 
might be identified as members of this political party family. Ignazi (2003) provides 
examples of citations that adopted this principle, like the one by Backes and Jesse 
(1993) that underlined the antidemocratic character of radical right parties, and the one 
by Betz (1994) regarding the rejection of socio-cultural and socio-political systems’ 
(Betz, 1994 in Ignazi, 2003:27) Fennema (1997) highlighting the nationalism and anti-
 29 
parliamentary attitudes of the parties. Similarly, Mudde (2000, 2002) proposes five 
features that are treated as common traits by most of the researchers. These are 
xenophobia, nationalism, racism, anti-democracy and strong state.  
 
Mudde (1996) in the War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family, 
calculates that in the existing literature on the radical right, there are twenty-six  
different approaches regarding the definition that accordingly contain at least fifty-
eight separate criteria. Additionally, Anastasakis (2000) offers a thorough presentation 
and analysis of the existing literature on the topic. Among others terms like: radical 
right (Minkenberg 1998; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Merkl and Weinberg, 1997), 
he (Anastasakis) addresses the various terms that have characterised the right wing 
movements, such as extreme right (Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 1996; Pfahl-Traughber, 
1993), right (Betz and Immerfall, 1998), right-wing populism (Eismann, 2002; Decker, 
2000), neo-fascist, mimetic or nostalgic fascism (Griffin, 1993) populist, common man 
protest, poujadist, ultra right, far right (Marcus, 2000; Jungerstam-Mulders, 2003), 
new populism (Taggart, 2000, Lloyd, 2006), ethno-nationalism (Rydgren, 2005), anti-
immigrant (Fennema, 1997, Gibson, 2002) and many morewhich have been used in 
order to emphasise  the specific elements of the radical right. This leads to the 
difficulty in terms of classification based on ‘organisational complexity and 
ideological heterogeneity’ (Anastasakis, 2000:5). Such classification, moreover, 
evolves from the mobilising nature of the parties (Mudde, 2000), since the parties 
change along with the demands of the electorate.  
 
It is difficult to conclude what the radical right stands for and to decide on a 
commonly accepted term to describe it. Nonetheless, several terms have been used to 
relate to similar parties of the first and second wave of the radical right. The term 
extreme right began to become popular among scholars during the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, it is still not clear what are the exact differences between the extreme and 
radical right. Thus, in order to clarify this aspect, a further revision is needed. Ignazi 
(2003), however emphasises that the term ‘radical right’ was firstly introduced in the 
pioneering study The Radical Right by Daniel Bell (1963). Also, Mudde (2002) points 
out that such term was commonly used in the American tradition, yet its meaning 
differs significantly form that used in the European literature. Moreover, Mudde 
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(1995) proposes that in fact ‘unequivocal definition’ of the radical right does not exist 
while various approaches have been taken in order to define and explain it. Therefore, 
it appears to be appropriate to agree with von Beyme’s (1988) point of view, whereby 
a common theory cannot be developed - only typologies.    
 
Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) refers to extremism as a rejection of the 
pluralismwhich represents liberal democracy. For March and Mudde (2005) 
extremism as opposed to radicalism argues against the values and practices of 
democracy and therefore extremists are seen as undemocratic in comparison to 
radicals who accept forms of liberal democracy. A further dimension concerns the 
populist approach. The central concept of populism is that we should place our trust in 
the common sense of the ordinary people to find solutions to complicated problems. 
 
Mudde (2004) explains populism as ‘an ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people 
versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volente generale (general will) of the people’ (2004:543), while for Betz (1998) and 
Eatwell (2000) the main belief behind populism is the idea of measuring social value 
in relation to individual social contribution. Populism rejects the established system 
and supports the idea of the many (people). The term populism underlines more of a 
political attitude where mobilisation of the electorates based on popular dissatisfaction, 
is the aim of the parties.  
 
Pfahl-Traughber (1993) takes a somewhat different approach, taking populism to 
describe those ‘modernising right wing partieswhich appeal to resentments, prejudices 
and traditional values and offer simplistic and unrealistic solutions to socio-political 
problems’ (in Ignazi, 2003:29). Finally, Kitschelt (1995) defines populism as a 
subcategory of the ‘new radical right’ in those ‘populist anti-statist appeals which are 
primarily directed against big government and the political class that dominates a 
country’s politics through the conventional parties’ (1995:21). 
 
For Mudde (2002) most of these definitions of populism barely contrast in 
content from definitions of radical right. Nonetheless, many scholars have chosen to 
adopt numerous terms in order to describe these political parties (Hainsworth, 2008). 
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However as Eatwell underlines, in an environment where other political families can 
be identified by their name e.g. Communists or Greens, the parties which have 
originated in the radical right family appear to be ‘extensive and cannot be summed up 
in a single identity’ (Eatwell, 2000:410). For Georgiadou (2008) the distinction 
between radical and extreme right contains an understanding that radicalism cannot be 
extreme, underlining the fine distinction between these two terms. In addition, Ignazi 
(2003) finds the term of new right equally vague because it does not reflect the radical 
context of the parties and, therefore, does not consider populism an explicit 
characteristic of the right.  
 
In this research, the preferred term used to describe the parties involved is 
radical right. The thesis recognises the boundaries between radical, extreme and 
populist as fluid and contested rather than fixed. The specific term ‘radical right’ is 
chosen because it characterises the political parties of the period under examination in 
a more precise manner, and gives a better explanation of their presence and position in 
the political arena, their party ideology and attitude towards the political system. The 
term radical right will be used to here to refer to the sections of the extreme right that 
encourage views which are conservative in terms of the traditional left-right scale 
(Plotke and Bell, 2001). Based on these criteria, radical right parties across Europe 
have had significant electoral success in recent years (i.e. the Danish and Norwegian 
Fremskrittspartiet, the Danish Dansk Folkeparti,  the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs, the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei, the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the 
French Front National, the Italian Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale, as well as the 
Greek Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós, and several others within the European 
continent (Betz, 1993). 
 
 2.4.2.   Historical background 
 
Over the last few decades the radical right has become a popular topic of the 
research in political sciences, mainly due to its increasing success across Western 
Europe. Moreover, the emergence, electoral success and recent rapid growth of radical 
right parties on the political arena of several countries in Western Europe has led to the 
crucial change in the political establishment of these countries (Betz, 1993). Many 
scholars have argued the post-war phenomenon of radical right appearing in so-called 
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‘waves’ (von Beyme, 1988; Mudde, 2000; Georgiadou, 2008). This wave metaphor 
points to an effective explanation of the radical right phenomenon based on the post-
WWII chronology of radical right development to date. 
 
The first wave started between 1945 and 1950. As von Beyme (1988) underlines, 
just after the termination of the Second World War, a small number of radical right 
movements were shaped not only in countries where fascism had achieved a notable 
degree of success, e.g. Germany and Italy, but also in countries with a traditionally 
democratic background, such as the Scandinavian ones. These movements focused on 
‘reviving interwar fascism’, although officially they opposed the idea of re-
establishing Fascism or Nazism, by ‘adopting conformity to representative democracy’ 
(Georgiadou, 2008:86). These parties experienced limited electoral success, and were 
mainly supported by eccentrics and those who lost out on Second World War (Milza 
2002; Georgiadou, 2008; Mudde, 2002; Betz, 1998; Hainsworth, 2000). For 
Minkenberg (1994), the first wave of the radical right although supporting the 
democratic system, rejected the idea of re-establishing the state, without though 
denying the potential use of force where indicated. Moreover, they collaborated in 
order to destabilise the democratic system, but their efforts were unsuccessful which 
led to their fading out just before the 1970s.  
 
A representative example of the first wave is Movimento Sociale Italiano that 
was formed in 1946 as a descendant of the fascist institution of Republica Sociale 
Italiana of 1943 (see Milza, 2004). Similarly in Germany, in 1950 the Deutsche 
Konservative Partei was founded by national-conservatives and neonazi supporters 
(see Ignazi 2003) along with the Sozialistische Reichpartei Deutschlands, which was 
founded in 1949 but was eventually banded by the Federal Constitutional Court in 
1952 (see Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Milza, 2004; Georgiadou 2008; Tsiras, 2011). 
 
The second wave of the radical right commenced around in 1955 and lasted 
nearly until the late 1980s. This wave was referred to as a populist protest movement 
(von Beyme, 1988) formed by the people who were not benefited by the post-war 
economic renovation. The parties of this period, according to Kitschelt and McGann 
(1995), started developing in a post-industrialist environment and were contemplated 
as an authoritarian reaction to the post-materialism of the libertarian left and a mirror 
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image of the emerging New Left. The focus of the parties of the second wave was 
mainly on anti-tax and anti-bureaucratic policies. The economic crisis of the 1970s, 
followed by an economic recession along with growing immigration to the industrial 
countries of Western Europe, and above all the weakness of established political 
parties to express and react to social problems (e.g. unemployment) contributed to the 
emergence of the radical right parties of the second wave (Georgiadou, 2008:87-89; 
Tsiras, 2011:42). As Ignazi (1996) underlines, the rhetoric of the parties of this period 
introduced an emphasis on issues related to the nation, security and cultural identity, 
but nevertheless the parties acknowledged the supremacy of representative democracy, 
an approach that reflected the legitimacy of radical right parties during that period in 
the eyes of the electorate.  
 
The most recognisable political parties of the second wave are the Progress 
parties in Scandinavia. In 1972 Mogens Glistrup, in Denmark, launched a newly 
formed party called Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party). The party rapidly increased in 
popularity as a party of protest by adopting liberal political and economic rhetoric. Its 
basic proposal was to reduce taxes and cut government costs. In 1973, in Norway 
Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party) was founded by Anders Lange, more as a protest 
movement against high taxes, subsidies and state intervention rather than a typical 
political party. The inspiration for the foundation of the party came from the 
unexpected success of the Fremskridtspartie in Denmark (see Bjørklund and 
Andersen, 1999; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Hainsworth, 2000; Georgiadou, 2008; 
Betz, 1994, Ignazi, 2003). The parties managed to adjust to the new social challenges 
and demands by abandoning anti-statism tactics and transforming nation-introversion 
to national-chauvinism. This led on to the third wave of the radical right.  
 
Since the 1980s, a third wave of radical right activity has begun under 
circumstances that were very different from the first and second waves (Hainsworth, 
2008). This wave has been the most successful for most radical right parties in Europe 
(Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2002). What distinguishes the third wave from the previous 
ones is the simultaneous emergence of parties of the radical right family in several 
Western European countries and moreover their effective approach to issues of socio-
cultural and socio-political significance (Betz, 1998). As mentioned above, the radical 
right of the third wave has emerged in a post-communist era. It advocates welfare and 
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redistributive social policies but defends ethnic-nationalism, which then provides the 
basis for selective social care policies; promotes demands of direct democratic 
enrichment of political expression and a wider plebiscitary form of political 
participation, while preferring authoritarian and hierarchical structures (see 
Georgiadou, 2008). In short, welfare chauvinism, radical anti-immigration policies, 
referendum policies and national priority (Hainsworth, 2000) along with the decline of 
the established socio-cultural and socio-political system and the minimising of the role 
of the state (Betz, 1994:4) are characteristics of radical right parties in this period. The 
majority of these radical right parties, according to Betz, (1994) seemed to combine 
classical liberal approaches to individual rights and the economy, with elements of the 
socio-political agenda of the radical right, in order to promote and deliver their 
policies in a more attractive form that would attract more potential voters. 
Correspondingly, the new radical right parties 
 
[l]eave behind policies and ideologies like the traditional fascism and extremism, as well as their 
proclivity for violence, for more versatile and issue-oriented political strategies which combine verbal 
radicalism and symbolic politics through political marketing and branding (Betz, 1998:1) 
 
Their closed structure provides them with the advantage of responding more 
quickly to the preferences of the electorate (Evans and Ivaldi, 2002). Besides, 
charismatic leadership, a distinguished characteristic of these parties, plays an 
essential role in the placement of these parties in the electoral arena. Guided by leaders 
with fluency in front of the press and the media, the radical right parties are considered 
‘the most prominent representatives of a new political entrepreneurialism’ (Ignazi, 
1997; Mudde 2002; Betz 1998; Eatwell 2000). As Mudde (2002) observes, although 
most of these parties are branded as pariahs, they have managed to launch themselves 
as significant features in the political field and, additionally, they have developed as a 
substantial challenge to established political agencies across several western European 
countries (see also Betz, 1994). In order to better understand their distinctive features, 
it is necessary to look at issues regarding their definition, their ideology, and the 
reasons for their electoral success including marketing and branding strategies. 
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2.4.3.  Approaches to radical right ideology: What do they stand for? 
 
Political ideologies can be associated with a variety of social groups, e.g. nations, 
classes and social movements.  Political parties display their ideology, policies and 
priorities in their own individual way. For this reason, no clarification of the radical 
right parties can be made a priori because, according to Hainsworth (2008), it is 
essential to identify their discourse, ideas and issues first, in order to be able to 
categorise them.   
 
 [A] political ideology is a relatively coherent set of empirical and normative beliefs and thought, 
focussing on the problems of human nature, the process of history and socio-political arrangements. 
(Eatwell and Wright, 1999:17) 
 
Mudde (2005), identifies five elements (nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-
democratic sentiment and support for a strong state) that appear to be referenced more 
frequently than other elements in the rhetoric of radical right parties. Additionally, 
political parties that share these aspects, or some of these, can be placed in the radical 
right family (see Mudde 2000; Hainsworth, 2008). Other common associations 
allocated to radical right parties are the acknowledgement of representative 
democracy, pluralism and ethno-nationalism (Mudde, 2000; Moufahim, 2007). 
Meanwhile, Ivaldi (2004) describes the identity of the radical right as a ‘heterogeneous 
political family, [with] a common ideological matrix’ (2004:16); (see also Hainsworth, 
2008; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). 
 
In order to understand the characteristics of the radical right, the focus should be 
on key elements (‘traits’) of their ideology, following a similar approach to that of 
Hainsworth (2008): immigration, anti-establishment populism, strong authoritarian 
security and neoliberal economic approaches 
 
2.4.3.1.  Immigration    
 
Hainsworth (1992) defines immigration as ‘the extreme right's issue par 
excellence’ (1992:7). Immigration ideologies, which incorporate strong sentiments of 
xenophobia, are among  the most characteristic themes of the radical right, with a 
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distinguishing popular appeal within the electorate. Xenophobia, literally reflecting the 
fear (phobia) of the foreigner (xenos), is the sentiments in which radical right parties 
invest, thus grounding their proposals of welfare-chauvinist policies and anti-
immigration measures (see Davies and Lynch, 2002 in Moufahim, 2007). As seen 
above, several scholars have adopted the label of anti-immigration parties (see 
Fennema, 1997) rather than any other definition. This sees radical right parties as ones 
focused on a ‘single issue’ (Mitra 1988 in Hainsworth, 2008), emphasising the 
importance of the issue of immigration3.  
 
Since the majority of immigrants originate from non-Western European 
countries, as Mudde (2002) notices, they are undertaken as a threat to the cultural 
identity of the host countries and, therefore, are often accused of exploiting the welfare 
system, taking the jobs from the native citizens, and being responsible for the increase 
of crime rates. 
 
[w]hat unites all of these parties is their particular commitment to some sort of ethnic exclusionism - a 
hostility to foreigners, immigrants, Third World asylum-seekers, and similar outgroups - as well as 
aggressive nationalism or localism.  (Husbands, 1992:268) 
 
Thus, the parties of the radical right project xenophobic sentiments, underline the 
threat of mass immigration and the potential creation of a multi-cultural society, and 
propose strict immigration control and asylum policies. In France, since the early 
1970s, the Front National adopted an anti-immigration rhetoric and called for ‘assisted 
repatriation’ (see Front National, 2001; Hainsworth, 2008); comparable examples are 
found in the Belgian, Vlaams Blok, in the Italian Lega Nord, in the Swiss 
Schweizerische Volksparteiand and in the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, 
among others. Norris (2005) argues that immigration is the ‘signature’ issue of the 
radical right, and the fear of the ‘other’ that drives policies on immigration, asylum 
seekers and multiculturalism (2005:132). Rejecting any form of multiculturalism is 
essential within the radical right ideology and is often the reason that radical right 
parties have been accused of racism. Nation and national identity along with an ethnic 
and religious homogeneity are seen as things that need to be protected and secured by 
                                                        
3 A detailed analysis on xenophobia and immigration can be found in Betz (1994). Radical Right Wing 
Populism in Western Europe St. Martin’s Press. New York. pp. 69-106 
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any threat e.g. asylum seekers, Muslims, immigrants. In addition, radical right parties 
‘postulate a homogenous society where national identity is passed on through blood 
and heredity’ (Camus, 2003; Hainsworth, 2000 in Moufahim, 2007:31). 
 
Immigration for radical right parties is strongly related to the concept of the 
nation. As seen above, the homogeneous entity of the nation is set up to be a priority in 
the radical right parties’ agenda and everything that is international and multinational 
is being treated as a threat to the ‘cultural identity and integrity of the nation’ 
(Moufahim, 2007:31). 
 
[T]he nationalistic myth is characterised by the effort to construct an idea of nation and national 
belonging by radicalising ethnic, cultural and political criteria of exclusion, and to condense the idea of 
the nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity. (Minkenberg, 2002:337) 
 
Another main element of radical right ideology is nationalism. Defending ethno-
nationalism the parties of the radical right argue for a homogeneous environment in 
which the nation is consistent with the state (Eatwell, 2000). Thus, they disregard or 
belittle any foreign elements that differentiate from it. The nation for radical right 
parties is perceived as a unit that shares identical cultural and ethnic origins, and 
individuals that do not share these features should not be considered as part of it 
(Hainsworth, 2008). In addition, the homogeneity of the nation reflects issues like 
welfare chauvinism. The socio-economic policy of welfare chauvinism introduces a 
notion of ‘our own people first’, an exclusionist approach adopted by the entirely of 
radical right parties. Based on this principle, the state funds and the offered job 
placements should be used by natives, rather than immigrants, and along with that the 
state should protect national economy against the ‘foreign competition’ (Mudde, 
2002:175) For Kitschelt and McGann (1995) what has contributed to the structure of 
radical right parties’ economic rhetoric has been the general anxiety over the growing 
global competition. Having said that, radical right parties often argue in favour of an 
economic nationalism, of measurements that will protect the state against its 
exploitation from the immigrants, while claiming that they can be the ones to protect 
the wishes and needs of the ordinary voters. 
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2.4.3.2.  Neo-liberal economic approaches 
 
When compared with fascism or post-war extreme right movements, the radical 
right parties of the third wave, as mentioned above, distinguish themselves due to their 
free market rhetoric. According to the ‘winning formula’ theorised by Kitschelt and 
McGann (1995) ‘only if they choose free-market appeals that are combined with 
authoritarian and ethnocentric and even racist messages will they attract a broad 
audience’ (1995:vii).  
 
Following a liberal economic approach, as Betz (1998) describes, the purpose is 
to encourage the development of small and medium-sized companies. Through 
antagonism within the global market, these enterprises would emerge as key factors 
that could influence the ‘economic future and development of Western societies’ (Betz 
1998:1-2). Having said that, the state should not interfere with the economy but 
concentrate on supporting a free market. Taking into account these features, the most 
successful radical right parties argue in favour of policies encouraging lower tax rates 
and the reduction of government spending (Hainsworth, 2000; Mudde, 2000; Betz, 
1998).  
 
In addition, and following the argument emerging from the national-orientation 
perspective of the parties, a form of ‘solidarism’ is proposed. This argues in favour of 
a welfare state where where ‘national solidarity replaces class struggle’ (Mudde, 
2000:189). Hence, the proposed alternative of the radical right is a complex mixture of 
neoliberalism and socio-protectionism (see Hainsworth, 2008) 
 
2.4.3.3.  Anti-establishment populism  
 
The radical right’s ideology, apart from focusing on the issue of immigration, 
also argues against the political establishment and the conventional traditional social 
structures (Hainsworth, 2000). Being often supported by a protest vote (see Eatwell, 
1998) these parties build up an argument based on the dissatisfaction created by 
crucial social issues like unemployment, economic insecurity, immigration policies, 
along with disappointment and mistrust towards the political parties and the political 
system (Betz, 1998; Hainsworth, 2008; Eatwell, 1998; Mudde, 2002; Georgiadou 
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2008) Having said that, the parties are asked to respond to the non-static needs of the 
electorate and address their dilemmas, wishes and fears regarding several issues such 
as economy, immigration, and state mistrust. The radical right parties appear to attract 
voters that feel dissatisfied and ‘forgotten’ by the political elite, and manage to engage 
with them by instilling the idea that it is themselves (the radical right parties) that 
represent ordinary people’s enefits and deal with their concerns. 
 
2.4.3.4.  Strong authoritarian security 
 
Eatwell (2000) underlines two major characteristics of the radical right parties: a) 
the devaluation of democratic principles (e.g. human liberties and equal rights), 
promoted by an authoritarian system where rights are classified according to such 
characteristics as race, nationality and religion; and b) the tolerance of violence as 
essential in order to accomplish political purposes. Rydgren (2004) highlights that 
‘authoritarian positions on issue areas such as law and order, citizenship and 
immigration policy are among the most characteristic features’ of the radical right 
parties (2004:9-10). 
 
According to Mudde (2002), in the ideology of radical right parties there is a 
general belief that the approach to ‘law and order’ safeguarded is linked to a well-
ordered community by strict penalties for law breaking.  Based on the principal idea of 
a strong state, there should be a strong police force in terms of ‘personnel, equipment 
and competencies’ (Mudde, 2002:173) along with a judicial system that would deliver 
harsher punishments for a variety of crimes. In addition, Mudde (2000) observes, the 
immigration issue is related to crime and insecurity, within the radical right rhetoric 
where parties call for a 'zero-tolerance' policy and extreme measures, e.g. expulsion of 
foreign delinquents (Mudde, 2000 in Moufahim 2007:35). 
 
Nonetheless, Fennema and Van der Brug (2006) describe these parties as a 
mixture since, according to them, these parties have been motivated directly by fascist 
rhetoric from the 1930s, whereas others do not sympathise with the fascist element and 
on the contrary promote policies that encourage the increase of initiatives by the 
electorate. In addition, some parties talk in favour of a neo-liberalist economic 
approach, while others reject the free market particularly when it comes to 
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international levels of trading. The ideology of a party, as examined above, is not the 
only factor influencing the party’s popularity. In the following, section further reasons 
explaining why the parties of the radical right have made an efficient impression on 
the electorate are discussed. 
 
2.4.4.  Why are they popular?  
 
As already stated above, during the past thirty years radical right parties have 
emerged in several Western European countries and experienced an increase in their 
electoral share not only at a national but also at a regional and international level. 
Golder (2003) argues that the emerging electoral support for radical right parties has 
often been seen as a compelling influence on government coalitions and policy 
assessments.  
 
Anastasakis (2000) proposes a model of four approaches to ‘the rise, resilience 
and nature’ of the radical right parties: a) historical, as a legacy of the fascist era, b) 
structural, in terms of a socio-economic context c) political, as political actors, and d) 
ideologico-cultural, as xenophobic rhetoric. (2000:5-6) 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Model of defining dimensions of the contemporary European radical right 
(Anastasakis, 2000:6) 
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The fascist element can be traced back to the changes, which occurred in the 
post-war era (Anastasakis, 2000; Hainsworth, 2000; Moufahim, 2007). Additionally, 
after the economic crisis of the 1970s that created social and economic difficulties 
followed by the decreasing level of productivity, higher rates in unemployment and a 
broader gap between rich and poor (Hainsworth, 2000), the radical right parties 
successfully addressed such distress by focusing on issues related to socio-economic 
changes, unemployment and immigration of a part of the electorate, which eventually 
raised their support level. The third feature involves the dimension of a protest vote 
where the vote can be translated as a protest vote against the political system but 
nevertheless a vote that additionally has ideological roots (Betz, 1994). Mistrust of 
established political parties has created a climate of discomfort within a part of the 
electorate that has chosen ‘to turn their back on politics or to use the ballot as a means 
of protest’ (Anastasakis, 2000:14; see also Kitschelt and McGann, 1995 on 
Scandinavia). Thus voters choose to project their dissatisfaction towards the political 
established parties by voting for a party that is considered a pariah of the system 
(Coffe, 2004).  Finally, the last dimension concerns the xenophobic approaches of the 
radical right parties. According to Betz (1994), the radical right parties have exploited 
the opportunity created by the failure of established political parties to address critical 
issues, such as immigration; issues considered highly significant by a part of the 
electorate. 
 
The success of radical parties in Western democracies is not only based on a 
favourable political environment, but also on leadership, organisational structure and 
political culture. The charismatic leadership and closed organisational structure of 
radical right parties has allowed them to rapidly react towards evolving issues (e.g 
immigration), and take advantage of the ‘changing political opportunities’ (see 
Hainsworth, 2000). Additionally, Betz (1998) notices that along with charismatic 
leadership, party organisation plays an important role as a determinant of success: 
 
[T]he most successful radical right-wing populist parties are led by charismatic figures capable of 
setting the political and programmatic direction. In addition, most parties display a highly centralised 
organisational structure, with decisions being made at the top by a relatively circumscribed circle of 
party activists and transmitted to the bottom. (Betz 1998:4) 
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This role of an outsider -or a pariah- often attributed to radical right parties not 
only is due their positions targeting the established political systems but also due to the 
criticism they receive from the conventional political parties. As Fennema and van der 
Brug (2006) argue, by denouncing the established political system, the parties of the 
radical right become more appealing to the electorate who want to punish the 
mainstream parties with casting a protest vote. Additionally, for Norris (2005) the 
emergence of the radical right can be examined, based on the perception of a 
structured political marketplace the wishes of the electorate and the response of the 
political parties to them play a key role.  
 
2.4.5. Media and the radical right parties: What is missing?  
 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that a large portion of the electorate appears to be 
neutral and unresponsive to politics, the supporters of radical right parties present a 
level of loyalty and appear to be willing to continue supporting these parties by 
offering their votes to them. This attitude enriches the argument of Rensmann (2003), 
who places the idea of political consumption in perspective by stating that within the a 
few years’ time the radical right parties will have succeeded in transforming new 
voters to devoted voters. This raises questions about how such parties communicate 
with voters and the extent to which they use political marketing strategies to increase 
their support.  
 
There are several conflicting reasons for the success of radical right parties. For 
Hainsworth (2008) this success reveals a successful ‘disillusionment’ with the 
traditional established political elites, in which the radical right parties have managed 
to effectively offer a political alternative to the electorate. And the key link can be the 
emerging role of the media over the last several decades.  
 
In the past, political parties manipulated part of the media, including newspapers 
and journals. In the last few decades, the media have managed to become autonomous 
from the political parties, and within the years that followed they have increased their 
influence on the broader audience (Mudde, 2004). Furthermore, recent developments 
in technology and regulation concerning the media have contributed to the evolution 
of the means through which the information is being delivered to the audience. 
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Through media, the shared information can influence the reactions of the audience and 
form attitudes relating to a variety of issues, politics being one of them.. The political 
parties acknowledge the recognition of the power that the media possess, and therefore 
it becomes essential from their perspective to keep the media on their side.  
 
A work that links radical right parties to communication strategies is that of 
Ellinas. In The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist 
Card, Ellinas (2010) observes that the media provide the necessary circumstances 
required in order for the political parties to communicate their political message to 
broader audiences and therefore ameliorate their position in the electoral market. In 
addition, exposition to the media, as Norris (2005) highlights, provides the parties of 
the radical right with a more legitimate profile, offering them the possibility to expand 
their influence and increase their access to public funding for electoral campaigns.  
  
Although extended works on the radical right parties, their emergence, their 
ideology and their success have been published since the 1980s (see, inter alia, Ignazi, 
2003; Betz, 1998; Hainsworth, 2008; Eatwell, 1998; Norris 2005; Kitschelt and 
McGann, 1995; Mudde, 2005) it has been only within the last few years that scholars 
have undertaken to work on issues concerning political marketing and communication 
strategies of parties of the radical right family (Ellinas, 2010; Norris, 2005; Moufahim 
et al., 2009).  
 
2.5. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, an overview of the literature on political communication together 
with that on political marketing, political branding and radical right has been provided. 
Following the work of such scholars as Betz, Hainsworth and Georgiadou, the chapter 
has presented an explanation to the basic theories that have been used for the purpose 
of this project along with the identification of the characteristics of the party family 
that was selected as a case study.  
 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the aim is to expand the 
existing literature on the communication techniques, which radical right parties choose 
to use, in relation to their primary ideology, and to investigate a connection between 
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these techniques and their electoral success.  The following   chapter focuses on the 
research methods that have been used for this project and a more extensive description 
of its means and goals, including a discussion of its central hypothesis. 
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3. Research Methodology  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The study adopts a deductive research strategy, developing a hypothesis and 
testing it against empirical data. According to Braikie’s (2000) position on deductive 
research approach, varying on the purpose, the conclusion to the argument can contain 
‘a hypothesis, a prediction, or regularity of occurrence that is to be explained’ 
(2000:178).  In addition, an in depth analysis of the theoretical framework should 
precede the collection of the data. In other words, based on the Braikie (2000) 
approach, in order to fulfill a project of this nature, the data must be ‘relevant to the 
hypothesis and the concepts represented in the hypothesis’ (2000:179). 
 
The case study approach, as adapted by Yin (2003), constitues a ‘comprehensive’ 
research approach, which consists of, an ‘all-encompassing method, covering the … 
design, data collection techniques and specific approaches to data analysis’ (2003:24). 
From the selected case studies, the aim is to recommend a hypothesis on the processes 
and purposes of marketing tactics of radical right parties. The purpose is to classify 
common patterns in the communication strategy that the parties use in order to achieve 
their purposes, notably raising their percentage in national elections or increasing the 
number of voters who remain loyal. The case study will be used as both a descriptive 
and explanatory tool. 
 
[t]he distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena’ 
due to the fact that ‘the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events  (Yin, 2003:2) 
 
In a case study approach, according to Yin (2003), some questions must be posed 
concerning the actor of the action, the purpose and the way. Having said that,  the 
hypothesis refers to ‘who and what’, the purpose is the ‘why’, and the ‘how’ is the 
followed procedure. For Yin (2003) case studies appear to be the favoured approach 
when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are presented, when the ‘investigator’ has little control 
over proceedings, and when the emphasis is on a ‘contemporary phenomenon’ within 
some ‘real-life context’ (Yin, 2003:5-10). There are also empirical and narrative case 
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studies, which can also be used. These would depend on the ‘extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioural events’, as well as the degree of ‘focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical studies’ (Yin, 2003:3-10). Furthermore, 
according to Yin (2003), there are several potential sources of evidence for a case 
study e.g. documents, archives, interviews, and participant-observation (2003:83, 85-
96). 
 
Stake (2000) points out that the case study is not a ‘methodological choice’ but, 
rather, a selection of what is to be examined. The case study can combine several 
methods (qualitative, quantitative or both) (Hartley, 2004; Yin, 2003). Moreover, the 
research methods that are used in a case study are not the elements that define it; rather 
the case study is examined in terms of its ‘theoretical orientation’ and attentiveness in 
separate cases and can be used with other ‘research strategies to address related 
research questions in different phases of a research project’ (Hartley, 2004:324; Stake, 
2000:435; Kohlbacher, 2006). Hartley (2004) describes case study research as  
 
[A] heterogeneous activity covering a range of research methods and techniques, a range of coverage 
[from single case study through carefully matched pairs up to multiple cases], varied levels of analysis 
[individuals, groups, organizations, organizational fields or social policies], and differing lengths and 
levels of involvement in organizational functioning  (2004:332) 
 
 Therefore, each case study will create the base for a general model which then 
will be challenged with another case and, in turn, might propose ways of modifying 
and enlightening the model to be used (Eckstein 1975; Braikie, 2000; Moses and 
Knutsen, 2007). This is the intention of the current project. More specifically, each 
party will be the subject of an individual case, but at the same time all three parties 
under examination will be used as a multiple-case design. The data analysis is based 
largely on texts. 
 
3.2. Approaches to the analysis 
 
The style, the structure and the content of political discourse, the rhetorical 
techniques, the strategies and the motivation of the protagonists are the basic materials 
of such an analysis. In both cases (content and discourse analysis) the basis is the main 
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point of reference is the texts – regardless of how generally ‘text’ is defined e.g. texts, 
media, internet and so on. 
 
Fairclough (2003) proposes that social analysis and research should always take 
language into consideration since it is a crucial component of social life. Bearing this 
in mind, this research focuses primarily on the analysis of texts. Textual analysis need 
not only be regarded as linguistic analysis since texts can also be seen in terms of 
different discourses and styles which might encompass, for example, images and 
sound effects. Such a view of language is sometimes defined as the analysis of 
language 'beyond the sentence'. Hence, texts such as transcripts or manuscripts not 
only provide further understanding, but they can also alter the way we feel and behave, 
as well as the values we adhere to (Fairclough, 2003:5-6). Therefore, in order to 
understand the extent of the influence texts may have on an electorate, a selection of 
texts used by political parties of the radical right family are examined. 
 
Content analysis began as a technique for the interrogation of political 
communication but now is applied in almost all the social sciences. Its main advantage 
is that it does not focus only on the content as it appears, but attempts to investigate 
underlying messages or subtexts. Therefore, selected texts, such as manifestos will be 
analysed in terms of content analysis, which is used as ‘a research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication’ (Berelson, 1952:18). Accordingly, this particular form of quantitative 
analysis places the focus on the language that parties stress in their platforms, whereby 
particularly their ideas and concerns are emphasised (Budge et al, 2001; Klingemann 
et al, 2006).  
 
Weber (1990), however, proposes that content analysis enables the researcher to 
make valid and reliable deductions from text, not only about the message itself but 
also about its addressor and its potential addressees. Other definitions stress content 
analysis as ‘any research technique for making inferences by systematically and 
objectively identifying specified characteristics within text’ (Stone et al, 1966:5), or as  
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[A] research technique for making replicative and valid inferences from data to their context, which 
involves specialised procedures for processing scientific data and its purpose is to provide knowledge, 
new insights, a representation of ‘facts’ and a practical guide to action (Krippendorff, 1980:21) 
 
or even  as ‘an attempt to characterise the meanings in a given body of discourse 
in a systematic and quantitative fashion’ (Kaplan, 1943:230). 
 
According to Babbie (2001), content analysis can be described as ‘the study of 
recorded human communications’ and is ‘essentially a coding operation’ where coding 
is defined as ‘the process of transforming raw data into a standardised form’ 
(2001:304-309). Similarly, Ryan and Bernard (2000) define content analysis as one of 
the ‘major coding traditions, in which ‘coding forces the researcher to make judgments 
about the meanings of contiguous blocks’ and ‘coding is the ‘heart and soul’ of text 
analysis (2000:780). According to them, classical content analysis ‘comprises 
techniques for reducing texts to a unit-by-variable matrix and analysing that matrix 
quantitatively to test hypotheses’. However, they also emphasize that such matrix 
cannot be produced if the set of codes of interest have not been yet obtained and 
exploited (Ryan and Bernard, 2000:785, Kohlbacher, 2006). Therefore, since this 
particular form of analysis can effectively be used in order to examine and analyse any 
form of text or any other forms of recorded communication, such as transcripts of 
interviews, narratives, TV programmes, newspapers and magazines, content analysis 
has been commonly applied to various disciplines, from literature through marketing 
and politics to ethnography.   
 
Content analysis may be used for several reasons, one of which is to identify not 
only the purpose and the meaning behind the message but also the crucial features of 
the sender. Thus it enables us to detect the existence of various patterns, such as that 
characteristics of propaganda. Lasswell (1927) developed a media content analysis 
which aimed to serve as a ‘systematic method to study mass media’ and particularly 
propaganda (Macnamara, 2005:1), in which the principal question was: ‘Who says 
what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what effect?’ Additionally, content 
analysis has been also used as a technique to uncover the centre of an individual or 
group attention, as well as a tool to describe the trends in the communication content 
(Berelson, 1952; Weber, 1990).  
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As Franzosi (2004) points out in the Handbook of data analysis, content analysis 
does not refer to a unique tool of analysis but rather to a wide range of tools and 
approaches unified by that common goal of quantification, standardisation and 
systematisation (2004:549) Bryman also emphasises that content analysis is an 
approach to analyse documents and underlines the role of the ‘investigator’ in the 
composition of the message: ‘There is an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge 
out of data and on recognising the significance of understanding the meaning of the 
context’ (2004:542). This aspect of content analysis is the main reason why it was 
chosen as a research method for this thesis. 
 
The application of content analysis focuses on three areas: a) description of 
message property, b) conclusions and assumptions about the sender of the message 
and why it is sent, and c) conclusions and assumptions about the impact that the 
message has on its receivers (Tsiras, 2011).  Thus, content analysis can be viewed as a 
research technique, which concentrates on the use of particular vocabulary, ideas, 
motifs, concepts or role models by media, in an attempt to quantify their use in an 
objective and reliable method. Furthermore, since such a technique focuses 
particularly on the use of specific terms or ideas in texts, it also allows carrying out 
quantitative analysis on large numbers of texts to search for specific words of interest 
(Carley, 1993:77). Moreover, it is also important to emphasise that texts are not only 
limited to books, interviews, debates, articles or documents, but rather they concern 
any form of communicative language, including advertising or transcripts of speeches 
and conversations. Before going through any content analysis, there are six questions 
according to Krippendorff  that need to be addressed: 
 
[w]hich data are going to be analysed, how are they defined, what is the population from which they are 
being drawn, what is the context relative to which the data are going to be analysed, what are the 
boundaries of the analysis and what is the target of the inference 1980:60-63) 
 
 Krippendorff also discusses a variety of methods in order to approach and 
illustrate content analysis, whereby the aforementioned six questions can serve as 
further guidance for the researcher. 
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While discussing content analysis of text it is important to emphasise that the text 
must be coded. Such coding can be done by assigning the text to pre-established 
categories, which can be formed on the bases of specific topics, forms of expressions, 
sentence, word or motives. Once the categories are established, analysis can be 
undertaken on the basis of conceptual analysis or relational analysis. Further 
explanation of such coding technique is derived from work by Titscher et al. 2000, 
where ‘categories are understood as the more or less operational definitions of 
variables’ (Titscher et al., 2000:58). 
 
In conceptual analysis, (or thematic analysis), the analysis contains a procedure 
of counting individual frequencies of preference based on a word count. As Mctavish 
and Pirro (1990) point out, the analysis begins with the identification of the research 
questions and the selection of the data; the next step is the coding of the text into the 
selected categories along with a constructed dictionary comprising elements which aid 
in defining the categories. Therefore, the coding technique can be described as a 
process of selective reduction, whereby assigning the components of text (units of 
analysis) are assigned to specific categories. This enables the researcher to concentrate 
on particular themes derived form all used words, which are of significant relevance to 
the research question.  
 
Carley (1992) proposes a different approach to the conceptual analysis and 
recommends the use of the method of ‘eight steps’ in the process of coding texts. 
Thus, he suggests that the first step should include the decision about the level of the 
analysis  (single word of a group of words) and the character of coded concepts 
(positive or negative meanings). Additionally, the researcher should determine 
whether to code for presence of a concept. Furthermore, the researcher must also 
decide how the distinction between the concepts and their meanings will be classified. 
Hence, concepts can be coded in the same way as they are presented in the text, or 
they might be entered as in reference to their original concept despite the various 
forms they originally appear in. Lastly, a set of rules determining the coding process 
should be also constructed, as it provides the researcher with a consistent coding 
method throughout the text. However, before the actual coding begins, the researcher 
should decide whether irrelevant information should be ignored.  
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Despite the fact that conceptual analysis is an effective analytical technique, it 
also suffers from shortcomings due to its quantitative nature. In order to conduct a 
more effective analysis and explore the relationships that exist between these concepts, 
relational analysis can be used as an additional tool. While both relational analysis 
(mapping analysis) and conceptual analysis rely strongly on detecting specific 
concepts in text materials, the relational analysis extends examination further and also 
takes into account the analysis of relationships between these concepts. Therefore, it is 
crucial to indicate the kind of concepts, which will be used for the analysis 
beforehand, as too many or too few categories may not only skew the data but more 
importantly may provide unreliable results and lead to invalid conclusions.  
 
 Following Carley’s approach (1992) again, eight steps can be followed in order to 
code a text or a set of texts during relational analysis. The whole process starts with 
the identification of the research question what type or types of relationships are about 
to be examined. This leads to the actual statistical analysis of the data at the end. 
Additionally, the results of both statistical and relational analysis are used for 
interpretation, which will allow to make inferences about the addressor of the 
messages, their audience and more importantly about the messages themselves. 
Another use of content analysis is to make numerical comparisons among and within 
documents, thus such features make content analysis a highly appropriate tool for this 
research project. Nevertheless, one could argue that such analysis relies mainly on 
simple word counts.  However, Weber (1990) argued that has analytical technique is 
reliable, but it is also valid, because creating categories and coding data with regard to 
their meaning enables determining significant implications.  
 
Content analysis is therefore a tool that allows the researcher to determine the 
central aspect of social interaction since it focuses particularly on communication via 
texts or transcripts. It is also a research approach that can combine both quantitative 
and qualitative methods.  Cassell and Symon (1994), on trying to describe qualitative 
analysis, argue that it is characterised by: 
 
[A] focus on interpretation rather than quantification; an emphasis on subjectivity rather than 
objectivity; flexibility in the process of conducting research; an orientation towards process rather than 
outcome; a concern with context regarding behaviour and situation as inextricably linked in forming 
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experience; and finally, an explicit recognition of the impact of the research process on the research 
situation (1994:7) 
 
 This explanation by Cassell and Symon provides an extended description of the main 
argument of qualitative analysis and at the same time distinguishes it from quantitative 
analysis by underlining their different perspectives. Following this definition, Neuman 
(1997) simplifies the differences between the two techniques by pointing out that the 
qualitative approach requires a selection of data in the form of words, whereas in the 
quantitative approach the data take the form of numbers.  
 
Going back to content analysis, the approach involves a linguistic issue, which 
words and in general ‘text’ are seen as the main point of enquiry analysis. In order to 
use content analysis in a research project, its goals should be summarised by reducing 
large amounts of unstructured content, describing the characteristics of the content and 
identifying aspects of the content in order to support the main argument. In this way, 
trends and relationships in the text, or set of texts, could become more insightful the 
intentions and the focus of communication trends could be stressed and additional 
descriptions of behavioural responses to communications and emotional states of 
groups and persons could be determined. An important element in content analysis is 
shaping the categories, in order to analyse the material and come to conclusions. As 
Berelson (1952) suggests, content analysis becomes accepted or rejected by the 
categories on which it is based. More specifically, the research is productive when 
these categories are clearly shaped and tailored to individual problems and content. 
Krippendorff (1980) summarizes the nature of the content analytic method as a highly 
systematic set of rules that govern the theoretical background and incremental 
processes in which the text may be broken down into smaller units of analysis. This 
aspect explains the gradual study of the data through the use of categories as part of 
the content analysis.   
 
Nevertheless, it is important that the primary concern of the research should not 
stray from the content and context of communication (Gerbner et al. 1969). This 
includes who transmits the message, what the issue is and what the cultural and 
sociological data defining the message are, what the literary-linguistic components are, 
who the receiver is, and who the target is (Tsiras, 2011). Moreover, it is also important 
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to emphasize that the fundamental principle in content analysis is that whilst many 
words are extracted from the text, the actual number of content categories will be 
much lower. Additionally, Weber (1990) holds that the process of word classification 
is crucial for analysis, whereby it is important that words in the same category have 
precisely analogous meaning. On the other hand, from the perspective of qualitative 
research it is quite common to view content analysis as simple record of word-
frequency. Such a belief is based on the notion that the greater word frequency in the 
text is indicative of its measure of importance (Krippendorff, 1980).  
 
In his sequential model of qualitative content analysis Mayring (2003) offers 
three different analytical techniques, which can be applied either separately or 
together, depending on the research question (Titsher et al. 2000:62-64, Kohlbacher, 
2006). These are a) summary, b) explication and c) structuring. The first part aims to 
minimise and organise the material so that it becomes manageable and effective. The 
second stage involves the procedure of clarification and examination of the material, 
and finally the structuring refers to the analysis stages used in a content analysis 
project. 
 
A modified approach to Mayring’s is that of Glaser and Laudel: 
  
 
Figure 3.1: Model of basic process of qualitative content analysis (after Glaser and 
Laudel, 1999:4) 
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Moreover, one must bear in mind that some words may not only have multiple 
meanings but also that they might be replaced by synonyms. Thus, Weber (1990) 
emphasises that such incidents may influence the extent to which a variable is indeed 
significant. Hence, while analysing word frequencies the researcher must be aware of 
the aforementioned limitations, since there are no well-developed weighting 
procedures to date. 
 
Krippendorff (1980), however, suggests that once the inferences about the data 
are made, several steps must be taken in order to ensure their better understanding. 
Such steps involve presenting summarised data, testing relational hypotheses and 
comparison of data obtained from content analysis and other methods, whereby the 
latter step enables to obtain missing material and increases the validity of the 
techniques used. These are the three major steps that the current project will follow in 
order to analyse the data in the best way obtain the expected outcomes, ultimately 
examining and explaining the communication strategies of the parties.  
 
However, content analysis approach has been criticised by many. Billig’s 
suggestion is the type of approach content analysis offers that refers to counting words 
but not actually being able to interpret them; a criticism based on the argument that 
words can only be annotated in the specific context in which they appear (Wilson, 
1993). This, however, may be more applicable to a study based on discourse analysis 
rather than content analysis itself. 
 
Schiffrin uses the term ‘text’ to differentiate between linguistic material from the 
environment in which ‘sayings’ occur and context.  
 
[I]n terms of utterances, then, ‘text’ is the linguistic content:  the stable semantic meanings of words, 
expressions, and sentences, but not the inferences available to hearers depending upon the contexts in 
which words, expressions, and sentences are used. […] Context is thus a world filled with people 
producing utterances: people who have social, cultural, and personal identities, knowledge, beliefs, 
goals and needs; those who interact with one another in various socially and culturally defined 
situations (Schiffrin, 1994:363) 
 
 Therefore, while administering discourse analysis researchers should equally 
emphasise use of language in social, political and cultural contexts as well as that of 
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the linguistics. Consequently, one must bear in mind that apart from the language 
itself, also other factors, such as the media, might be involved.  
 
As mentioned previously, ‘text’ is an interaction between the writer and reader 
and such interaction can be referred to as discourse. The purpose of this research 
project is to determine the nature and the characteristics of this relation. Based on the 
primary data of this project, the next step is to identify the elements that would help in 
the identification of a pattern of communication techniques used by radical right 
parties to connect with the electorate and present their ideas in public. However, one 
must also bear in mind that messages embedded in the text do not have a single 
meaning, thus their content can be both viewed and interpreted from various 
perspectives, particularly when the nature of data is ambiguous and symbolic 
(Krippendorff, 1980). 
 
Using content analysis, this project aims to isolate the messages that parties of 
the radical right use to communicate with the electorate and to detect the purpose of 
electoral campaign documents, speeches and official manifestos. The ‘product’ offered 
by the party is key to the analysis. This will be undertaken on the basis of the 
importance given by the party to policy issues,  the brands that can be discovered from 
the primary data used in the research and through the discourse of symbols.  As Joppe 
(2000) emphasises   
 
[t]he extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total 
population under study is referred to as reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a 
similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to be reliable (in Golafshani, 2003:598) 
 
Finally, in content analysis, a framing analysis is adopted in order to examine 
specifically the posters and images of the parties. Framing analysis is a process 
through which we may observe and analyse the way in which the sender of a message 
uses an image framework, which is usually emotional in order to lead the receiver to 
specific conclusions. The idea of framing analysis can be found in Entman’s work 
where he extensively emphasises that to: ‘frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
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and/or treatment recommendation, (1993:52). Such frame analysis is a political 
communications tool used across a broad set of actions.  McCombs, Shaw and Weaver 
use the term 'second level agenda setting' to describe the inferences that have the 
public perception of the process in which the media highlight some specific elements 
of an event (in Tsiras, 2011:267). As Tsiras (2011) underlines, the political 
communication research in the early 1980s began to engage in the formulation of 
questions and answers, which affect the respondent’s perception of risk. 
 
The issues of reliability and validity are important when conducting content 
analysis. For Titcher (2000), there are two major issues of content analysis that are 
discussed in this context  - problems of inference and problems of reliability. The 
problem of inference reflects the potential of making assumptions/implications on a 
text based on a small sample, which might mislead the results and not produce 
effective conclusions on the analysis. The second part involves the problem of 
reliability, which relates to the way the coding has been classified. ‘The so-called 
inter-coder reliability shows to what extent different coders agree in the coding of the 
same text, and intra-coder reliability explains how stable the coding of one coder is’ 
(Titcher, 2000:66,). 
 
The reliability of a content analytic approach relies on several elements, e.g. 
stability, reproducibility and accuracy (see Stemler, 2001). Kirk and Miller (1986) 
classify three types of the  ‘reliability issue referred to in quantitative research, which 
relate to the degree in which a measurement, given repeatedly, remains the same, the 
stability of a measurement over time and the similarity of measurements within a 
given time period’ (in Golafshani, 2003:598). For Weber (1990) attention should be 
given to reaching conclusions based on the text itself. Additionally, the analysis 
procedure should be accurate and reliable in terms of being consistent with regard to 
its coding (different people should be able to code the same text in the same way) (see 
Stemler, 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, one must also bear in mind that the extent to which the 
researcher’s conclusions can be generalised is highly susceptible to the manner in 
which categories are established. Additionally, the generalisability also depends on the 
reliability of the categories used in the research. Therefore, it is crucial to develop the 
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categories in such a manner that they precisely measure the concepts the researcher 
actually intends to measure. Constructing rules that permit the initial researcher, as 
well as others, to categorise and encrypt the same data in a similar way over a period 
of time, as seen above, is a measure of stability. Stability can also be acknowledged 
when the same sample of content is being coded repeatedly by the same coder (see 
Weber, 1990).  
 
Reproducibility, relates to creating a set of categories that helps the analysis 
become firmer. Having said that, reproducibility indicates the degree in which content 
categorisation leads to the same or similar conclusions after the text is being processed 
by several coders (see Weber, 1990). Finally, accuracy discusses the issue of which 
level the classification of text resembles to a pattern or a type of model, and it is the 
clearest expression of reliability. Krippendorff (1980) argues that ‘it has sometimes 
been used to test the performance of human coders where a standard coding for some 
text has already been established’ (1980:131).  
 
Validity on the other hand, defines the degree of effectiveness of the study by 
measuring the original intention and how or in what level the outcome of the results is 
ingenuous. According to Krippendorff (1977), validity ‘designates a quality that 
compels one to accept scientific results as evidence. Its closest scientific relative is 
objective truth […] this definition is too broad to be useful and finer differentiations 
are called for’ (Andren, 1981:51). The making of final decisions by the researcher, in 
terms of what concepts to measure and how to measure them creates the issue of 
validity or, in other words, ‘[a]re we really measuring what we want to measure?’ 
(Neuendorf, 2002). 
 
Joppe (2000) underlines that ‘validity establishes whether the results obtained 
meet all of the requirements of the scientific method. While reliability is concerned 
with the accuracy of the actual measuring instrument or procedure, validity is 
concerned with the study's success at measuring what the researchers set out to 
measure’ (2000:1). Moreover, Shapiro & Markoff (1997) emphasise that content 
analysis is only valid and significant to the degree that the outcomes are associated to 
other procedures, e.g. triangulation (see Stemler, 2001), while Wainer and Braun 
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(1998) define validity as ‘construct validity [that] determines which data are to be 
gathered and how they are to be gathered’ (in Golafshani, 2003:599).  
 
There are numerous forms of validity that contribute to the overall validity of a 
project. The two main features are internal and external validity. Internal validity relies 
on the level of accuracy of the results of a research, and external validity reflects in the 
degree in which research outcomes can be tested outside the selected model of a 
specific research project. In all, validity mirrors the range in which the data of a 
specific research is credible and dependable. For this reason, extra care should be 
taken when it comes to testing the level of validity or similarly the degree of the 
reliability, as both are equally important to proving the effectiveness of a research 
project (see Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Anastasi (1988) comments on face validity by 
proposing that  
 
[c]ontent validity should not be confused with face validity. The latter is not validity in the technical 
sense. It refers not to what the test actually measures, but to what it appears superficially to measure. 
Face validity pertains to whether the test ‘looks valid’ to the examinees who take it , the administrative 
personnel who decide on its use, and other technically untrained observers (1988:144) 
 
Triangulation is an approach to developing and evaluating the validity and 
reliability of research and/or its outcomes.  It is used  ‘in order to control bias and 
establish valid propositions because traditional scientific techniques are incompatible 
with this alternate epistemology’ (Mathison, 1988:13). Patton (2001) states that 
triangulation can strengthen a study and may combine different kinds of methods or 
data by merging both quantitative and qualitative approaches (Golafshani, 2003:603). 
However, Kohlbacher (2006) argues that triangulation can be approached from two 
different perspectives, when using qualitative content analysis carries out the 
examination. Thus, triangulation can appear either as ‘integrating different material 
and evidence often also collected by using various methods’ or ‘applying a method of 
analysis (qualitative content analysis) that has not been particularly developed for this 
purpose to a different research design’ (Kohlbacher, 2006)4. 
 
 
                                                        
4  http://www.qualitative research.net/index.php/fqs/article/%20view/75/153January%202006, last 
accessed January 2014 
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3.3.  Categorising the data – Specifics       
 
Before starting to categorise the data, as in any research project, understanding 
the question posed at the beginning of the research exercise is the first step. The 
hypothesis of this thesis is the compass throughout the project and the usage of the 
data is the means to substantiate the hypothesis and lead the analysis to a conclusion.  
In this specific case, the target is to identify political marketing and branding 
techniques by using manifestos and other official party documents as data. The case 
study combines three different parties, which are all being examined comparatively 
within the timeframe of a decade 2000-2010.  
 
One of the major difficulties in this project has been the difference in languages. 
In general, while choosing texts for comparison within the context of a content 
analysis, the researcher should keep in mind that each language has specific idioms 
and expressions and styles that could be used in order to describe policies and ideas. 
Another thing that influences the text is the party itself, and the form of the language it 
chooses to use. Finally, all these should be combined in a table of categories under the 
same language, translated accurately in order to be valid as data and as method.  
 
At this point it is necessary to clarify the differences between language between 
language used in everyday life and the language used by political parties. Since the 
study examines three different cases, with different contextual backgrounds, great 
attention has been paid to creating a category basis that would be applicable to all. One 
of the primary purposes behind the construction of the categories was to test the 
degree in which the cases under examination manifest characteristics of radical right 
ideology  (see Chapter 2). In order to identify the elements of political marketing and 
branding, the coding exercise was firstly focused on creating categories based on the 
official policies expressed by the radical right parties. Ideology is one of the factors for 
placing a party in a specific political family. Finding evidence of the ideology within 
the documents is one of the expected outcomes of the research. Within the qualitative 
framework favoured in this research it is essential to develop the ‘aspects of 
interpretation’ namely the categories, which need to be as close as possible to the 
material and to ‘formulate’ them in terms of the material (Kohlbacher, 2006). Having 
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said that, Mayring’s research (2000) suggests that the process of data classification can 
be explained in terms of following the process set out in Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2: Process of deductive category development (after: Mayring, 2000) 
 
Mayring’s proposal aims to create an applicable model for text analysis using a 
category system. For Bryman (2004) qualitative content analysis is based on 
‘searching out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed’ (2004:392). More 
specifically, Bryman provides a broad description of qualitative content analysis as:  
 
[a]n approach to documents that emphasises the role of the investigator in the construction of the 
meaning of and in texts. There is an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data and on 
recognising the significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being 
analysed (2004:542) 
 
The results that this project will present attempt to show that ideology is used as 
a form of brand, and that similar patterns of political communication and marketing 
technique are followed by all three cases in order to project themselves to the 
electorate. (This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7).  
 
The categories constructed for this research are based on general themes and 
reflect a broad spectrum of specific policy issues that the radical right parties include in 
its programme, e.g. nationalism, immigration, welfare chauvinism. Coding uses not 
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only single words but also set of words (word strings) of a combination of words and 
phrases (see Technical Appendix 1). Additionally, in some cases the coding includes 
positive or negative meanings. The frequency of words, phrases and so on, is also 
examined.  
 
At this point, the analysis focuses on communication and statements of 
preference, that is, the particular topics noted by the political parties. By examining the 
official documents of the parties the other issues mentioned are divided into these 
major categories: politics and democracy, society and values, religion, economy, 
education, health, culture, environment, immigration, nation and national identity, law 
and security development, Europe and the EU, and general international relations. 
Each party’s text is examined separately. The full set of categories is summarised in 
Table 3.1 
 
  
Politics and Democracy Environment 
Society and Values Immigration 
Religion Nation and National Identity 
Economy Law and Security 
Education Europe and EU 
Health General IR  
Culture Development 
Table 3.1: Categories applied to texts to identify key concerns of radical right parties 
 
The purpose here is to create a basis on which further comparative analysis can 
be made between the parties under examination. Having the Manifesto Project as a 
guide, changes in policy positions or changes in emphases over time within the parties 
will be compared (see also Budge et al., 1998). This will facilitate an examination of 
the similarities and differences in policy positions of the individual parties during the 
chosen time frame, comparison among the three parties under scrutiny. The basic data 
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supporting such comparisons are the proportions of election programmes devoted to 
each category in a set of standardised issue areas. The coding is created, based on what 
the unit of the analysis seeks to examine. The categories allow for the gathering and 
creation of the best average illustration of the topics and issues in the selected data. 
The units of analysis reflect the way the material appears in the texts within their 
respective context, which is an indispensable parte of the interpretation, and analysis 
that follows. This categorisation has been developed in order to cover the entire 
content of election programmes and speeches by identifying the statements of 
preference expressed in them. 
 
3.4. Using CATA  
 
[n]o single software package can be made to perform qualitative data analysis in and of itself. The 
appropriate use of software depends on appreciation of the kind of data being analysed and of the 
analytic purchase the researcher wants to obtain on those data (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996:166).  
 
As Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) underline in their research on measuring 
radicalism, by using computer-assisted content analysis researchers measuring 
radicalism rely on a dictionary approach whereby a ‘computer counts the proportion of 
words that they consider to be indicators’ of radicalism (2011:1275). The selection of 
words for the dictionary was made on the basis of both empirical and theoretical 
reasoning by selecting lists of words normally used by such parties over a period of 
time. The purpose of the dictionary is to simplify the search for analysis units and 
contain as much information as possible in order to measure the content while 
calculating the joint frequencies. An English version is provided in the technical 
appendix at the end of this chapter. Finally, since this research encompasses a 
comparison between three different cases, from different countries, with different 
languages, in order for the dictionary to be as accurate as possible, there was no 
translation of the texts used as data.  Each one of them was examined in its original 
language and format in order to keep the context as specific as possible.  
 
Apart from Rooduijn and Pauwels’ work (2011) which uses computer based 
content analysis of election manifestos, using other research has been carried out over 
the past decade or so. A discourse analysis is used by Moufahim (2007) to analyse the 
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Vlaams Blok, where the focus was on the marketing of an extreme right party. 
Additionally, there is a selection of works by Bara (2001, 2006, 2011, 2013) 
computerised analysis, several of which have used HAMLET II– at least for part of the 
analysis. There are numerous computer programmes that offer the opportunity for a 
content analysis e.g. Concordance, Diction, DIMAP, INTEXT, TEXTPACK, 
WordStat and so on, but HAMLET II was chosen deliberately for this specific project 
for, a second reason.  
 
The HAMLET II software was developed by Alan Brier of Southampton 
University and Bruno Hopp, of the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research in 
Cologne. Its main purpose is to search a text file for words in a given vocabulary list, 
and to count joint frequencies within any specified context unit, representing a given 
span of words. In other words, it counts both individual and joint word frequencies in 
which the resulting similarities matrix can be analysed using different methods (e.g. 
cluster analysis, multi-dimensional scaling, Jaccard co-efficiency. The main analytical 
procedure is used to search for ‘inter-connections between a number of key words that 
occur in a text and explore word and category associations’ (HAMLET II software 
manual 2013:4). The programme offers the opportunity to compare lists of words 
common across several texts. It is also useful in generating lists, including synonyms, 
for comparing a number of texts, and thus providing a means of viewing, editing and 
annotating the various files, including graphics.  
 
To sum up, HAMLET II offers a variety of possible tools, individual word 
frequencies (fi), joint frequencies analysis (fij) for pairs of words (i,j), both expressed 
in terms of the chosen unit of context, while the corresponding standardised joint 
frequencies sij = (fij) / (fi + fj - fij) are displayed in a similarities matrix, which can be 
submitted to a simple cluster analysis and multi-dimensional scaling, if required. 
 
For Tashakkori and Teddie (2010) the use of computer software helps the scholar 
to ‘subdivide’ the textual material in individual ‘hermeneutic’ units; in these unit 
words, phrases or expressions are being identified (2010:383). The units of analysis for 
this project contain words and phrases identified in the text, the established categories. 
The texts are not divided into smaller divisions but are examined as a whole.  
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As Bara, Weale and Bicquelet (2007) underline in their work focusing on the 
analysis of a parliamentary debate on abortion, a ‘semi-automated’ CATA, like the one 
HAMLET II offers, is an efficient approach to examining and measuring assumptions 
on, among others, policies and political behaviours (2007:580). The ‘semi-automated’ 
characterisation refers to the HAMLET II requirement of preparation of a general 
vocabulary (see Technical Appendix) of key words and terminology according to 
which the analysis will be conducted.   
 
HAMLET II allows the researcher to explore text, which in this specific case 
comprise texts manifestos and presidential speeches, on the basis of the established 
vocabulary.  The procedure of the construction of the vocabulary entails several stages. 
The first step is a comprehensive empirical qualitative analysis of the manifestos and 
presidential speeches. The context of the data is the key point for the next steps of the 
analysis: the categories and the vocabulary. Following the flow of the text, the next 
step is to highlight the focus of the party in order to create the categories. A need for a 
common pattern between all the three cases of this thesis has been deemed   crucial in 
terms of adding validity to the results of the forthcoming analysis. After the finalisation 
of the categories, established on the basis of party policies offered (see Chapter 7), the 
construction of the vocabulary is the final step before the analysis. Since the 
documents are examined in their original language, the specific features of each 
language and their implications had to be considered in order to build a common 
applicable pattern. This is similar to the procedure of establishing the categories. The 
vocabulary is meant to be designed in a way that facilitates the examination and 
identification of the areas covered by the categories.  
 
Keeping that in mind, three different vocabularies are created in the original 
language of the documents derived from the three respective countries involved in the 
case studies of this thesis. The idea is to keep the same vocabulary structure, adding 
specific words or phrases that are applicable to each individual case based on the 
language element, e.g. the word for ‘parliament’, which is different in all three cases. 
Additionally, during the procedure of building the vocabulary the definition of 
meanings had to be examined in those cases, where the outcome could be misleading. 
One of the advantages of the software, and a main reason for which HAMLET II has 
been chosen for this project is its capacity to examine the documents in their original 
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language without the necessity of translation, since that would impose limitations on 
the cnceptualisation of the data.  
 
Having established the categories and the vocabulary, the next step is the 
analysis itself. The presentation of the data, in terms of measuring their salience in the 
documents (see Chapter 7), is in percentage form. It should be underlined that in the 
texts, a large amount of words included appear to be largely meaningless, something 
that explains low levels of percentage in the final results (see also Bara, Weale and 
Bicquelet 2007). Again, what is important at this point is to try and focus on the useful 
information, which is clarified through the categories within the vocabulary. This can 
also be explained based on the rhetoric characteristic of the manifestos and presidential 
speeches themselves. After all, the purpose of the current project is to identify the 
original message of the parties under examination, in order to build and argument 
about their communication strategies, while discarding any unnecessary information. 
The specific presentation of the data has been selected because it gives a general idea 
about the extent of the specific categories in the selected documents while at the same 
time, it offers an efficient comparison between the chosen cases. 
 
Along with HAMLET II, another software programme Nvivo, has been used. 
According to Bazeley (2007), Nvivo follows five principle according to which an 
analysis can be conducted: a) managing the data by organising them, b) managing 
ideas in order to comprehend the ‘conceptual and theoretical issues’ encountered 
during the research project c) query data by ‘posing several questions of the data’, and 
operating the software to answer these queries d) modelling visually by producing 
diagrams and e) reporting by exploiting the data gathered (2007:2-3). As Bazeley 
(2007) underlines, using a computer essentially guarantees that the user operates in a 
more methodical, thorough, and assiduous way. NVivo is a Qualitative Data Analysis 
(QDA) computer software package, offering a reduction of manual tasks. Adopting a 
facilitated approach analysis of qualitative data has enhanced reliability. 
 
Finally R language is used for purposes of presenting data and analysis. R 
language provides a wide diversity of statistical elements e.g. statistical tests, 
classification, clustering and graphical methods (see www.r-project.org, 2013). In this 
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thesis, R is used to help in creating graphical representation of the results of the content 
analysis (see Chapter 7). 
 
3.5.  Why take a comparative approach? 
 
Comparisons between different countries, institutions or agents enable us to 
analyse similarities and differences, and thereby make claims or test hypotheses. This 
facilitates greater understanding of the individual cases in different contexts. For 
Lijphart (1975) comparative analysis is the  
 
[m]ethod of testing hypothesised empirical relationships among variables on the basis of the 
same logic that guides the statistical method, but in which the cases are selected in such a way as to 
maximise the variance of the independent variables and to minimise the variance of the control 
variables (quoted in Moses and Knutsen 2007:95) 
 
There are different ways in which comparative analysis can be applied to the 
examination of case studies. Through a comparative perspective the same methods of 
analysis and the same concepts can be applied to different country-based cases. A 
major issue for comparative analysis is that in every case that is used in the 
comparison, the same framework should be followed as closely as possible. This can 
be achieved by using appropriate indicators, measurements and interpretations. In 
comparative research several disciplines can be combined, since there is no 
methodology ‘peculiar’ to comparative research (Heidenheimer, 1983). Content 
analysis, thus, represents a useful comparative tool in this regard. 
 
The three parties chosen as the cases in this research are drawn from the party 
systems of Greece, Switzerland and Italy. The similarities in the parties’ emergence 
during the period of 2000-2010, and the common elements that place them in the 
radical right family, are the main criteria that have contributed to this choice. The 
parties that have been selected as cases for study are the Greek Laikós Orthódoxos 
Synagermós (LA.O.S.), Switzerland’s Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) and the 
Italian Alleanza Nazionale (AN). Although SVP and AN have a longer history than 
LA.O.S.. the research focuses just on the first decade of the twenty-first century, a 
common period when all three parties experienced growing levels of political support. 
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Specific policies, as outlined in Chapter 2 have been selected as a major focus in terms 
of identifying the ‘radical rightness’ of the parties. 
 
The nature of policies is very similar in the manifestos of all three parties. They 
all make xenophobic appeals, calling for the expulsion of illegal immigrants and 
demanding stricter measures to reduce immigration. For them, immigration is a threat 
to several major aspects of national life, such as national security, unemployment and 
crime. At the same time, all three are self-characterised as nationalist, with nationalism 
itself being an issue well used during their national campaigns. Furthermore, 
anticommunism and anti-Semitism are part of the parties’ ideology. One other 
important factor that represents a link between these cases is charismatic leadership 
and its role in the organisation of the party itself. All three party leaders, Karatzaferis, 
Blocher and Fini ,are strong personalities who guide the parties in their every move 
and have created a functional organisational system around them. At the same time, all 
three parties have great access to the media where they can propose their ideas to the 
voters and attract their attention.  
 
Despite the similarities between the parties, there are also certain major structural 
and cultural differences, e.g. difference in political systems, which is a particular 
aspect in the Swiss case.   Furthermore, in the Swiss and Italian cases, the chosen 
parties have participated in government coalitions, a factor that is not relevant to the 
Greek case in the chosen time frame (LA.O.S. participated in a coalition government 
formed in 2011). Another important issue is the link between fascism and post-fascism 
in the Italian and the Greek case, while this is not relevant in the Swiss case. Finally, 
both the Italian and Greek parties are close to the Church, something that distinguishes 
them from SVP.   
 
As mentioned above, the period of 2000-2010 saw all three parties appearing to 
experience electoral success at a national level and represent themselves in the ir 
countries’ parliaments. Additionally, despite the fact that the Swiss and Italian parties 
have been more active in their countries’ political scene in the years before the selected 
period, Blocher’s contribution after 1999 (Chapter 5) in the case of SVP, and the 
turning point of 1995 (Chapter 6) in the case of AN, suggest that, 2000 can be 
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legitimately considered a significant point of reference that marks the beginning of a 
time frame for the comparative examination of all three parties.  
 
 Moreover, as seen above (Chapter 2), it is often the case that the parties 
examined under the label of the Radical Right family have numerous differences 
between them, which creates difficulty when making a comparative analysis between 
them.  Nevertheless, as underlined in the previous chapter (Chapter 2), all three parties 
are considered members of the Radical Right family, validating the comparative aspect 
of this project. Finally, the current project recognises and acknowledges the differences 
of the parties, which are presented in extended detail in the following chapters (4, 5 
and 6). 
 
In comparative research the cases may be similar in some regard, but may differ 
in some other. This is exactly what the evidence shows in this project, and these 
differences are treated as an additional point for examination. The goal is to discover 
where the cases are different, but also where these cases find a common ground. 
Having said that, emphasis is placed on the aspects, properties and attributes that 
characterise the case studies. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
It is important to understand that this research does not plan to ignore the 
differences between the parties but to engage them in the general analysis which, 
despite those differences, demonstrates that LA.O.S., SVP and AN are valuable cases 
for this research project, because of their placement within their national political 
arenas and their development as successful representatives of the radical right family. 
Furthermore, it is very important to understand how the parties function within the 
political scene, and to become familiar with their identity. The following Chapters (4, 5 
and 6) present an in depth qualitative analysis of texts produced by each party.  
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3.7. Technical Appendix  
 
Politics and Democracy 
administration 
administrator 
Advisory 
affairs of state 
anti-fascism 
backroom 
bipartisanship 
bureaucracy 
cabinet 
campaigning 
citizen 
citizenry 
civics 
confederation 
congressional 
constitution 
constitutions 
control 
cybernetics 
democracy 
democratically 
deputy 
devolution 
domestic affairs 
elect 
elected 
election 
electioneering 
fascism 
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federal 
foreign affairs 
governance 
government 
government policy 
hegemony of the parties 
hustle 
internal affairs 
legislature 
Legislature 
matters of state 
Ministerial 
Ministry 
Municipal 
municipalities 
Nepotism 
Neutrality 
Parliamentary 
Parties 
Party 
Policies 
Policy 
political changeover 
political practice 
political science 
Politics 
Polity 
Polity 
Power 
Predominance 
premier 
presidency 
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presidentialism 
presidents 
referendum 
regency 
regime 
regimental 
regimental 
regimentation 
representativeness 
royalties 
sovereignty 
State 
statecraft 
statecraft 
stateship 
subsidiarity  
the feds 
the Right 
undemocratic 
vote 
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Society and Values  
babies 
baby 
carrier 
child 
Childhood 
children 
class 
communities 
community 
companionship 
dignity 
elderly 
equality 
families 
family 
fellowship 
free 
freedom 
groups 
harmonisation 
high society 
independence  
independent 
inequality 
liberty 
men 
mother 
mothers 
older 
operators 
popular sovereignty 
population 
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sector 
Seniors 
sex 
single people 
social  
social class 
social club 
social culture 
social group 
social organisation 
social organisation 
social system 
socials 
society 
socio-economic class 
stratum 
welfare  
wellbeing 
women 
young 
 
 
Religion 
believers 
catechism 
Catholicism 
cemeteries 
chaplain 
Christ 
Christian 
Christian values 
christianity 
Church 
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faith 
fundamental 
God 
intellectual 
Lord 
multi-religious 
Orthodox 
orthodoxy 
prayer 
priest 
religion 
religions 
religiosity 
religious 
religious belief 
ritual 
spiritual 
 
Economy 
account 
austerity 
balance sheet 
bank 
bedt 
benefit 
budget 
costs 
credit 
crisis 
curator 
currencies 
currency 
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debt 
deposit 
earning 
earnings 
economic 
economic crisis 
economy 
economy 
euro 
euro 
excesses 
expenditure 
expense 
expenses 
fee 
financial 
franc 
GDP 
gold 
income 
inflation 
interest rate 
its tax 
loan 
market 
money 
multinational 
national tax 
partnership 
pension 
poverty 
poverty 
price 
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privacy 
profit 
property 
proprietorships 
prosperity 
rates 
reduction 
rentier 
retired 
retirement 
revenue 
salary 
savings 
stock 
stock exchange 
tax 
tax cuts 
Tax Department 
tax evasion 
tax evasions 
tax office 
tax sovereignty 
taxation 
taxman 
taxman 
taxpayer 
trade 
trade union 
trade unionists  
value 
VAT 
wages 
wealth 
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wealth 
work/employment 
 
Education  
coaching 
college 
culture 
educate 
education  
education  
educational 
educational 
educationals 
elementary school 
students 
elementary school 
teacher 
high-school 
learning 
pedagogical 
pedagogy 
private school 
public school 
qualification 
scholarship 
scholarship 
school 
schooling 
science 
student/students 
study 
teacher 
teachers 
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teaching 
training 
tuition 
tutor 
tutoring 
university 
 
Health 
diagnostic 
disease 
doctor 
drugs 
ehphoria 
health 
health insurance 
healthcare 
healthfulness 
healthiness 
hospital doctors 
hospital network 
hospitalised 
illness 
injured 
insurance  
medicine 
mental 
nurses 
parmaceutical 
patient 
pharmaceutical 
industry 
pharmacy 
physical 
 79 
sickness 
well-being 
 
Culture 
archives 
conservation 
cultural 
cultural assets 
culture 
heritage 
historical 
history 
journalism 
journalist 
library/libraries 
literary heritage 
media 
museum 
newspaper 
radio-TV broadcasting 
system 
reporter 
television 
 
Environment  
biomass 
electricity 
emissions 
energy 
enviromentalist 
environment 
environmental politics 
gothermal 
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hydroelectirc 
hydrogeological 
natural 
nuclear 
park 
pollution 
rubbish 
solar 
sustainable 
development 
water 
 
Nation and National Identity 
autonomy 
bortherhood 
devolution 
nation  
national 
national unity 
nationalism 
nationality  
patriot 
patriotic 
 
Immigration  
adoptive citizen 
alien 
alien absconders 
alien residents 
amnesty  
asylum applicants 
asylum seekers 
border crossers 
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border jumpers 
borders 
day-laborers 
deportation 
deportations 
documented alien 
entrants 
foreign nationals 
foreign students 
foreign-born 
foreign-born inmate 
foreign-born newcomers 
foreign-born workers 
foreigner 
guest workers 
identification papers 
illegal 
illegal border-crossers 
illegal entrants 
illegal immigragion  
illegal immigrants 
illegal newcomers 
illegal residents 
illegal workers 
immigrant 
immigration 
incomer 
lower-wage illegal 
workers 
migrant 
migrant workers 
minaret 
naturalised citizen 
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newcomer 
out-of-status migrant 
outsider 
paperless immigrant 
pioneer 
refugee 
seeker 
settler/colonist 
UDA (Undocumented 
Alien) 
unauthorized workers 
uncontrolled 
immigration 
under-banked 
under-served population 
undocumented 
undocumented citizens 
undocumented 
foreigners 
undocumented 
immigrants 
undocumented janitors 
undocumented persons 
undocumented workers 
visa overstayers 
 
Law and Security 
abolition 
abuse 
abusement 
armed 
armies 
army 
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authority 
court 
crime 
criminal 
criminals 
defence strategy 
defense 
defense policy 
discrimination 
guilty 
lawbreaker 
lawbreakers 
military 
offence 
penal 
penalty 
perpetrator 
police 
pornographic 
protstitution 
rural police 
safety 
security 
security forces 
security union 
sex crimes 
squadron 
terrorism 
violence 
war 
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Development 
agriculture 
building areas 
business  
company 
corporation 
development 
enterprise 
farm 
farmers 
fishing 
industry 
livestock 
navigation 
peddlers 
ports 
production 
sailor 
shipbuilding 
shipping 
smuggling 
tourism 
traffic 
transport 
unemployment 
union 
work 
 
Europe and EU 
EU 
Europe  
European Union 
Europeanism 
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Maastricht 
agreement 
 
General IR  
Africa 
centralisation 
diplomat 
Far East 
foreign policy 
globalisation 
internationalisation 
Latin America 
Mediterranean area 
Middle East 
NATO 
NATO 
Russia 
Schengen 
UN 
  USA   
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4. The Case of Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (LA.O.S.) 
 
4.1.  Introduction  
 
The first case is that of Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (LA.O.S.), a radical right 
party formed in 2000 by a journalist and former member of the conservative party of 
Greece, Nea Democratia (ND)5. LA.O.S. is a political party that has been identified as 
a radical right party, as it complies with Taggart’s thesis about radical right parties 
adopting anti-establishment rhetoric and claiming that they expresses ‘mainstream’ 
voters’ views. Despite this it has a closed structure, is characterised by a strong 
leadership and attracts younger voters who have become disillusioned with a wide 
spectrum of political ideologies (see Ignazi, 2003). The rhetoric of LA.O.S. includes 
elements of national populism and, after 2005, strong anti-immigration strategies. It is 
often compared to the French Front National or the Alleanza Nazionale in Italy (see 
Tsiras, 2011; Georgiadou, 2008; Ellinas, 2010), so LA.O.S can be regarded as the 
Greek representative of the third wave of the radical right.  
 
4.2. Background – Foundation and Electoral success  
 
According to his personal website Karatzaferis, the founder and current leader of 
LA.O.S., essentially began his involvement with politics in 1980, when ND asked him 
to be a columnist on the party’s newspaper Nea Poreia (New Directions) 
(Karatzaferis, 2012). In 1990 he created the radio station Radio City and TV Telecity, 
renamed as Teleasty6 . Karatzaferis was nominated as a candidate for ND in the 
national elections of 1993, 1996 and 2000 and was elected in all three (Karatzaferis, 
2012). In 2000, when ND lost the national elections, he was banned from ND, and a 
few months after his dismissal he announced the establishment of a new party 
(LA.O.S.). The exact date was September 14, 2000 – the day commemorating for 
Greek Orthodox people the lifting of the Holy Cross, which highlights potent religious 
symbolism. (Tsiras, 2011). Before and after ND’s electoral defeat in the 2000 
                                                        
5 Nea Democratia (New Democracy, ND) is the main centre-right political party and one of the two 
major parties in Greece. It was founded in 1974 by Konstantinos Karamanlis  
6 This change of name indicates the increasing attention paid to ‘Hellenic values’ by LA.O.S., expressed 
through the use of ‘pure’ Greek language, which excludes the use of foreign terms; a linguistic 
equivalent to their nationalist and anti-immigration policies. 
 87 
elections, Karamanlis, the then leader of ND, sought to adopt a more centrist 
orientation (Vernadakis 2005), and as a direct consequence Karatzaferis was expelled 
(Tsiras, 2011; Ios, 2012). 
 
LA.O.S. from its foundation until 2010 has participated in six elections: the 
municipal and prefectoral elections of 2002, the national and European elections of 
2004, the municipal and prefectoral elections of 2006, the snap national elections of 
2007, and the national and European elections in 2009. Through these electoral 
processes has gradually developed its political activity, aiming to emerge from the 
side-lines. The following section is based on the official records of the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs, which can be found through its official website. 
 
The electoral debut of LA.O.S. took place on 13 October 2002. The chairman of 
the party Karatzaferis was the only candidate of the party in the prefectoral election in 
Athens-Piraeus and he managed to acquire 13.6% of the vote. The performance of 
LA.O.S. in ensuing elections was even better. In March’s 2004 national election the 
party was not able to surpass the threshold of 3% (managing 2.19% with 162,103 
votes), but the performance was very promising and well above the predictions of exit 
polls and election surveys. In the European Parliament elections that followed, 
LA.O.S. did even better and managed to elect its president  Karatzaferis as a 
representative in the European Parliament. It should be noted that 2004 marked a 
turning point for the emergence of the party. Although unable to gain the necessary 
percentage in order to enter parliament in the elections of March, LA.O.S. managed to 
elect Karatzaferis as a MEP. In the prefectoral elections of October 2006, LA.O.S. 
participated in sixteen prefectures and in one municipality in Thessaloniki, with 
Karatzaferis as a candidate. The statement of Karatzaferis, immediately after the 
elections on October 16th, is very enlightening in terms of how the party perceived the 
election result: 
 
[w]e achieved our one, clear strategic objective. In previous elections we declared our rejection oft he 
established political system. Remember that we were accused of extremism, concerning our views on 
the functioning of democracy in this country. So we managed through a strategy (indeed a very efficient 
one that we built with my colleagues at LA.O.S.) to go into these elections without any direct or indirect 
reference to these issues, which dominated the previous elections. […] It does not change what we 
serve! We changed the way we serve it (Karatzaferis, 2006) 
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LA.O.S., in the minds of the electorate, is placed at the radical right point of the 
left-right scale. It notes the highest voting intention in rightmost points of the far right 
in the political spectrum, while the majority of its voters originate from the ND party. 
In the years from 2004, LA.O.S extended its electoral appeal and achieved its highest 
levels of electoral success. This increase, however, did not occurr unilaterally (see 
Tsiras, 2011; Psarras, 2010; Kolovos 2005).  
 
As Psarras (2010) notes, many potential voters of LA.O.S. place themselves on 
the right of the political spectrum. They tend to be socially conservative and inward 
looking, and reflect an aversion towards modernism and the avant-garde. They are also 
distributed across the political spectrum, and belong to dynamically growing segments 
of Greek society, such as the young and mid-upper social strata. As Vernardakis 
(2005) notices, experts understand the major distinct expression of this trait as the 
difference between the placement of LA.O.S. in the left-right scale and the 
corresponding self placement on the same scale by its potential voters. According to 
Vernadakis (2005), voters most likely to vote for LA.O.S. are centre-right and define 
themselves as more leftist than the average voter of ND. LA.O.S. is also socially 
conservative and introspective, but not much more than other constituencies and social 
groups.  
 
 Seven years after its foundation, LA.O.S. passed the threshold for election to the 
national  parliament by receiving 3.8% of the votes and electing 10 members in the 
parliament.  In the European parliament elections of 2009 the party managed to gain 
7.15% of the total votes and elected 2 members. The result of the election of 2009 for 
the LA.OS was 386,152 votes and 5.63%.  
 
Figure 4.1 that follows represents the electoral presence of LA.O.S. since 2004, 
a that changed the level of the presence of the party in the national and international 
political scenes. From 2004-2009 the party experienced a remarkable surge and 
established its place as one of the most influential parties in Greece.   
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Figure 4.1: Election Results since 2004 (LA.O.S.) 
 
Additionally, in the national elections of 2007 the party had its breakthrough by 
reaching 3.8% of the vote and electing 10 members of parliament. In 2009 the party 
gained 5.63% of the vote and elected fifteen members of parliament. As Ellinas 
underlines in The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist 
Card (2010), the number of seats won by LA.O.S. in 2009 was partly because of the 
changes to the Greek electoral system, which reduced disproportionality and favoured 
smaller parties. 
 
 As mentioned above (see Chapter 2), before trying to identify a common model 
of communication used by the parties under examination, it is necessary to identify 
each party’s characteristics and ideology as well as its aims and purposes. In order to 
achieve this, official documents of the parties are examined which in the case of 
LA.O.S. are the manifestos of 2004 and 2007. These documents provide an 
opportunity to understand the parties’ identity through the spectrum of their rhetoric, 
and thus provide more detailed evidence on their communication tactics.  
 
4.3.  How does the party identify itself?  
 
Following the conceptualisation presented on the existing literature (see Chapter 
2), political communication focuses on the ways, that political parties choose to 
express themselves, in terms of their intention to attract the attention of the electorate. 
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A key point in the strategic use of communication is the way a political party identifies 
itself in public. In the case of LA.O.S. ,just before the election of 2004, the party 
announced its official ‘ideological platform’, along with a national electoral 
programme (LA.O.S., 2004), something that was retained in literally identical form in 
the manifesto of 2007 (LA.O.S., 2007). This introduces LA.O.S. as 
 
[…] a fully democratic party, where priority is to ensure national sovereignty as guaranteed by Article 1 
of the Constitution; a party which advocates equity, collaborates along with the operating institutions 
and with elected officers ,and addresses conscious citizens that do not tolerate deception or leave others 
to take decisions in their name (LA.O.S., 2004) 
 
 The foundation of the party is identified in this document as meeting an 
historical need to address the nation’s requirements. The ‘self-identification’ of the 
party emphasises that it is, above all else, a Greek party. Hence, it focuses on the long-
term interests of the country and the Greek people; similarly its policies are inspired 
by the so-called Greek spirit, Greek values and Greek culture. The main priority of the 
new party was the restoration of the sovereignty of the people and the overthrow of the 
‘rotten’ status quo that is seen as oppressing the country and leading to the gradual 
‘de-Hellenisation and enslavement of the nation’ (LA.O.S., 2004). Its main purpose is 
to gain ‘power through democratic and legal means’ (LA.O.S. 2004 article 2). From 
the beginning, LA.O.S. wanted to make clear its democratic identity in order to 
distinguish itself from other existing extreme right movements which express anti-
state ideas and give emphasis to the greatness of the nation and Greek identity.   
 
In this document, the party continues by underlining that it is a ‘popular party, 
without being populist’, putting the interests and protection of under-privileged Greeks 
above all and supporting both individual liberties and the right to security, progress 
and well-being for all people living legally in Greece without discrimination (LA.O.S., 
2004). Still LA.O.S. wants to support the importance of the people and their respect 
and recognition of their liberties and rights, but at the same time, points to the issue of 
illegal immigration, which is a clear indication of its ideology. Similarly, it rejects the 
label of ‘radical right’, even though it accepts that ‘we should bear in mind the 
collapse of communist ideology and the serious social and economic problems faced 
by all countries that were imposed such a regime’ (LA.O.S., 2007). This is an 
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approach taken by similar parties in other European democracies, such as the Front 
National in France, or the Fremskrittspartiet in Norway, among others.  
 
Meanwhile, it states that ‘it is an anthropocentric party, which encourages hard 
work, ingenuity, the creativity and entrepreneurial spirit of Greek citizens, while 
supporting the rights of vulnerable economic classes and the safeguarding of workers’. 
The citizen is at the centre of attention, where motivation is rewarded, but at the same 
time the intention of attracting voters is clear. By targeting the vulnerable economic 
classes LA.O.S. openly targets a part of the electorate that is most exposed to 
economic crises and most influenced by political and economic decisions. 
Additionally, it sees itself as ‘a modern party, in real sense of the word, condemning 
all phenomena that characterise bankrupt societies, such as corruption, cronyism and 
nepotism, unemployment and informal economy, insecurity and crime, etc.’ (LA.O.S., 
2004). Again, by opposing the established parties and the policies of the last few years 
that caused the country such significant problems as unemployment, insecurity and 
crime, LA.O.S. wants to distance itself from the mainstream political parties and 
underline its differences from them by promoting a caring and determined profile in 
order to work in the name of the country and for its benefit.  
 
The first impression from this ‘ideological platform’ of LA.O.S. is that it 
highlights the identity hat the party wants to claim for itself in the eyes of the 
electorate, which plays a major role in the broader communication strategy of the 
party. The emphasis on the national element, anti-establishment sentiment, democratic 
identity and the party’s populist appeal, are key aspects of the political identity and the 
rhetoric that the party adopts. These are elements that can be traced throughout the 
party’s effort to succeed. 
 
In the manifesto of 2007, after identifying its characteristics, the party clarifies 
what it does not stand for. According to this statement LA.O.S. is not a dogmatic anti-
American party, but, does not accept that Greece should be guided by U.S. foreign 
policy and that it should react when U.S. policies threatens the interests of Greece. 
Having said that, it continues by underlining that it is not a dogmatic anti-European 
party, but it rejects the idea that ‘powers that cancel our national sovereignty should be 
offered to the European Union’ (LA.O.S., 2007). The vision of the party is to create a 
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secure environment for Greek citizens and their children in a different and improved 
country that represents the ‘spiritual, economic, social and political forefront of 
Europe and the world’ (LA.O.S., 2007). This vision continues with a definition of the 
values it stands for, e.g. human dignity. LA.O.S. argues in favour of a state free of 
partisan influences and economic dependency in a country where the political 
leadership will serve the interests of the people and will promote the country’s 
political, economic, social and cultural interests. In saying so, LA.O.S. is considered to 
be using radical populist rhetoric, making direct appeals to the ‘common man’ and 
distancing itself from the political establishment (Ellinas, 2010). 
 
According to LA.O.S., Greece should be an independent and strong nation that 
will not risk its territorial integrity. Believing in a Greece characterised by social 
justice and clear rules in all aspects of economic and social life, the party underlines 
the need for substantial support for expectant mothers, children and the elderly, and 
the need for protection of all structures necessary to ensure that there will be ‘Greeks 
in the future’ (LA.O.S., 2007). It continues by denying that it is a nationalist party, yet 
at the same time it asserts that it should not be acceptable to devalue the fundamental 
contribution made by ‘the Greek spirit’ to global culture. The supremacy of Greece 
and its culture, and contribution to the world is something that is commonly mentioned 
throughout LA.O.S.’s official documents but also by its members and its leader. For 
them, Greece is the centre of the civilisation of the western world and a model of 
democracy and culture that should have the required respect from other countries and 
cultures.  
 
Finally, it emphasises that it is not a racist party, even though it proposes that it 
‘would be easy to underestimate the problems created in our country as a result of 
uncontrolled immigration’ and similarly denies being a religious fundamentalist party, 
it regardless of the fact that it states that ‘you should not overlook what the 
Constitution provides us, the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ as the prevailing 
religion of Greece’ (LA.O.S., 2007). This section represents a denunciation of the 
criticism that LA.O.S. receives from within its own party members regarding its stance 
on several major issues concerning nationalism, racism and fundamentalism in terms 
of religion. Again, it tries to draw attention to the prevailing religion of the Eastern 
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Orthodox Church of Christ, and the problems that could be caused by illegal 
immigration, rather than spelling out a clear anti-immigration stance. 
 
In short, the general goals of the party, as stated officially, might be summarised 
as: achieving a democratic and meritocratic organisation and functioning for the party, 
resolving the problems of ordinary people; consolidating and securing the patriotic and 
religious sentiment of the people; demonstrating a sense of civic responsibility; 
formulating policies only on the basis of evidence; being direct and interactive in 
communicating with and providing information for the people, regardless of their 
social and economic status; defending each wrongly accused Greek citizen, and finally 
providing radical solutions to the ever lasting concerns of Greek citizens. It is 
important to understand that the main concern of the manifesto is not what the party 
represents, but what the party wants people to believe it rejects. As pointed out in the 
introduction to the manifesto of 2007, LA.O.S. is the latest parliamentary party 
undergoing a process of defining its identity (LA.O.S., 2007). ‘But what we are; what 
we want; what we believe; and most importantly! And most importantly, ‘what we are 
and what they repel!’ (LA.O.S., 2007).  This statement, according to Psarras (2010) is 
a clear example of the strategy that the party chooses to follow, which he terms as 
‘politics of the Trojan horse’ (see Psarras, 2010:136-172). This evaluation by Psarras 
contributes to the general understanding of the communication tactics of LA.O.S. 
Referring back to McNair’s (1995) argument on political communication (see Chapter  
2), these first parts of the manifestos underline the aspects that develop the party’s 
political identity.   
 
4.4.  Structure and Ideology  
  
4.4.1. Structure 
 
In order to understand how the party works, it is useful to examine briefly the 
structure of the party. As mentioned earlier, the perspective of LA.O.S. is that the 
party represents a ‘vision’ that had become, a reality incorporated by its leader and 
founder  Karatzaferis. The presence and the influence of the president is clear and 
determined in every step and every decision-making procedure.  
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The structure of the party is extremely complex, but in the majority of cases the 
subordinate organs are under the direct control of the president; in other words, it is 
based on the centrality of the leader. A representative example is the political council, 
which is not only appointed by the president but has a variable number of members. 
Specifically, according to article 20:  
 
[g]iven that members of the political directors are appointed by the president of the party, their number 
is defined and varies with the need to fix the political arena (LA.O.S., 2004) 
 
As Psarras (2010) underlines, it is an absolute bureaucratic regime of which the 
only source of power is the president. Also, the party structure is based on an 
indefinite arrangement which may be given a different shape in accordance with the 
president’s will at any given time. In practice, the party is under the firm control of 
Karatzaferis, who rarely convenes the Executive Office and who runs it with the help 
of close associates and employees from Teleasty (Ellinas, 2010).  
 
4.4.2. Ideology and policy-making  
 
Since its foundation LA.O.S. has been characterised by many scholars as a party 
of the radical right family (see Georgiadou, 2008; Kolovos, 2005; Tsiras, 2011; 
Psarras, 2010). Nevertheless, Karatzaferis strongly rejects the term radical right as a 
description of the party, a reaction common in many parties of this party family, e.g. 
Le Pen, who pressed lawsuits against journalists and fellow politicians that were using 
the term (see Tsiras, 2011; Ios, 2012). Having said that, the main concern for parties, 
such as LA.O.S., is how to change their public perception as a pariah and establish 
their position, as patriotic movements  in their national political systems.  
 
The idea of how the political parties under examination structure their political 
rhetoric is one of the main motivations of this project. It demonstrates how the 
manifestos contribute to the identification of aspects of ideology and the policy-
making process and that they are the main means for political parties to promote their 
intentions and underlining motives . Before conducting the content analysis (see 
Chapter 7), it is important to understand the core ideology of the parties and their 
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proposed policies, which reflect the relationship between their political 
communication and their political agenda. 
 
Nationalism  
Concerning its ideology LA.O.S. could be characterized as a mixture of ethnic 
and state nationalism. According to the official statement in the party’s manifesto, it 
stresses that the party aims to serve ‘the Nation, the Virgin Mary, the Faith, the 
History and the Greek cultural identity’ (LA.O.S., 2004). It underlines that the party is 
at the service of all Greek citizens with no exceptions and accepts as its member every 
Greek citizen or anyone with a Greek origin, regardless of any other particular traits.  
As stated clearly, LA.O.S. prioritises patriotism above any other elements. The focus 
is on Greece and the Greek citizen.  In the meantime, the party does not prevent 
foreigners from becoming permanent residents and citizens of the country, but in order 
to demonstrate their commitment to Greece the male foreigners would have to serve 
the Greek army. Nevertheless, the party identifies with ethno-nationalism at least 
‘according to the constitutional requirement that everything undertaken by the state 
must serve the Nation (LA.O.S., 2004, 2007). The party, therefore, seeks to defend the 
Greek interests, Greek minorities abroad and cultural heritage in areas where 
historically there is a Greek presence. Furthermore, the party seeks the union of 
Cyprus with Greece, and also defends the human rights of all the Greek people and 
their right to self-determination.  
 
The party rejects ‘complexes of chauvinism or racism’, but nonetheless believes 
that with regard to ‘the effort of minimising the problem of illegal immigration … the 
attitude of bullying those who are rightly concerned about the chaos that prevails... is 
racism against the Greek people and every non-Greek citizen who lawfully entered 
and resides in the country’ (LA.O.S., 2007). It also stresses that it would surely not 
discriminate against any other known religion or belief, but the latter should not be 
against the prevailing religion of Greece. Along with this, LA.O.S. express multi-
nationalism, as it recognises and respects the contribution of all people and expects the 
same kind of attitude towards their (the people) own choices and cultural 
characteristics. Regarding the EU, the party does not deny the European identity of 
Greece but does not accept resignation of powers, which effectively invalidate the 
sovereignty of the country. It advocates a united Europe of nations, while maintaining 
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‘the right of veto over vital matters’ (LA.O.S., 2007). The party connects multi-
nationalism with the struggle against globalisation, which it accuses of leading to the 
disappearance of cultural and national particularities, and maintains hat multi-
culturalism is the ideological foundation of globalisation. According to the party, 
multiculturalism will lead to the demise of local and national cultures and their 
replacement with a uniform system of values imposed from above. Moreover, the 
party argues that Turkey should not be accepted into the EU, as it ‘does not have a 
common ethnic and cultural background and contains extreme Islamic elements’ 
(LA.O.S., 2007).  
 
Additionally, LA.O.S. expresses anti-Semitic tendencies, e.g.  that globalisation 
‘[ sic.is.] initiated and supported by huge multinational companies … which are 
largely controlled by Zionist interests, located in the U.S., whose policy they dictate’ 
(LA.O.S., 2007). There is also evidence of conspiracy theory and LA.O.S. claims to 
have identified projects that it considers a threat to the Greek people and the Greek 
nation, and believes that there are enemies of Orthodoxy and Hellenism wishing to 
flatten the country under the banner of globalisation. Indeed, part of the party’s 
campaign in the 2004 elections was to ask voters to act on ‘the rejection of guilty plans 
against Hellenism’ by voting for LA.O.S. (see Psarras, 2010).  
 
Another clear and related element of the ideology of LA.O.S. is xenophobia. The 
party views the uncontrolled influx of illegal immigrants as the most egregious crime, 
and as curse cast upon Greek society. Furthermore, the party notes that the majority of 
illegal immigrants comes from neighbouring countries, and regards them as the 
greatest threat to national stability. LA.O.S. asserts that the increase in unemployment 
is due to the influx of illegal immigrants and calls for their immediate deportation. 
Those of them who have jobs and housing could remain in Greece until their work is 
completed and should then be deported. Indeed, LA.O.S. ‘will see to their return to 
their homeland, even if funding is required to resettle them in their countries’ 
(LA.O.S.., 2007). The party proposes strict control of non-EU visitors and allowing 
entry only to those who have a pre-arranged employment contract and housing 
provided by their employer who will bear the costs of any repatriation. As stated 
previously, LA.O.S. is opposed to Turkey joining the EU – one reason for this is that it 
fears a possible mass population migration from Turkey to Greece.  
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Constitutional issues 
Also, there is populism in the programme of the party, in which it is suggested 
that referendums should be held for policy proposals on all major national and social 
problems, if proposed by 3% of the electorate. LA.O.S. calls for a referendum in order 
to let people decide on the issue of including religion and ethnicity on identity cards. 
Also, they express populist and anti-establishment sentiments. The two major parties 
are seen as corrupt and decadent and as leading to the destruction of Greece, 
indifferent to the problems of the people and serving only the interests of 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, it is emphasised that all previous Greek governments have been 
characterised by submissiveness, for they have been servile to the U.S. on foreign 
policy, ignoring the Greek national interests.  
 
Undemocratic characteristics are not expressed in the party programme. LA.O.S. 
emphasises that it seeks to rupture the dominance of the political establishment 
through democratic processes, but moreover the party stresses that ‘we must seek the 
stability of the institution of the Higher Authority by ensuring the continued respect 
towards and acceptance of the primate’ (LA.O.S.., 2007). The Higher Authority should 
not be the result of partisan compromises. Indeed, the party proposes the establishment 
of an optimum council that would advice the president. LA.O.S. calls for the 
discontinuation of government subsidies to political parties and expresses a preference 
for a proportional representation electoral system where the threshold for entering the 
parliament is set at 5%. 
 
Law and security  
With respect to law and order and militarism, LA.O.S. proposes strict 
enforcement of the law, imposing life sentences on abusers of public money and repeat 
offenders, strict penalties for killing police officers, judges and priests, and the 
creation of special courts for smugglers and drug traffickers, paedophiles and child 
rapists under all of whom should be brought to court under special laws that would not 
exclude the possibility of imposing the death penalty (death penalty is a penalty, not a 
law in its own right) (LA.O.S., 2007). In the meantime, the police need to be 
adequately equipped with the necessary infrastructure and have a sufficient number 
staff. According to the party, a powerful defence force is necessary to prevent potential 
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threats and address current risks. Therefore, funds for defence should be considered a 
basic and immediate priority for the state budget.  
 
Additionally the party argues that Greece should have the best possible 
equipment and 'gradually become a nuclear power’ (LA.O.S., 2007). LA.O.S. aims to 
reduce imports of weapons systems and stimulate the development of a domestic arms 
industry. The party states that the morale of the armed forces should be raised and 
military service should neither be reduced nor unreasonably and unnecessarily 
prolonged. LA.O.S. even suggested the formation of an army consisting of ‘100,000 
troops’ and proposed ‘basic military coaching in schools and frequent training of 
reservists in order to familiarise themselves with new weapons and technology’ 
(LA.O.S., 2007). Additionally, in order to offer extra support to the armed forces, 
LA.O.S. proposes ‘the right to any family with more than three children to send a child 
to military school without examination if he (or she) meets the qualification critiria’ 
(LA.O.S., 2007). 
 
Morality  
LA.O.S. expresses support for traditional morality and hopes to address the low 
birth rate by supporting families with more than three children. The party wants to 
stimulate the sense of family, which it considers the basic‘cell of society and the 
source of mental development and integration of personality’ (LA.O.S., 2007). 
Abortion is condemned from a Christian moral-spiritual perspective. In general, 
LA.O.S. espouses religious ethics and considers the Greek Orthodox Church as ‘the 
mother of the new Greek state’ (LA.O.S., 2004). The party wants to protect Greek 
Orthodox Christian culture and stresses that ‘education will be nationalism-centred 
and would aim to develop a model of modest and virtuous men based on the standards 
of the teaching of Jesus Christ’ (LA.O.S., 2004, 2007). Meanwhile, with the teaching 
of Greek-Christian ideals and history, LA.O.S. intends to raise the morale of the 
Armed Forces. Moreover, the party proposes to establish an f educational centre each 
diocese and invite the clergy to lead the struggle against globalisation. Indeed, 
LA.O.S. ‘does not accept a Europe that does not include Orthodoxy in terms of history 
and family; a Europe which overrides the church’ (LA.O.S., 2004, 2007).  
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Economy and welfare  
In socio-economic issues, LA.O.S. promotes a mixture of liberalism and 
corporatism. It is opposed to monopolies and oligopolies and intends to ‘encourage the 
ingenuity, creativity and entrepreneurship of Greek citizens’(LA.O.S., 2007). At the 
same time, it wants to encourage productivity in sectors that are vital to national 
output.   
  
The party retains elements of welfare chauvinism as it emphasises that Greece 
will only participate in the EU as long as the country's resources are not threatened. 
Moreover, LA.O.S. prohibits the use of cheap illegal immigrants in the construction 
industry:  ‘only Greeks and EU citizens should benefit from public funds supplied by 
the Greek taxpayers’ (LA.O.S., 2007). More specifically, it is unacceptable to  
 
[r]emove wages of Greek employers, if it is proven that they employ low-paid illegal immigrants...[and] 
the treasury of Greece and the savings of Greek taxpayers should primarily benefit the Greeks, then 
Community citizens and then if there is room, the settlers (LA.O.S., 2007) 
 
Employees from countries outside the EU will be hired only when a Greek 
worker or workers from the EU cannot fill the vacancy. Finally, LA.O.S. calls for 
countering illegal itinerant vendors. The party has held maximalist views on ‘national’ 
issues and has sought to profit from the mobilisation of nationalist sentiments (Ellinas, 
2010). Karatzaferis has described LA.O.S. as ‘a profoundly democratic party’, 
consisting of everything from a ‘pre-dictatorship Right’ to a merger of Left and Right 
to a ‘Popular Liberalism’ in the official party literature. He has also stated that he 
supports ‘patriotism and social solidarity, taking from all ideologies and personalities I 
appreciate. I don't care if it's called communism, liberalism or socialism’ (Karatzaferis, 
2012). However, it is often characterised as nationalist and radical right, although 
Karatzaferis rejects the latter term and even threatens to sue those who address the 
party using it. It has also been argued that its founding declaration included 
antidemocratic, anti-parliamentary ideas, the most conspicuous being the party’s 
proposal to enforce legislative decisions through a council which would include 
military officers and church officials.  
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The ideology of LA.O.S., as presented and described by the party itself, is key to 
understanding the policies and decisions made by the party and its members. Having 
said that, the interest and the aim of this research is to point out ideological elements in 
the party’s communication strategies, and show how the latter are directly linked to the 
party’s ideology  
 
 4.4.3. Leadership  
 
As seen above, LA.O.S. was founded by Karatzaferis in 2000. The party 
emerged around the strong figure and the charismatic leadership of Karatzaferis, 
similarly to other leaders of radical right parties in western European countries. The 
personality of Karatzaferis reflects the party’s political presence, and provide evidence 
for the importance of the leader’s character as a significant factor for a party’s success.  
 
Even when Karatzaferis was a member of the ND, he had expressed affinities to 
the neo-fascist, radical right organization Chrysi Avgi. Specifically, on January 16th, 
1998, broadcasting on his TV channel Telecity, he argued that the ND should 
cooperate with the Chrysi Avgi, because the latter was closer to right-wing than ND.  
He also praised the activism of Chrysi Avgi and contrasted it to ONNED, the youth 
organisation of ND, despite the latter being generally regarded as particularly radical.  
 
LA.O.S. is often seen as a descendant of the post-authoritarian radical right on 
the basis of its comprehensive nationalist worldview through which it filters its 
programmatic positions on both foreign policy and domestic issues. This worldview 
explains the frequent resorting to anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic rhetoric (Ellinas, 
2010) by the president and other members of the party.  
 
LA.O.S. began as a party with a dual Orthodox Christian religious and radically 
nationalist political identity. Although since its foundation it has allegedly tried to 
'moderate' the nationalist elements of its appeal by disciplining party members who 
express extreme-nationalist or neo-fascist tendencies,  new radical right members have 
joined its ranks in recent years and some have been elected to parliament. 
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Popular appeal 
In April 2001, the first conference of LA.O.S. took place in Paleo Faliro, near 
Piraeus. There, Karatzaferis tried to lay the foundations for both the ideology and the 
rhetorical approach that the new party would follow. Karatzaferis  in his opening 
speech said that, ‘[w]e are the ones who will take Greece from the swamp of rodents, 
from the swamp, from the piranhas.’ In the same speech he tried to justify why he 
welcomed the success of LePen by saying ‘I welcome anyone who resists 
Globalisation, New World Order and Zionist Imperialism [...]’ and he welcomed ‘the 
hero Milosevic who is in court [...]’ and finally ‘the Libyan leader Gaddafi, who sent a 
delegation to attend the conference’ (Karatzaferis, 2001). 
 
This example shows clearly the populist indictment of Karatzaferis, an 
accusation that has lasted over the years since LA.O.S’s foundation. It is well known 
that Karatzaferis has his own style that cannot be controlled. In speeches like the one 
mentioned above, the way the language has been used is more than recognisable. 
Karatzaferis chooses a raw, direct and easy way to talk to the electorate, by using 
words from ordinary life without a sophisticated tone, a decision that could easily be 
characterised as populism. His explicit way of addressing the public shows a 
communication skill that cannot be bettered, an advantage Karatzaferis possesses over 
his rivals. Even at the point where several issues and arguments do not always make 
total sense in light of the theme of the speech, Karatzaferis manages to gain the 
attention of the audience and most importantly be understood by the majority of the 
people. Makis Voridis, at the time elected MP of LA.O.S., commenting on 
Karatzaferis’ rhetoric, mentions that Karatzaferis uses public discourse very 
efficiently. Voridis would be surprised if there would be consequences arising from 
Karatzaferis’s words (quoted in Kasimatis, 2010 in Kathimerini). Karatzaferis 
frequently refers to the Greek economic elite as Jewish pawns of the international 
Zionism which is also responsible for machinating a global ‘new order’ (Tsiras, 2011).  
 
In the 2001 speech Karatzaferis began to develop a highly xenophobic rhetoric 
by saying that: ‘no illegal immigrants in Greece...jobs to the Greeks first...we are not 
victims, we are not blind... Greece belongs to Orthodox Greeks’ (Karatzaferis, 2001). 
The manifesto of 2004 follows the same positions on immigrants, and proposes to 
combat illegal immigration through the modernisation of ports, installation of 
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navigational control systems, and by combating unfair competition caused by illegal 
street vendors (LA.O.S., 2004). In the party’s official programme for the national 
elections of 2004 illegal immigrants are presented as ‘the worst problem currently 
plaguing Greek society’, and continues: ‘together we accept illegal immigrants from 
neighbouring countries which have territorial claims against us, and which threaten he 
security and integrity of our border areas’, and proposes that: ‘rural development and 
rebuilding the rural police should help our farmers feel more secure without having 
themselves to deal with the excess burden of illegal immigrants‘ (LA.O.S., 2004) 
 
LA.O.S., as noted by Karatzaferis himself, is not alone in the effort to rupture 
and overthrow the status quo that governs the country. To help him achieve his vision 
he had as an ally and supporter, Archbishop Christodoulos, and several prominent 
members of the Greek Orthodox Church (Tsiras, 2011). Psarras gives an overview of 
the relationship that Karatzaferis had with Archbishop Christodoulos. Their 
relationship began in 1987 when Karatzaferis (then a journalist) was writing an article 
about demonstrations of the clergy concerning ecclesiastical property, which was 
among the political issues in which Christodoulos was active as a young priest (Tsiras, 
2011). After the death of Archbishop Christodoulos, Karatzaferis argued that he not 
only helped in the election of the Archbishop but that they had jointly developed ‘an 
action plan’ (Psarras, 2010). This statement was based on the words of Christodoulos 
arguing that voters of LA.O.S. were ‘good Christians and not right-wing’ (Psarras, 
2010:125-126). However, even after the death of Archbishop Christodoulos, LA.O.S. 
did not lack supporters from inside the Church community. As Charitos notes, 
‘Christianity can serve as a protective shield of national civilisation against the waves 
of Muslim immigrants and the cultural utopianism of the left’ (Charitos, 2008 in 
Tsiras, 2011:114). 
 
In the meantime, during the prefectural election campaign of 2002 it was 
discovered that Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn) had collaborated with LAOS by providing 
four representatives as candidates with LA.O.S. The neo-Nazist party of Chrysi Avgi  
has caused many conflicts regarding its legitimacy and approaches. In an attempt to 
draw the public’s attention away from elements linking LAOS to the radical right, 
Karatzaferis stated that there are Jews, homosexuals and Gypsies on the same ballot, 
but he could not reveal their names. Just after this statement the Central Jewish 
 103 
Council on 9 October 2002, released the following announcement: 
 
[T]he Central Jewish Board considers it necessary to specify that the declaration by the candidate 
Karatzaferis that Jews participate in his ballot is not true. Karatzaferis himself, for many years, had tried 
to manipulate and distort the truth concerning Jewish issues. (Greek Human Rights List, 2002) 
 
As Psarras (2010) points out, similar to other radical right parties, in LA.O.S. the 
rhetoric of the leader is as important to the official party as manifestos are. As seen 
above in the section examining the structure of the party, the organisation of the party 
is structured around the figure of the leader both ‘in statute and in practice’ (Ellinas, 
2010:140). Ellinas (2010) stresses that, based on the statute of the party, the president 
is the one who administers the party in most of its functions, e.g. organising the 
agenda, appointing officials, and introducing the party’s ideology to the electorate. 
The electoral campaigns, as will be shown below, have been based on the figure of 
Karatzaferis and, therefore, LA.O.S. is seen by many as his personal achievement.  
 
Undoubtedly the party leader plays a key role in the party’s communication 
strategy. In radical right parties especially, the leader is crucial for the party’s success 
(see Chapter 2).  The leader is the face that requests the support of potential voters in 
order to achieve electoral success in the name of the party. In the case of LA.O.S. 
Karatzaferis has proved to be a charismatic leader with strong interface with the 
audience over time. As such a strong personality, Karatzaferis represents the main face 
of the party. His popular appeal places him high in the party’s priorities when 
constructing its communication strategies. Having gained considerable electoral 
support between 2000 and 2010, LAOS and especially Karatzaferis have had 
significant influence on the national political scene. 
 
4.5. Analysis of the context 
 
4.5.1. Beyond text  
 
In an effort to identify the communication tactics of the political parties under 
examination, a qualitative analysis of the actual content of the manifestos is necessary. 
To achieve this, it is important to go beyond the first impressions created the mere 
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presentation of official manifestos, and conduct an extensive analysis of them seeking 
to detect the core ideology of the parties under examination. The emphasis on the 
rhetoric in the official documents contributes to the structure of the general image and 
identity of the party, which is proposed to the electorate. Ultimately, however, this is 
only one aspect of the whole communication strategy of the parties in their effort to 
attract the electorate’s support. 
 
LA.O.S.’s manifestos suggest that the party openly attacks the Greek 
constitution and calls for referendums on important issues; asks and demands respect 
for the culture, language, and history of any nation; calls for the definition of 
migration and the establishment of specific rules on this issue; states that it fully 
endorses constitutional legality and democracy; takes a stand in defence of human 
rights, culture and natural environment and finally, declares that it embraces all Greeks 
regardless of party origin, and opposes any form of fanaticism, arrogance and 
totalitarianism, including globalisation and the ‘new order’ (LA.O.S.., 2007).  From 
this declaration it appears that LA.O.S. adopts in its rhetoric many of the typical 
positions of modern radical right parties, e.g. intense scepticism about, if not 
opposition to the European Union and its institutions; conducting referendums on 
every legal movement considered critical for the country's future, in a general effort to 
‘flatter’ the people; accepting democratic legitimacy; imposing restrictions on 
immigration, while mentioning a ‘new world order’ that puts the national identity and 
culture of Greece in danger. 
 
According to the party’s manifesto of August 2007, LA.O.S. is described as an 
Orthodox popular party, but not a populist one, that aims to protect all non-privileged 
Greeks.  Similarly, as mentioned in the manifesto of 2004, the 2007 document states 
that it is not anti-American, yet implying that Greece will never obey the wishes of the 
U.S.; it is not anti-European party but implies that it will never accept the assignment 
of the national sovereignty to Brussels; it is not a nationalist party but this does not 
mean that they do not value the extent to which Greek culture has influenced mankind; 
it is not a radical-right party but underlines the benefits of the collapse of communism 
and the problems created when it was imposed; it is not a racist party but problems 
resulting from illegal immigration should not be ignored, and finally, it is not a 
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religious-fundamentalist party but emphasises that Orthodox Christianity is the 
predominant religion in Greece (LA.O.S., 2007).   
 
Nevertheless, in the 2004 programme it was maintained that the party was 
founded because foreign powers wanted to impose a new situation on Greek people, 
foreign and extraneous to the traditions of the Greek race. In order to exploit anti-
American sentiments among the Greek populace, Karatzaferis accuses the two main 
parties of ‘slave-like’ behaviour toward the U.S., which has led the country ‘into a 
situation that is going to be worse than Nazism’ (see Ellinas, 2010:138). LA.O.S. 
denounces the existence of corruption in the country and believes that Greece has 
entered a period in which the uncontrolled entry of multinational companies and cause 
unemployment and poverty. Also, LA.O.S. seeks to ensure national independence and 
sovereignty, to provide equal opportunities for all  Greeks in a country where fairness, 
parity and social justice should prevail (LA.O.S., 2007). 
   
More specifically, concerning immigrants and other minorities in Greece, 
LA.O.S. believes that: a) male immigrants who wish to become citizens should first 
undertake their military service; b) immigrants should pay taxes but that does not 
mean that this will ensure their legitimacy; c) there is a need for a strictly enforced 
immigration policy which should not exploit the immigrant population; d) a solution  
must be found to stop the growing demographic problem that threatens the 
maintenance of the Greek race and the Greek cultural identity, because this would 
diminish the Greek population and its cultural identity; e) if Greece continues with its 
current immigration policy, Greeks by 2050 will be a minority in their own country; f) 
in  Greece there is an imported form of crime that is directly related to the large 
number of illegal immigrants; g) the population of Muslims in Thrace should be equal 
to Orthodox Christians in other contested, non-Greek areas, such as Imbros, Tenedos 
and Istanbul; and h) the Greek state offers too much assistance to Gypsies and 
Muslims, which conduces to a situation where these two groups do not even need to 
work while, at the same time, the Greek family suffers (LA.O.S., 2007).  Finally, in a 
text entitled The documents of shame, which can be read on LA.O.S.’s website, the 
party accuses Greek MPs of other parties of an anti-Hellenic attitude, because they 
allegedly vote in favour of granting voting rights to immigrants and set in danger 
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national interests in  the Greek province of Macedonia in northern Greece and in the 
Aegean sea.  
 
Despite the 2007 manifesto the party appears to be promoting contradicting 
policies, as it appears to support both the education of foreign students at all levels, 
while at the same time it calls for the promotion of intercultural education in the form 
of a national/Greek curriculum. An anti-immigrant position can be seen, however, in 
the adoption of certain policy exclusions: after calling for electronic health cards for 
more immediate and more effective protection of citizens' health, the party notes that 
this card should be given only to legal residents. Finally, the party identity, once again, 
is identified with Greek Orthodox Christianity, the programme of August 2007 
reconfirms that Orthodox Christianity is the predominant religion, nothing that 
Hellenism and Christianity have been inextricably intertwined for centuries, which 
necessitates the recognition of the national interests of the church (LA.O.S., 2007).  
 
By analysing further the LA.O.S. manifesto of 11 August 2007 we can draw 
more conclusions. LA.O.S. understands very well what concepts and rhetoric its 
opponents use in order to characterise it as a radical right party. Thus, it is quick to 
emphasise that it is neither anti-American nor anti-European; neither nationalist, nor 
racist and extremist; neither undemocratic nor populist. These are  all positions which 
are seen as determining whether   a modern party is of the far-right. (Theofilopoulos, 
2008). LA.O.S. argues that it is not populist, but at the same time invokes the feelings 
of the people and tries to manipulate them. Also, it constantly denounces the status 
quo that has brought the country to the ‘brink of disaster’, constantly refers to the 
underprivileged, promises everything to everyone, constantly expresses its faith in the 
Eastern Orthodox Church by attempting to flatter the religious sentiment of the 
Greeks, and stresses that the problems of the Greeks can be blamed on immigrants, the 
U.S. and neighbouring countries (LA.O.S.., 2007).   
 
Still however LA.O.S. argues that it is neither racist nor nationalist and 
fundamentalist. Indeed, the language used in the official programme of LA.O.S. is so 
careful that one can hardly find any overtly racist positions. But nevertheless it is a 
deeply xenophobic party. LA.O.S. considers immigrants as the source of a variety of 
social problems like unemployment, poverty, crime, and regards them as a serious 
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threat to national cohesion, national identity and culture, even the existence of Greece 
itself.  A candidate of the party for the 2004 national elections refers to immigration in 
the following manner:  
 
[I] do not want an Albanian neighbour, but a Greek one. I prefer neighbours who will enter my house 
through the door at 6pm, not those who break into my house through the windows at 3am. If this makes 
me a far rightist, then I am! (quoted in Ellinas, 2010:138) 
 
So the party proposes a policy of exclusion of immigrants by asking for tight 
immigration policies and a number of restrictions on permanent settlement in the 
country, forced conscription and taxation of immigrants without guaranteeing their 
settlement, exclusion of immigrants from health services and from work, which 
suggests that the Greeks should pay more attention to whom they choose to offer 
employment (Theofilopoulos, 2008). Karatzaferis characterises them as ‘useless’ 
people who do not offer anything to the country and are lazy, and exploit the system. 
LA.O.S. argues that Greece should use its cultural heritage and Greek education to 
make immigrant children ‘to be Greeks in soul and in spirit’ (Ellinas, 2010:138). 
 
LA.O.S. refers to itself as an ‘anthropocentric’ and ‘modern’ party. But how 
anthropocentric and how modern can a party be when in 2007 in a developed western 
country that is a member of the European Union their programme refers to a 
predominant religion, speaks of the collapse of communism as if they were the U.S. 
during the Cold War, and regards minorities as citizens of third and fourth class, if not 
as enemies of the nation? Also, how can it not be an anti-American party and an anti-
European one, when it essentially states in its programme that Greeks are slaves of the 
U.S. and do whatever the latter command, that the European Union is judged only 
through the issue of national sovereignty and with respect to the depreciation of Greek 
culture. 
 
As seen above (see Chapter 2), Hainsworth (2000) claimed that the post-war 
radical right is like a ‘complex alchemy’, a mixture of divergent ideological positions 
and political principles: nationalism, authoritarianism, xenophobia and anti-
communism, combined with liberalism, and anti-capitalism, statism and anti-statism 
and populism. These are contradictory elements of the ideological alloy created by the 
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politically extreme right, covering almost the entire range of the left-right spectrum 
(see Betz, 1998; Hainsworth, 2008; Georgiadou, 2008).  The ‘complex alchemy’ of the 
radical right maintains the inherent political opportunism of this political family; the 
post-war radical right is melleable, adapting to current demands, without renouncing 
historical origins and selective affinities with the ideological current of anti-
Enlightenment.  
 
4.5.2.  Organised Campaigns 
 
Apart from the qualitative content analysis of the manifestos, it is important to 
examine the party’s brands (posters and party insignia). Following a rather semiotic 
approach where everything is regarded as a text (see Chandler, 2007). LA.O.S.'s party 
insignia is more than just a logo; it is about the political message; it is about the name; 
it is about the personalities. According to article 4 of the Manifesto of LA.O.S. 2004: 
‘This Party is entitled LA.O.S’. The emblem of the party consists of four white arrows 
in a symbolic sign, which is a green wild olive branch.  
 
 
Figure 4:2 The Emblem of LA.O.S. 
 
The arrows and the wild olive branch are embedded in an azure square while the 
whole complex is surrounded by a red circle (LA.O.S., 2004, 2007). This has a strong 
link to Greek mythology. 
 
 Based on mythology, the inventor of sport and the founder of the Olympic 
games was Idaios Hercules, who planted the first wild olive at Olympia. Idaios 
Hercules had four brothers, Paionaio, Epimidi, Iasio and Ida. The older brother went to 
run at Olympia one day. Hercules crowned the winner with an olive branch from the 
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tree he himself had planted there. Since then, it was the custom to crown winners of 
the Olympic games with wreaths of wild olive branches. The winners were considered 
respected persons who were helped to win by the divine grace and favour of the gods. 
It was also believed that through the olive wreath all divine forces were passed  on to 
them  The same symbolism was conveyed by the red woollen ribbons that adorned the 
athletes. The olive wreath was the highest award for any athlete and for every single 
citizen (the verb ‘crown’ was synonymous with reward) (see Psarras, 2010).  
 
      What was considered a symbol of physical and mental excellence for 
centuries has acquired a new role. In modern use the symbol has become associated 
with extremist right wing organisations with the adaptation of the Arrow Cross 
(Nyilaskereszt) symbol which was used in Hungary in the 1930s as the symbol of the 
leading Hungarian fascist political party, Nyilaskeresztes Párt (see Figure 4:3) as well 
as in the standards of the Nazi party in Germany. The symbol consists of two green 
double-ended arrows in a cross configuration on a white circular background, much 
like the German Nazi swastika. The arrow cross symbol remains outlawed in Hungary. 
The symbol has been used by neo-Nazi organisations in England like the ‘League of 
St. George (1974) (see Figure 4:5) which appears to be 90% identical to the emblem 
LA.O.S with the only difference being the lack of laurels and the use of different 
colours. Similar insignia have been used by other racist organisations based in 
America, e.g. the ‘Nationalist Movement, 1987, a radical-racist organisation in 
America in favour of the supremacy of the White race against blacks and Jews or -
WASP: White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (see Figure 4:4); the symbol has also been 
used by the Greek organization Chrysi Avgi (1980) (see Figure 4:6), a neo-Nazi 
organization in Greece. In Golden Dawn’s case the expanding cross is used as the 
initial symbol on the cover photograph of the first issue of the magazine along with the 
swastika of the Thule secret society. 
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Figure 4:3 Emblem of Nyilaskeresztes Párt , Hungary , 1930s 
 
 
Figure 4:4  Emblem of Nationalist Movement, USA 
 
 
Figure 4:5 Emblem of League of St. George, England 
 
 
Figure 4:6  Front page of the magazine of Chrysi Avgi (1980), Greece 
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The underlying meaning of the arrow cross is to express expansion in all 
directions. In this, it is synonymous with all the Christian crosses used to represent 
global evangelisation, the effort to spread the doctrines of the Christian faith in all 
directions. The sign is also used in cartography. On some maps it signifies monuments 
or towers. 
 
In an interview, taken by C. Muibua and G. Stamkos, entitled: ‘I am not a 
nationalist, Place me with Peron!’, Karatzaferis comments on the emblem:  
ZENITH: ‘The logo of your party looks surprisingly similar to the one of the Ku 
Klux Klan. Why do you think this is the case?’  
Karatzaferis: ‘We see things in a different perspective’  
ZENITH: ‘Should I show you?’ 
Karatzaferis: ‘Surely you can show me!’ 
ZENITH: ‘There you are’ (showing the two logos) 
Karatzaferis: ‘What is the relationship with one another?’ 
ZENITH: ‘The circle, the cross, the colour [...]’ 
Karatzaferis: ‘I am not familiar with the case and it is the first time I have seen 
it.’ Referring to the circle: ‘here is ancient Greece (pointing to the crown of laurels), 
red is Byzantium, (as LA.O.S. stands in favour of theocratic Byzantium) and here, we 
want to expand  Greece with four arrows: east, west, north and south.’ 
ZENITH: ‘The red, the white and the blue...don’t you see the resemblance?’ 
Karatzaferis: So what if they look alike? And what should be done about it? I 
have never used black myself anywhere. Today it is the first time I have seen it.’ 
(Zenith, vol.13:2007). 
 
Adonis Georgiadis, another leading member of LA.O.S. and MP, referring to the 
party logo on his website, formally admitted that the banner of the party has been used 
in the past and is still being used by right wing and Nazi organisations and parties 
across the world. Nevertheless, in an effort to convince the public that his party has no 
ideological relationship with them, despite the-selection and use of conspicuously 
similar emblems, he argues: ‘We put on the arrows to show that the Greek spirit 
extends to all parts of the horizon, which makes it universal. Numerous organisations 
worldwide have used Greek symbols, but this does not mean anything’ (Georgiadis, 
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2009). For Georgiadis, the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler used the swastika, one of the 
‘most ancient symbols of humanity and Hellenism’, and admits that right-wing 
extremists around the world have shown preference for this type of cross. ‘So what?’ 
the politician comments. In any case, for Georgiadis, after two years in Parliament, 
only  
 
[…]malicious people, those who are our political opponents, try to connect our party with totalitarian 
theories. […] We are by far the most democratic party in Greece; evident in that we are the only ones 
asking for referendums on all serious issues, as is done in Switzerland, Canada, France, Italy, the U.S., 
and elsewhere. And those, so-called ‘democrats’ have not even called for a Referendum in forty years 
(Georgiadis, 2009) 
 
The major figure in the posters of LA.O.S. is Karatzaferis himself. As mentioned 
before, he is not just the party’s president, and not just the founder of LA.O.S.;  
Karatzaferis is the personification of the party. In the posters he appears confident, 
strong, ready to defend, and well-prepared for any difficulty; ready to ‘strike the 
political establishment’ with a pair of boxing gloves, and to make valuable changes for 
the people and the country; exactly how a leader should be. Karatzaferis chooses an 
informal appearance, making himself more approachable to common people, 
something that corresponds with the populist profile of the party in general.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Poster of the president of LA.O.S. 
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Figure 4:8 Poster of the President of LA.O.S. 
 
 
Figure 4:9 Poster of the President of LA.O.S. 
 
 
It is important to stress that throughout the party’s official documents, its official 
website, its official paper and in the official electoral campaigns and posters, blue, 
white and red colours dominate - the colours of the emblem. When examining the 
posters of the party, the idea of a person-oriented campaign is very clear. The posters 
are  iconic, for they act as a signifier through the figure of Karatzaferis; but there is 
also some symbolic signage and that is the party insignia. Using Karatzaferis as the 
signifier of its campaign, LA.O.S. reinforces the importance of the leader in his 
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popular appeal. In other words, branding the party’s president is a well-placed 
argument for LA.O.S..  
 
Meanwhile, in the posters there is often a rhyme between words. Its slogan ‘Hand 
in hand (because he makes a difference)’ became one of the most successful electoral 
catch-phrases  in the period under consideration, and created a direct link to the party. 
‘Hand’ has been used several times by reporters, politicians, researchers and 
academics, as a pun in order to make a reference to LA.O.S. (Figures 4:7; 4:8; 4:9). 
The text in the posters addresses the desire for security as well as anti-establishment 
sentiments, and highlights trust in the judgement of the electorate.  
 
Another brand that can be easily recognised is the name of the party itself. 
LA.O.S., the acronym of the party’s name is a great communication ‘trick’. The     
pronunciation of the name is an issue; with importance placed on the accent. 
‘LA.O.S..’ in the Greek language means ‘people’. In several different points in the 
official documents, as well as in the speeches of the president and other party 
members, emphasis is given on the placement of the accent within the name.  
 
‘The reality is that LA.O.S., with the emphasis on the O, correspond to the Greek 
word for people which is currently the most central to democratic forces in country; 
today LA.O.S., with the accent  on the O, […]reflects clearer than any other political 
party the agonies, desires, needs, and a vision for all Greeks. The reality is that 
LA.O.S., […] has as basic and fundamental principles the total  respect for the 
constitution, democracy and all democratic processes; today LA.O.S., […]is the only 
political party struggling for genuine parliamentary democracy and the sovereignty of 
people (LA.O.S.., 2004) (see Chapter 8 on discussion). 
 
4.6.  Outcomes  
 
Having determined the characteristics of the radical right family, we need to ask 
the question: what kind of party is LA.OS? The party rejects its placement at the 
radical right pole and describes itself as a ‘popular party’. But the programmatic 
positions (in favour of plebiscitary democracy, a fraternal House, but against illegal 
immigration), leave no doubt that LA.OS belongs to the parties of the radical right, 
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with features that reflect the nature of the third wave. In the meantime, shortly after the 
election of 2004, Karatzaferis understood that LA.O.S. was very close to scoring the 
big goal of gaining admissions to the parliament. But in order to make that happen, he 
also understood that he needed to shed the radical right label, an objective that became 
his main concern. The effort was twofold. First he attempted to rid the party of the 
stigma of extremism which at least until a little after the elections of 2004. 
Karatzaferis eventually succeeded in abolishing this stigma by stating that he respected 
and honoured both the various national elements that his party unique, as well as 
democracy and its institutions, not only of the Greek State but also of the European 
Union. 
 
However, from the first signs of the manifesto of 2007 it is clear that the political 
position of LA.O.S. towards the EU favours a loose relationship between nation-states 
of the European Union. LA.O.S. rejects the Constitution and ‘the idea of a European 
super-state,’ believing that ‘the dominant institution in making decisions should 
remain each country’s National Assembly’. It also adds that the European Union 
Constitution is nothing but ‘the lion of the New World Order which wants to turn 
Europe's citizens into effectively-controlled slave-like tools, which is unprecedented in 
human history’ (LA.O.S., 2007) The party declares that it respects ‘the independence, 
language, history, culture and traditions of each nation and every state of the EU’ but 
afterwards almost smugly stated that ‘European culture is rooted in our [i.e. the Greek] 
values and virtues’. The 2007 manifesto tries to clarify that the party opposes ‘any 
kind of social marginalisation, any form of racism, intolerance and anti-Semitism’, 
that it respects ‘absolutely all nations and religions,’ while clearly supporting the 
party’s anti-immigrant stance. LA.O.S. gives high priority to controlling migration by 
establishing absolutely certain rules. As the party underlines, uncontrolled and illegal 
immigration is a 
 
[t]ool of the New Order … [while] it is necessary to preserve  for Greek citizens the right to work, the 
rights guaranteed to workers, labour relationships and fees. All the negative aspects of uncontrolled 
illegal immigration are no longer visible, they began to create ghettos in cities, and crime is at a zenith. 
Limitation and control of immigration is a direct national and social necessity (LA.O.S., 2007) 
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Nevertheless LA.O.S. makes clear that it is a party that espouses democracy, and 
fights in the name of democracy. It is a party that ‘embraces all the Greeks, whatever 
their political basis’ as long as they do ‘not align themselves with fanaticism, 
arrogance, totalitarianism, globalisation and the New World Order’ (LA.O.S., 2007). 
In the context of the policies of LA.O.S., there is a turning point in the form of the 
party’s first published political programme which was later removed from nearly all 
party websites. The reason is that the program of 2004 is inconsistent with the 
principle of ‘solidarity’.   
 
Beyond that, in the LA.O.S. manifesto of 2007 the main emphasis is on national 
issues. There are elements in favour of welfare chauvinism and against immigration, 
which is considered responsible for imported crime ‘...[ sic which] is directly related to 
the large number of illegal economic migrants who organize themselves in closed 
ranks so that the police find it difficult to control them’ (LA.O.S., 2004). Moreover, 
there is a strong negative attitude towards the mainstream established parties which 
deny the possibility of holding direct democratic referendum. Further to this, LA.O.S. 
proposes ‘to establish the possibility of revoking the parliamentary status of those 
proven to have acted contrary to their election commitments’ (LA.O.S. 2007). 
 
 
4.7  Conclusion  
 
This brief survey of LA.O.S.’s texts indicates that, in general,  the major issues 
that LA.O.S. discusses are the economy, public administration, foreign relations 
followed by environmental issues and health. At a certain level, this thematic division 
might not have been found to differ from any other party in the Greek political arena, a 
fact that might suggest that LA.O.S. does not want to differentiate itself from 
‘mainstream’ Greek parties. From a quick examination we can say that LA.O.S. 
presents a profile of a party interested in a wide range of policies by using a more 
populist rhetorical approach.  
 
However, from what has been examined so far, it is clear that although LA.O.S. 
uses different rhetorical and communication techniques their goal remains to establish 
and create necessary emotional connections with voters. Branding through posters and 
party insignia enables LA.O.S to communicate their goals and ideals for the upcoming 
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elections efficiently and emphatically. In political branding, instead of attaching a 
product or service to a brand, political marketers attach ideals and promises to an 
individual brand (see Chapter 2). In the case of LA.O.S., the personality of 
Karatzaferis, the emblem of the party as well as the combination of colours, the logo 
of the campaigns, has one specific purpose: to find common ground and an emotional 
connection with voters. This is the main aim of the party’s communication strategy. 
 
LA.O.S. appears to have a complete understanding of how political 
communication works. The proof of this is its successful campaigns and promotions. 
By hiding the primary radical ideologies that were established from the moment of its 
foundation, LA.O.S. presents a modern and popular profile that makes it a tempting 
and applicable choice for the electorate. This image contributes to election gains, for 
the party and a strong presence in the political scene. Yet, further research (see 
Chapter 8) clearly indicates the elements that distinguish the communication strategies 
of LA.O.S. from other parties in the Greek national political scene, which should 
justify the theory of the Trojan horse that was discussed above.  
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5.  The case of Schweizerische Volkspartei  (SVP) 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
In Switzerland, in the 1960s, a number of small parties appeared. Their political 
agenda included anti-immigration, tough asylum-seeker policies and other policies 
familiar to parties in the radical right family, which led to enhanced support and 
success (see Hainsworth, 2008:44). The Schweizerische Volkspartei  (SVP) by sharing 
with other radical right parties a common belief in a ‘united and sovereign population 
and a xenophobic rhetoric’ (Coffé and Voorpostel, 2010:436) is thus identifiable as a 
member of the radical right family.  
 
The party has been classified as a ‘cultural and nationalist populist’ party 
(Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008, Cranmer, 2011:290), based on the incorporation of 
core elements of  ‘right-wing populist ethno-nationalism under its former leader, 
Christoph Blocher, from the mid 1990s’ (Betz, 2009:99; Mazzoleni, 2003 in Cranmer, 
2011:290-291). Christoph Blocher is considered the ‘architect of the party’s turn to 
populism’, and responsible for the party’s ‘radicalisation’ (Albertazzi, 2009:2). It was 
after 1999, when SVP under his leadership gained national attention and started to 
become a major factor in the country’s politics.  
 
The party has seen success under the leadership of Ueli Maurer, party leader from 
1996-2008, followed by Toni Brunner. Informal supervision by Christoph Blocher, 
also helped the party to become the largest party in Bundesversammlung (Federal 
Assembly), Switzerland’s federal parliament, in the national elections of 2011 
(admin.ch, 2013) with 54 members in Nationalrat (National Council) and 5 in the 
Ständerat (Council of States).  
 
5.2. Background – Foundation and Electoral success 
 
5.2.1.  The origins of the party 
 
On their official website, SVP present an extended version of the history of the 
party and its origins, which follows the evolution of the party from the beginning of the 
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20th century until the present.  Based on this information, the party was founded in 
1971 by the merger of Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Bürgerpartei (Party of Farmers, Traders 
and Independents) (BGB), itself a merger between several farmers’ parties at a 
cantonal level, which dates from 1917, and Sozialpolitische Gruppe (Democratic 
Party), another coalition of parties from different cantons, which took place during the 
Second World War (1942) (SVP, 2013).  
 
In his introductory chapter on the history of SVP, Skenderovic (2009) follows the 
development of the elements that contributed to the emergence of SVP, and provides 
information on the origins of the party. Starting from the late 1910s with the various 
cantonal farmers’ parties that started to experience electoral support and gained 
representation at a national level, until 1936 and the official foundation of BGB.  
 
Having said that, the BGB’s purpose was to represent local Swiss traders and 
farmers against big business and international capital, while opposing all kinds of left-
wing ideology. It managed to become a reliable political partner for Bürgerlich-
Demokratische Partei Schweiz (Swiss Conservative People's Party) (BDP) and 
Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party), and also contributed to the 
establishment of consensual politics, social agreements and policies of economic 
growth. As a result, it achieved an active presence in the Swiss political arena 
Skenderovic, 2009:124-127).  
 
In 1971, the BGB merged with Sozialpolitische Gruppe from the cantons of 
Glarus and Graubünden (Geden, 2006:94, Skenderovic, 2009:128, SVP, 2013) and 
changed its name to SVP. For SVP, the policies that determine the profile of the party 
remained unchained, although the change of name brought about a ‘new dawn’ at a 
wider federal level (SVP, 2013).  
 
Under the presidency of Fritz Hofmann, the party also offered a re-organisation 
change. In addition, during a series of party conferences that took place in 1977 and 
1978, SVP managed to present a new programme (SVP, 2013). During this period the 
party obtained 9.9% of the federal vote. By marking a new political direction 
introducing new issues to the political agenda and by reforming its political 
campaigning style, the party aimed to approach a larger number of voters and become 
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even more appealing at a national level (Skenderovic, 2009:128). Initially however, 
SVP did not attract ‘any increased support beyond that which the BGB had gained, 
remaining at around 11% of the vote through the 1970s and 1980s’ and serving mostly 
as a junior member in coalitions since 1959 (Hainsworth, 2008:44).  
 
In 1991, SVP became the strongest party in Zürich for the first time, with 20.2% 
of the vote. Having said that, the party ‘broke through in the early 1990s in both Zürich 
and Switzerland as a whole, and experienced dramatically increased results in 
elections’ (Skenderovic, 2009:147). Its popularity has increased even more ever since. 
This has allowed it to go from ‘a conservative, Protestant and rural party into that of a 
right-wing populist force’ (Sciarini et al. 2003 in Bühlmann, Nicolett and Selb 2006:3; 
Hutter and Giugni, 2009:433; Fontana, Hardmeier and Sidler, 2006:243; Church, 
2004:64). 
 
In 1992, SVP was the only party to speak against Switzerland's accession to the 
European Economic Area (EEA), which increased the popularity of the party even 
further. Since then, SVP has projected itself as the guardian of Swiss independence, 
defended Swiss neutrality and committed itself to maintaining a restrictive immigration 
policy. These stances, along with support for neo-liberal and anti-state positions in 
economic and fiscal policy (Mazzoleni, 2003; Skenderovic, 2013) as well as its 
preference for lean management and a good business environment (SVP, 2013), have 
resulted in its ever-increasing support in more recent years.  
 
5.2.2. The electoral breakthrough 
 
At the 1999 election, Blocher, a leading politician of SVP and a successful Zurich 
businessman, managed to make an impact on the national political scene. Blocher, who 
has been in charge of the Zurich SVP since 1977, developed a new radical right-wing 
populist agenda, which was similar to that of other radical-right parties in Western 
Europe (Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 2007; Helms, 1997; Betz, 2004). By adopting 
such a populist agenda in the 1990s (see Skenderovic, 2007), the party managed to 
attract its largest share of votes (nearly 23%) in the 1999 federal election, thus 
becoming the second largest party with its number of seats reaching forty-four in the 
lower house of Nationalrat, a result that Hainsworth (2008) has described as having  
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‘fuelled a discussion on right-wing extremism in the country’ (2008:44). This was the 
greatest ‘increase of votes for any party in the entire history of the Swiss proportional 
electoral system, which was introduced in 1919’ (Skenderovic, 2009:150, Hainsworth, 
2008:44). 
 
According to Marcus (2000), under the influence of Blocher the traditionally 
conservative SVP, adopted a more radical approach by setting its electoral campaign 
on an anti-immigrant and xenophobic platform and objecting to any possible entry of 
Switzerland into the European Union (McGann and Kitschelt, 2005:12). The party also 
adopted propositions, which idealised the Swiss nation (Stockemer, 2012, Hutter and 
Giugni, 2009:435), with Blocher himself, trying to ‘harness Swiss resentment at Jewish 
organizations’ efforts to persuade Swiss banks to honour debts to Holocaust victims 
and their families’  (Marcus, 2000:36-37).  
 
For Rose (2000), Blocher’s ‘Switzerland First’ views appealed to an increasing 
number of voters. They appreciated that his main argument was that the time had come 
to form a coalition based on such political stands as lowering taxes and defending 
national interests (2000:37); these policies appeared to have had ‘substantial popular 
appeal among Swiss who preferred their splendid isolation’ (Rose, 2000:37).  
 
In 2003 the party gained the biggest share of the vote, and it ‘was awarded an 
additional seat on the Federal Council’ (Skenderovic, 2009:134). Campaigning on 
issues such as asylum, taxation cuts and reduced state intervention, the party managed 
to win 26.7% and increase its number of seats to fifty-five, which translates into more 
than one-quarter of the seats in the Nationalrat. SVP was the first party to win such a 
large number of seats since 1943 (Hainsworth, 2008:44, Norris, 2005:63) by gaining 
such a remarkable increase in its the popular vote. The electoral success of SVP 
contributed to the re-arrangement of the national political coalition; it successfully 
gained two places in the seven-member government (Bundesrat) (Georgiadou, 
2008:401), with Blocher becoming a powerful and important member (Church, 
2004:518, Betz, 2005:150) in the role of the Head of the Department of Justice and 
Police. Many characterise him as the architect of what SVP has become (Hainsworth, 
2008; Georgiadou, 2008) 
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 By 2007 SVP had significantly extended its appeal. Along with the changes 
pioneered by Blocher, the party started to concentrate on the issue of immigration. In 
October’s elections of 2007 the party had won sixty-two parliamentary seats, 
increasing its voting share to almost 29%, the highest score ever recorded for a single 
party. Significantly, in the 2011 federal election the party gained almost 27% of the 
popular vote and ‘managed to maintain its position as the strongest party in the Swiss 
national assembly and the one of the most powerful radical right-wing party in 
Western’ Europe (see Stockemer, 2012), despite a small decrease of 2,3% since the 
previous election of 20077. A more comprehensive presentation of SVP’s electoral 
results is presented in Figure 5.1 below:  
 
 
Figure 5:1 Election results since 1971 (SVP) 
 
5.2.3. Approaches to the party’s electoral success. The transformation to 
a major political factor and its’ contributors: the opportunity, the leader, the 
rhetoric 
 
In order to understand better the electoral success of SPV and its rise in the Swiss 
political arena a number of organisational and structural factors should be taken into 
account. For Skenderovic (2007), the factor which contributed most to the party’s 
establishment in the national political scene was the fact that, unlike the other Swiss 
                                                        
7 The decrease of the support can be explained by the creation of the BDP party by former SVP 
members, which gained 5.4% of the vote in 2011. 
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radical-right parties, SVP did not have to experience the preliminary procedure of 
party establishment as it already had structural resources and committed voters, since it 
had been active for many years. In addition, as Mazzoleni and Skenderovic, (2007) 
underline, the party had made noticeable progress to its structure, campaign strategies 
and leadership associations. Having said that, SVP extended and consolidated its 
structure and activities, and brought its campaigns to a national level. In addition, with 
Blocher at the front, SVP could depend and rely on a charismatic figure that was 
experted great appeal to the electorate. Electoral studies show that the attractiveness of 
Blocher ‘was a decisive factor in motivating electors to vote for SVP’ (Kriesi, Lachat, 
Selb, Bornschier and Helbling, 2005 in Skenderovic, 2007). 
 
An additional factor that can explain the increasing popular support of SVP can 
be located in the party’s ideological and policy transformation. The anti-immigration 
policies, along with the rejection of the idea of a European Union membership were, 
according to Kriesi et al (2005), important influences on the party’s popularity.  As the 
authors underline, the reasons for the party’s success can additionally be explained by 
the organised electoral campaign of  the1990s, in which SVP presented the European 
integration as a threat to the country’s national identity, an approach that will follow 
the party’s rhetoric for the following years until today  (in Skenderovic, 2007). 
 
Finally, SVP successfully managed to play a dual role as both opposing but also 
participating in the political system. This offered the opportunity to create an‘anti-
establishment rhetoric’ that resonated with the electorate’s disapproval of the 
established political parties. Additionally, it showed the party’s capacity of holding 
executive political positions and sustaining its appeal to its traditional voters (McGann 
and Kitschelt, 1999).  
 
As McGann and Kitschelt underline (2005) , since the mid-1980s, Blocher was 
‘able to gain control of the Zurich section of SVP’ and start to campaign aggressively 
against potential future ‘Swiss international commitments, such as joining the 
European Union’ (2005:8). In their work comparing Austrian and Swiss radical right 
parties, McGann and Kitschelt suggest that the electoral success of the so-called 
‘Blocherian’ cantons […] have strengthened Blocher’s position within the party’ thus 
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becoming ‘the main vehicle of the Swiss anti-internationalist right’ (McGann and 
Kitschelt, 2005:8).  
 
For McGann and Kitschelt (2005), Blocher managed to maximise SVP’s 
ideological resources to gather its main electorate and at the same time attract new 
potential voters instantaneously. This was achieved through the same appeal that he 
brought to bear on winning over the ‘new radical-right’ electorate, ‘while at the same 
time retaining the traditional SVP electorate and attracting a broader anti-EU 
constituency’ (McGann and Kitschelt, 2005:8). Having said that, in the national 
referendum, more than 60% of the voters supported the measures proposed by Blocher 
on tough legislation on asylum, making Switzerland a country with one the strictest 
asylum regimes in Europe (Hainsworth, 2008:45).   
 
Over the last 20 years, SVP has effectively transformed itself from a conservative 
party into a radical right party. With SVP gaining major support at a national level and 
demanding full implementation of its policies, such as those on migration and financial 
austerity (Hainsworth, 2008:45), many believed that the stability of the party system 
was in danger. Betz (2005) similarly stresses that as a result of the SPV increased 
popularity, the ‘country's ‘magic formula’, which since 1959 has determined the 
composition of the Swiss government and has been the main pillar of the country's 
consociational system, came under increasing pressure’ (Georgiadou, 2008:401).  
 
The party, according to data from the European Election Database (NSD), has 
‘pursued conservative social and economic policies, including lower taxes and reduced 
spending, as well as the protection of Swiss agriculture and industry’ (nsd.uib.no, 
2013) and while opposing Swiss membership in international bodies such as the UN 
and EU. All proposals and policies that previously characterised SVP have turned it 
from a moderate agrarian party to a more extreme (radical) populist party (Church 
2000:217-218; Mudde, 2007:58).  
 
 Mazzoleni and Skenderovic (2007) consider the nature of the transformation of 
SVP from an established ‘centre-right party’ into a ‘radical right-wing populist party’. 
While the party was developing into a challenger party, ‘defiant of the rules and 
agreements that structured the Swiss system’, its ‘electoral and referendum campaigns 
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of the party became increasingly marked by a populist style and resentful rhetoric’ 
(Mazzoleni and Skenderovic, 2007:93).  That corresponds to the political style 
typically adopted by populist movements, in which they are keen to use ‘agitation, 
spectacular acts, exaggeration, calculated provocations’, and to breach ‘political and 
socio-cultural taboos’ (Heinisch, 2003: 94; Taggart, 2000 in Mazzoleni and 
Skenderovic, 2007:93).  
 
The transformation of SVP into a party, which prioritises the nation above all 
else, might be seen as an outcome of the referendum tactics of the party. For 
Georgiadou (2008) these initiatives offer the ability to mobilise the elements within the 
electorate towards a different direction from the one of the rest of the parties 
participating in the government coalition. Moreover, this would allow the party to 
project its anti-immigration, anti-European and anti-international positions (2008:402). 
For Skenderovic (2007), direct democracy tactics like referendums offer SVP the 
opportunity, while participating in coalition governments, to promote federal initiatives 
in order to express their anti-establishment anti-immigration sentiments and ‘to 
reinforce its credibility as a popular voice that takes the people’s grievances and 
worries about immigration issues seriously’ (2007:172). In this, the party was able to 
set and make policies on issues related to immigration and to exert pressure on 
government policy regarding immigration. Referendum tactics and anti-immigration 
policies are thus the most salient signifiers of the party’s communication strategies 
while offer a vital contribution to the party’s success.   
 
Following SVP’s calls for a referendum in 1992, the Swiss electorate rejected, by 
53,6%, the initiative against the illegal immigration, which aimed to bring in stricter 
laws on political asylum (Altermatt and Skenderovic, 1999:103); and did so again a 
decade later, on the referendum against the restricting of the asylum system with the 
majority of the people rejecting the proposal by 50,1% (Geden, 2006:103; 
Skenderovic, 2009:135-137). Similarly, a proposal for the granting of naturalisation 
was rejected, with a result of 51,6% for the proposal against the granting of nationality 
to third generation immigrants and a 56,8% to second generation immigrants (Geden, 
2006:103; Skenderovic, 2009:135-137).  Another example is that on signing the 
Schengen agreement in 2005, where 54,6% of the voters were in favour of a ‘Europe 
without frontiers’ (2005) and the one in 2002 about joining the UN, where ‘yes’ 
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gathered 54,6% of the vote (Skenderovic, 2009:135-137). Having said that, the party’s 
same policies on immigration are those that remain in place today. Based on the 
findings of GfS Research Company, SVP is recognised by 58% of the population as 
the most efficient party when it comes to immigration policies and by 69% on policies 
concerning asylum seekers and refuges (gfsbern, 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, one of the most important successes of the party was the initiative 
against the participation of Switzerland in the European Economic Area in 1992. 
Standing in opposition to every other party participating in the Bundesrat along with 
elements from several trade unions and the media, the party succeeded in winning 
50,3% of the votes (Geden, 2006:133-134; Skenderovic, 2009:135-137). For many, the 
success of the party is attributed, to a great extent, to Blocher himself, who has proved 
to be a ‘demagogue’ who ‘likes polarising’ (Scharsach, 2002:140-141 in Georgiadou, 
2008:403). He has ‘unrivalled media skills, highly effective organizational skills and a 
deep pocket’ (Church, 2000:217). For Church (2000), along with Blocher’s 
personality, official policies together with the party’s approach of having direct contact 
with the electorate have facilitated SVP’s transformation into a powerful player on the 
political scene, in general, and in coalition governments in particular (2000:216-217).  
 
The rhetoric adopted in the last decade proved to be a successful formula for the 
party, which along with its populist communication and choice of political agenda 
have contributed to the party’s electoral success. Stockemer (2012), however, 
examines the electoral success of SVP in terms of the electoral support of the party and 
the nature of its voters. Based on his analysis, the characteristics of SVP voters have 
hardly changed over fifteen years, with the exception that men appear keener on voting 
for the party than women. In 2007, compared to 1995, the typical SVP supporter had 
the same characteristics: traditional conservative views, low level of education and had 
‘been socialised into a right-wing milieu’ (Stockemer, 2012) with a tendency to 
combine an economically rightist outlook with strong social conservatism (Germann, 
Mendez, Serdult and Wheatley, 2012:19). Skenderovic (2013) adds to this profile of 
the voter by underlining that traditional SVP voters come from rural regions, from the 
old middle class, and are often self-employed workers. Lately however, SVP has 
gained supporters from voters in lower and middle-income groups, and those with 
lower or average levels of formal education (Skenderovic, 2013).  
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The views of the party appear to have resonated with a significant portion of the 
population, the majority of which considers it as the most appropriate vehicle for 
addressing the major problems of the country on environmental issues, unemployment, 
economic growth, in addition to immigration and asylum (gsfbern.ch, 2013). For 
Stockemer (2012), the fact that the party managed to attract part of the electorate 
originated from dissimilar ideological backgrounds. He explains the increase in the 
party`s vote in terms of two major factors: the identity politics that distinguishes the 
party from all other Swiss parties and its organisational capacity which will be 
analysed in further detail below.  
 
Skenderovic  (2009) has underlined that one of the other reasons explaining 
SVP's success can be understood by the growing dissatisfaction towards the country's 
consensual system. Nevertheless, SVP has without a doubt become a long-term 
political force in the Swiss political arena by gaining instant representation in the 
national parliament and by participating in coalition governments at municipal, 
cantonal and national level. 
 
5.3.  Structure and Ideology  
 
As in the case of LA.O.S. (see Chapter 4), the structure and the ideology of the 
party are indispensable elements when constructing the party’s identity. At first sight, 
SVP demonstrates most of the elements that are seen as constituting a radical right 
party in Western Europe and this will now be examined further in light of the 
conceptualisation of political communication discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
5.3.1.  Structure 
 
An overview of the party’s structure can be found in its official website (svp.ch), 
where we are also introduced to its official policies and its organisational structure. 
The website also provides its manifesto and various other official party documents via 
a rich archive. According to the party, the structure of SVP corresponds to the federal 
structure of the country itself; Switzerland has three political levels: the Confederation 
(federal), cantons and municipalities. Accordingly, SVP also has a national (Swiss) 
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party, as a ‘roof’ over the so-called cantonal parties (SVP, 2013). Based on the party’s 
official records, SVP has over 90,000 members throughout Switzerland. Trying to 
create its own member profile, the party provides information according to which 
about one-fifth of its membership comes from agriculture and forestry, another fifth 
from the professions (business, medicine, law, etc.) and the remaining three-fifths can 
be found among workers, civil servants, and teachers (SVP, 2013). By having 
members from these backgrounds allows SVP to identify itself as a genuine and 
modern ‘People's Party’ (SVP, 2013), which is represented in all four-language regions 
of Switzerland.  
 
5.3.2.  Leadership 
 
The party leader is the most powerful official within a party, as s/he is responsible 
for the party’s relationship with the electorate and the general public, apart from being 
the party’s public face and main contact with the media. In radical right parties, 
charismatic leadership is one of the major characteristics which lead to their success. 
The SVP is no exception although there are other strong party members who appear to 
play an important role like the party’s spokesmen.  
 
Ueli Maurer was the party’s president from 1996-2008. Before that he was a 
member of the cantonal parliament of Zurich from 1983-1991 and in 1996, at 
Blocher’s suggestion, he was elected president of the SVP (Skenderovic, 2009:134). 
Under his leadership, SVP became one of the strongest political parties on the Swiss 
political scene and established its place at a national level.  Since 2008 the chairman of 
the party is Toni Brunner. But it is Blocher who contributed most to the transformation 
of the party. As a public figure, directly linked to the party, Blocher’s personality 
became, for Skenderovic (2009), a powerful symbol and a motivation for people to 
vote for the party.  
 
A politician, an industrialist and a member of the Swiss Federal Council and the 
Federal Department of Justice and police from 2004 to 2007, Blocher serves as Vice 
President of the SVP and his contribution to the success of SVP since the first decade 
of the twenty-first century is well acknowledged. In his political career, Blocher had 
been a member of Nationalrat (1979-2003), president of SVP in Zurich (1977-2003), 
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and president of the AUNS (Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland)  
(Blocher, 2013). 
 
For Georgiadou (2008), more than ‘demagogue and populist’, more than a ‘media 
personality’, Blocher is a successful businessman who knows the techniques of 
administration and organisation and how to market a product and make it available to 
consumers (2008:408). By recognising the gaps in the commercial market, the deficit 
in political confrontation, the accumulation of feelings of discontent and protest, 
Blocher sought to attract votes by means of an aggressive campaign style. Blocher 
appeared as a populist leader, successful in ‘mobilising support in election and voting 
campaigns and in skilfully demonstrating what it takes to build a mass, following in an 
era where media have become an important vehicle for winning voter support’ 
(Skenderovic, 2009, 139-140). In his personal website, launched in 1996, the visitor 
has access to Blocher’s political programme, personal speeches and numerous 
interviews and articles. For Canovan (1999), what marks politicians like Blocher 
populists is not only that they employ simple direct language in the way they address 
political issues, but that they offer ‘political analyses and proposed solutions that are 
also simple and direct (1999:5). By understanding the potential offered by a more 
strategic use of communication in order to influence the public (see Swanson & 
Nimmo, 1990), Blocher managed to employ simple and direct language while 
addressing political issues, as well as offering solutions, which could be understood 
easily. It is under the strong influence of Blocher that SVP saw its numbers grow; his 
presence in the party leadership played a key role in the selection and development of 
communication strategies for the party.  
 
Along with a new organisational structure, charismatic leadership and 
improvements in political campaigning and public relations, SVP changed its way of 
addressing the electorate. Before going into more depth about the communication skills 
of the party, the context of the electoral manifestos will be discussed.  
 
5.3.3  Ideology – Policy making  
 
This research draws together the following documents in order to depict the 
ideology of the party. The political party manifesto programme as adopted in 1999, 
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with the statutes of the party (the most official document), gives a comprehensive 
description of the image and identity that SVP likes to project. Consideration of the 
manifesto of 2007 develops this even further. Apart from this, in the official website of 
the party there are official announcements, official speeches and press releases, which 
reflect the positions of the party on various issues covering a wide range of topics such 
as politics, economy, environment etc. Such a very well structured source of 
information offered on the website creates a very user-friendly environment. In its 
official website, SVP provides its own analytical image of what the party stands for, in 
terms of its positions and policies. There are links to an extensive archive covering the 
period from 2003 until the present where all official position papers, slogans, press 
releases, annual reports, interviews and brief overviews of the positions are made 
available; as are the party’s newspaper, speeches and press releases. Although for the 
purposes of this research the focus remains on analysing the electoral manifestos and 
selected speeches by the leader, the rich material offered on the website is worth 
highlighting, especially in comparison to the cases of LA.O.S. and AN.  
 
Concerning its ideology, the party claims to adhere to the values of  ‘national 
conservatism’, aiming at the preservation of Switzerland's political sovereignty and a 
conservative society (SVP, 2013). In the 1990s SVP, as mentioned above, transferred 
its focus on social issues, national and international security, globalisation, 
immigration and cultural pluralism. These issues are going to be the signifiers of the 
party’s rhetoric and can be traced through several aspects of SVP’s communication 
tactics, e.g. electoral campaigns and speeches. Having Blocher on the front line, the 
party managed to connect fear of foreigners with social insecurities concerning 
unemployment, taxation, bureaucracy and economic welfare (Georgiadou, 2008:406). 
For Betz (2005), it is this connection between such national-cultural fear and social-
economic insecurity, or else, these ‘fusion materials and cultural concerns’ that SVP 
was aiming at (2005:164).   
 
Adopting a more national chauvinistic approach towards how the country should 
be governed, the party manifesto of 2007 starts and concludes with the Swiss flag 
along with the phrase of ‘my country-our Switzerland’ (SVP, 2007). This suggests that 
the party primarily adapts its rhetoric to right-wing conservative voters, who are part of 
the target electorate for the radical right. Additionally, according to Betz (2005), the 
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party is flattering the hard-working middle class, sharing the indignation of the 
electorate by stressing that there is a need for ‘unjust punishment’ towards taxation 
policies, and projects liberal policies promoting the principle of individual 
responsibility. It is also sceptical about any expansion of governmental services 
(2005:165-166).  In an environment where the potential voter feels insecure, and is 
motivated by the ‘principle of neutrality’ and the conservative values of a traditional 
society, the party offers an alternative that promises the preservation of both Swiss 
national identity and the system. This will be achieved by the rejection of the policy, 
which seeks the accession of Switzerland to the European Union, the rejection of 
military involvement abroad, the protection of homeland security and the rejection of 
increases in government spending on social welfare and education. The party is in 
favour of increased competition in the market and lower taxes, while it is against 
deficit budgets. In sum, the underlying principles of the party can be found in the 
official statement of the party programme of 2003-2007, where SVP defends Swiss 
exceptionalism 
 
[…] Our freedom and our independence makes us strong…and for this we will defend ourselves…The 
democratic birthright of the people must become a model to imitate at a national level and in no case to 
be sacrificed to foreign policy objectives such as joining the EU (SVP, 2013) 
 
 Additionally, in the document there is an emphasis on the fact that accession 
would waste public money, which would lead to an increase in taxation, a subsidising 
of taxpayers with unnecessary services like ‘promoting a movie, kindergartens and 
offices for equality’. The party defends the model of the traditional family that ‘owns 
the care of children from birth until adulthood’ (SVP, 2013). 
 
5.4.  Analysing the context  
 
5.4.1.  Beyond the text 
 
In this part of the discussion the main focus is to analyse and present the identity 
of the party and to develop an argument that will support the main hypothesis 
regarding ideology and communication politics. In the party manifesto, released just 
before the elections of 1999 and which was the official party line for several years, 
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SVP introduced its new image. The years that followed marked a significant increase 
in SVP popularity. The issues that occupied the agenda of 1999 are the same that SVP 
continues to follow to this day. This political agenda can be characterised as typical of 
a radical right party, equivalent to those of other parties with similar ideology around 
Europe. Major issues addressed are asylum and security, immigration and welfare 
chauvinism, issues that have been developed and adjusted to the party’s programme 
and rhetoric and which have come to characterise the party as a whole. Above all, SVP 
stressed its commitment towards the electorate and its members by identifying as a 
party on which  ‘people can rely’ since the party is committed to keeping its promises 
(SVP, 2007). Along with the ideas and policies presented in the party manifestos, 
wider information is communicated through images containing the Swiss flag, 
countryside landscapes, photos from party events and public speeches, images that 
encapsulate the idea of what SVP stands for. 
 
Within the first few pages of every manifesto from 1999 until the latest party 
programme of 2011, the party introduces its principal values and positions according to 
which the party builds up its programme and claims its place in the political spectrum. 
The aim of the party is to give the impression of placing the citizen at the centre of its 
concerns. The desire for liberty, independence and personal responsibility is seen as 
having formed the bedrock of the Confederation from its very beginning. According to 
the party, these are the values that have made the country strong and shaped it for 
centuries, as they guarantee prosperity and security. ‘The economic crises and budget 
deficits so characteristic of the modern era demonstrate the superiority of 
Switzerland’s recipe for success ,but these achievements are under threat; the actions 
of the Federal Council, parliament and the administration are increasingly challenging 
the fundamental values and strengths of our country’ (SVP, 2007); nonetheless, the 
party stands for a ‘secure future in freedom and prosperity’ in a country that ‘is worth 
living in and of which someone can be proud’ and work for the conservation of 
Switzerland’s unique system that was founded on ‘sovereignty, direct democracy, 
permanent neutrality, federalism and subsidiarity’ (SVP, 2013).  
 
Ideas on the state and its evolution 
When it comes to financial and tax policies, they determine all the other tasks of 
the state. ‘The state needs money to perform the tasks entrust it with. However, people 
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have a right to expect that the taxes, levies and fees they pay are used efficiently and 
responsibly’ (SVP, 2013). 
 
 SVP finds Switzerland’s financial policy situation remains unsatisfactory and 
despite all the savings and relief programmes, the state’s budget continues to grow. 
And the explanation lies in the fact that 
 
[f]ederal government has neither an effective list of financial policy priorities nor a strategic objective, 
let alone an effective plan for reining in unnecessary expenditure (SVP, 2007) 
 
In addition, the party promises to work to guarantee the ‘protection of the private 
property and privacy’ and promote tighter control of the national budget along with 
lower taxes and a more neo-liberal economic approach to the market with less 
bureaucracy (SVP, 2013). It will also place emphasis ‘on securing jobs in many areas, 
while retaining an open foreign policy which at the same time rejects membership of 
the EU, EEA or NATO’ (SVP, 2013) in any form. In terms of crime, SVP will demand 
‘tougher penalties on lawbreakers and ask for deportation of foreign criminals’ (SVP, 
2013). On the major issue of immigration and asylum policy, the party asks for a 
‘consistent asylum policy that prevents abuse and offers protection’ and an 
immigration policy ‘tailored to the needs of the country’ itself with the army used as 
the national defence system (SVP, 2013).  
 
Moreover, the party welcomes a productive agricultural sector with ‘family-run 
farms’, a social welfare system protected from any kind of ‘abuse’, and an education 
system that ‘expects and encourages performances’ and emphasises the personal 
responsibility of the individual (SVP, 2013). The party wants a ‘safe, cheap and 
independent energy supply’, realistic action for the security of the environment and a 
media policy based on competition (SVP, 2013). Finally, SVP supports a vibrant 
culture characterised by a sense of community, the fundamental values of Western 
Christian culture (SVP, 2013). For SVP, the state is responsible for creating and 
developing a healthy economic environment for its citizens and, additionally, for 
creating circumstances essential for minimising unemployment levels.  
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Another important tenet for the party is preserving the Swiss currency, gold and 
tax sovereignty. Tax competition between cantons and municipalities has made a 
substantial contribution to the prosperity of the country. For SVP creeping 
internationalisation, bureaucratisation, centralisation and harmonisation are a threat to 
direct democracy and the gradual process of disenfranchisement is being carried out 
under the seemingly attractive mantra of ‘increased efficiency’ (SVP, 2007). For this 
reason SVP demands that all politicians and judges act resolutely to defend the Swiss 
legal system. The federal government, by contrast, according to the party, increasingly 
adopts prescriptions laid down by international organisations, the cantons do what the 
federal government tells them, and the municipalities take their orders from the 
cantons. Similarly, public servants at all levels have less power to influence matters 
(SVP, 2007).  Additionally, SVP’s approach to businesses and enterprises 
encompasses the 
 
[…]support  for a wide range of enterprises from  large to  medium-sized and small,  considering them   
the foundation of  the country’s prosperity .It advocates the reduction of expensive  bureaucracy and the 
enforcement of the  legal system as it is rather than  new prohibitions ; it is also against the state 
competing with private enterprises or obstructing them (SVP, 2007) 
 
SVP supports the abolition of the right of appeal for associations and calls for a 
simplification of value added tax and a reduction in the profits tax on companies in the 
direct federal tax. Finally, it states it is against the burden placed on smaller companies 
to gather statistics as well as the self-serving collaboration ‘of left-wing pseudo-
companies’, while supporting the client confidentiality of Swiss bank and the whole 
Swiss financial centre (SVP, 2007). Furthermore, it calls for an ‘effective stock 
corporation law’ to protect property against managerial excesses and advocates a 
special value added tax rate for the hotel and catering industry (SVP, 2007).  
 
The threat of immigration  
As previously mentioned, developing policies which focus on asylum seekers 
and foreigners in general is an area of major importance for SVP, especially in the last 
two decades. Since Switzerland is seen as a country with a high risk of accepting too 
many immigrants (20% of the population are foreigners) (SVP, 1999), SVP wants 
consistent asylum and immigration policies to limit this influx in order to ensure social 
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peace, which could become endangered. Their argument is based on the notion that the 
future of the Swiss people will be threatened by increasing numbers of immigrants, to 
the extent that ‘in a small period of time we are going to become strangers in our own 
country’ (SVP, 1999). 
 
According to SVP it is because Switzerland provides a high standard of living 
and a generous social benefits sector that makes the country attractive to mass 
immigration. But it is the abuse of hospitality that creates xenophobia and this is the 
reason that xenophobia and racism need to be effectively countered (SVP, 1999). For 
the party, asylum for genuine refugees, people whose lives are demonstrably 
threatened, and therefore seek protection, should be granted in Switzerland. However, 
as Switzerland is regarded as a rich country with unlimited possibilities many illegal 
immigrants who do not fulfil these requirements are trying to claim asylum. In order to 
prevent this from appening, SVP proposes more effective border protection and 
efficient laws that will shorten the procedures (SVP 1999, 2007).  
 
The party declares that Switzerland is ‘not a country of immigration’, and argues 
that the Swiss Plateau is already one of the world's most densely populated regions. 
Because of the policies of the Federal Council and the centre-left parties, SVP claims 
that the country has been exposed to uncontrolled population growth with far-reaching 
consequences, and because of that important qualities and traditions of the nation are at 
risk. According to the party ‘this situation is the consequence of uncontrolled mass 
immigration’ and that is why SVP launched its deportation initiative: ‘foreigners who 
commit murder, rape or robbery or who abuse our social welfare system must leave 
our country’ (SVP, 2007). The party condemns the so-alled ‘asylum industry’ by 
stating that three quarters of the people asking for asylum are doing so only in order to 
take advantage of this generous welfare provision, and stresses that the majority of the 
people in prison are from other countries and thus contribute to raising crime levels  
(SVP, 2007). 
 
The party makes a connection between criminal attitudes and the origin of the 
immigrants, especially those coming from Muslim countries, and underlines the 
incompatibility between Christianity and Islam. Along with this argument SVP 
challenges the capability and willingness of these people to integrate since 60% of 
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them come from countries that are not culturally compatible with Switzerland (SVP, 
2013). As Betz (2005) sees it, in some election material in 2003, Islam was openly 
named as the basic obstacle for the integration of immigrants, since it is a ‘factor that 
could be applied in order to destroy Western Christian culture’ (2005:160).  
 
Nevertheless, integration is a cornerstone of any sensible immigration policy and 
‘is not only the responsibility of the host country but it is also the responsibility of the 
immigrants themselves’ (SVP, 1999). It should be based on the willingness of those 
immigrating to settle in the host country, as well as on the local population interacting 
with incomers on the basis of honesty and a sharing of information on both sides. The 
SVP encourages the naturalisation and integration of a number of foreigners and to 
facilitate this, SVP launched an initiative aimed at fighting asylum abuse and reducing 
the attractiveness of Switzerland for asylum seekers; it also calls for effective 
implementation of asylum decisions and effective measures to stabilise the total 
foreign population (SVP, 2007). Finally, it asks for a revision of the criminal law 
against racism. Continuing its argument on the issue of immigration, the party wants 
the dual nationality and immigration background to be recorded in the official federal 
crime statistics. As long as danger of an increase in the number of immigrants remains, 
the party asks for consistent application of asylum law, and demands that ‘asylum 
seekers from countries where there is no risk of persecution be sent back immediately 
– if necessary by compulsory deportation’ (SVP, 2007). It considers it unacceptable 
that municipalities should be forced to pick up the bill for sloppy asylum procedures at 
a federal level, and the party believes that it is untenable for social security payments 
to be made to people whose removal has been declared legally enforceable. 
 
The party calls for the ‘reintroduction of quotas for immigration and for 
parliament to be given the power to decide on their application’ (SVP, 1999, 2007).  It 
also opposes any further easing of the requirements for naturalisation and demands that 
those wishing to acquire Swiss citizenship pay an appropriate amount in order to do so. 
SVP advocates probationary naturalisation, and that citizenship should be withdrawn 
from those who commit crimes. Similarly, it opposes the naturalisation of any 
applicants who do not have a residence permit, have a criminal background or lack the 
ability to speak, read and write in an official language. Citizenship should be 
withdrawn from persons with dual nationality that are guilty of serious offences. . If 
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Swiss citizenship is granted to asylum seekers it must include a formal declaration of 
loyalty to the Swiss law and the Constitution. Furthermore it is opposed to granting 
any voting rights to foreigners and demands strict and consistent application of the law 
on foreigners in connection with those who are in Switzerland illegally or have no 
identification papers. Finally it does not accept the legalisation of those who are in the 
country illegally and without papers and calls for a strengthening of the border police 
to prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country (SVP, 2007). 
 
Law and order applications 
Moreover, the party considers that the proportion of crimes that are actually 
solved is lamentably low, because many are not even reported and the risk of 
prosecution is constantly decreasing. Along with that, the Swiss economy has long 
depended on foreign workers and the country has therefore always offered a generous, 
but controlled, welcome to the immigrants that have contributed to the growth and, in 
return, enjoyed a life of relative prosperity in Switzerland. But the population of 
Switzerland is currently ‘exploding’ (SVP, 2007). As pointed out by Skenderovic 
(2007), from the 1990s the agenda adopted by SVP regarding immigration and asylum 
policies was displayed along with the party rhetoric in its campaigns where the issue of 
asylum seekers was presented in terms which referred to asylum-seekers as the source 
of the numerous problems in Swiss society. 
 
Having this in mind, SVP calls for the reintroduction of suspended and non-
suspended sentences even for periods of less than six months and demands the 
abolition of suspended fines and so-called reparations and the reintroduction of fines 
for misdemeanours and crimes (SVP, 2007). In the meantime the party demands the 
compulsory confinement of criminals, and especially serial criminal, in appropriate 
closed institutions and wants judges to be able to apply the maximum penalty for 
adults from the age of sixteen for serious crimes such as rape, grievous bodily harm, or 
murder. As for young offenders, they are to be automatically reported to their teachers 
and instructors, with details of the offence they have committed (SVP, 2007). Security 
is a very important issue for the party, and is linked to the most popular theme of the 
agenda: the immigrants. Reports of beatings, stabbings, rapes and murders, theft, 
burglary and threatening behaviour by immigrants are seen as ‘increasing [sic. and] 
endangering the safety of the population at large’ (SVP, 2007). 
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Additionally, the Swiss legal system is increasingly being amended so that it 
complies line with EU and international law. Yet, EU law and international law are 
made not by the people, but by civil servants, experts, professors and politicians. For 
SVP, Switzerland adopts numerous EU regulations where there is no need to do so, 
and the European Convention on Human Rights too, goes far beyond binding 
international law and threatens the liberties on which the Swiss state is founded (SVP, 
2007).  Finally, instead of granting citizens the freedom to make their own judgments, 
the public authorities increasingly act as their moral guardians. The moralising 
opinions increasingly voiced by the Federal Council are questionable and 
unacceptable. ‘Democracy is a form of state that offers alternatives. There must always 
be scope for a yes or a no answer, without advocates of the one or the other view being 
shouted down or even dismissed as morally inferior. It is equally undemocratic when 
the Federal Council or parliament bundles popular vote proposals together with the 
express intention of frustrating the will of the people’ (SVP, 2007). 
 
International relations and EU 
When it comes to the EU, SVP identifies Switzerland as closely linked with all 
European countries culturally and politically, and that the country has an important 
role in Europe, both geographically and economically. For SVP Switzerland is a 
country which can be held up as a model of democracy, environmental protection, 
social security and economic performance. This is seen as the incentive behind 
Europe’s   keen interest in joining with this important and financially strong trading 
partner . Joining the EU though is not one of the interests of SVP although it welcomes 
Switzerland's cooperation with the EU in the form of balanced bilateral agreements 
(SVP, 1999, 2007). For SVP a possible accession would be equal to the elimination of 
elements that characterise the Swiss culture, e.g. direct democracy, independence and 
neutrality and would possibly cause serious problems, e.g. rising unemployment and 
increasing of taxes (SVP, 2007). The official line of SVP concerning international 
relations with the EU is withdrawal from any discussion on the issue of free movement 
of people across the boarders.  
 
SVP recognises that joining the EU could help Switzerland's cooperation with 
Europe in different areas, like easier reciprocal market access and improved 
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information exchange, which might open new possibilities. More specifically, 
advantages could be had for the ‘exportation sector by reducing customs formalities, 
and EU membership might provide some transnational procedures for example in 
helping the fight against organised crime’, but nevertheless the potential accession to 
the EU could destroy Swiss independence (SVP, 2007). Switzerland then would be 
called to support the troubled economy of the Eurozone something that would only 
harm the country.  Additionally it would make it easier to abuse asylum procedures. 
SVP favours an open attitude towards all states and suggests that there will be a way 
for better mutual collaboration:  ‘The party is now demanding a thorough testing of 
bilateral contracts with the EU, rejects EU membership and calls for the withdrawal of 
the EU membership application and a departure from this strategic goal in favour of 
broad discussion on cooperation’ (SVP, 1999).  
 
The role of education  
With regard to education, SVP believes that it is is one of the most important 
reserves of the country. Professional knowledge can define the performance of the 
country itself (SVP, 1999) and can also contribute to the protection of values and 
virtues and be an investment for the future. For SVP the quality of education in public 
schools has deteriorated. The teaching of traditional values and virtues, such as 
reliability, discipline and respect, is frowned upon and also the work of the teaching 
staff has become difficult.  
 
Another particular problem that has been presented by the party in recent years is 
the growing number of foreign children in schools, creating a situation that requires the 
preparation of extra language courses and measures in order to facilitate the integration 
of these new students. At the same time, an important component of basic education in 
multilingual Switzerland is the teaching of national languages. Only in this will the 
multilingualism of Switzerland be used as an advantage. Effective education in the 
mother language and another national language as a second language are indispensable 
for progress (SVP, 1999). Better school qualifications and higher education in 
particular are enjoying increasing popularity and education and research for the future 
of Switzerland should be rewarding (SVP, 1999). Bearing this in mind the party 
promises to create a generous environment in which investment in research and 
formulation of new opportunities is paramount. In sum, SVP calls for a performance-
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based education system in which the performance of the young requires more 
collaboration between university and private sector and a closer link between practice 
and research. Finally, SVP wants attractive, future-oriented vocational training and 
calls for linguistic skills to be adjusted through the enrolment of foreign students in 
special classes. 
 
As far as matters relating to the family, and parental responsibility for bringing 
up children are concerned, the SVP increasingly questions whether the state is making 
ever-greater incursions into the parental sphere. The party suggests that children are 
already supposed to begin compulsory schooling at the age of just four, and if the 
educational bureaucrats have their way, they will be integrated into state care even 
earlier (SVP, 2007). Finally, for SVP, politicians and trade unionists are overloading 
the social welfare system, but every Swiss citizen has to pick up the bill. In relation to 
that, more and more foreigners who come in the country end up not in the labour 
market but in the social welfare system. And since the system can only be maintained 
if those who pay can rest assured that they are not being defrauded, ‘abuse of the 
system needs to be systematically rooted out’.  
 
The Personal initiative  
For SVP the most important thing and the actual bedrock for the country and 
nation are the people, who represent supreme authority in the state, and they alone 
should decide which direction it will follow. The party believes that the way to self-
determination and self-confidence is if the nation is represented in a liberal state with 
comprehensive freedoms and citizens’ rights, a neutral foreign policy and a federal 
political order. Based on this, ‘SVP is committed to an independent Switzerland that is 
open to the world: one that maintains good political, economic and cultural relations 
with all nations but at the same time protects its own sovereignty and makes its own 
decisions’ (SVP, 2007). The bond, according to the party, is a patriotism that is not tied 
to a single culture or language but rather to a shared history and a commitment to a 
unique political system without which the Swiss multicultural nation could not enjoy 
the freedoms that people cherish today; SVP believes that the Swiss are united by 
commitment to a system based on independence, federalism, direct democracy, 
permanent armed neutrality. For this reason there should be a ‘commitment to 
Switzerland’s unique system as, despite adverse external conditions, it has brought us 
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almost two centuries of peace, stability, security and prosperity and in the option of 
abandoning the commitment to that uniqueness’ and to ‘give up one or more of the 
pillars on which the state is built, people risk endangering the quality of Switzerland as 
a whole’ (SVP, 2007). 
 
Values and Traditions  
The best choice from the perspective of SVP is to focus on values depicting both 
strength and traditional culture, such as modesty, and hard work, which have 
traditionally characterised the Swiss people. ‘There are scarcely any examples to 
follow, since few countries have begun tackling the difficulties that we too face: 
national indebtedness, weak growth, unemployment, a ballooning social welfare 
system, poor education, crime and mass immigration’ (SVP, 2007). For SVP only 
federalism gives citizens the highest possible degree of democratic co-determination 
within a manageable framework. ‘The closer to the people the decisions are taken, the 
more efficient and sensible is the use made of public funds. The smaller the political 
unit, the more prudently it manages its resources’ (SVP, 2007). 
 
Environment  
As seen in the manifestos, the safeguarding of resources is also a major issue in 
SVP policy. Sustainable development in Switzerland is an important concern and for 
this reason Switzerland in the field of environmental protection is already leading the 
world as a role model. This favoured model is based on research in the field of the 
rational use of energy and fuel, and urges favourable conditions for energy production 
and procurement for Switzerland and is committed to the protection of nature for 
future generations. The party stands in favour of measures for the efficient use of all 
alternative energies, says ‘yes to continue to use nuclear energy and supports the 
maintenance and renewal of existing as well as the moderate, environmentally 
compatible construction of new water supplies’ (SVP, 1999).  
 
Thoughts on the federal system and the nation above all 
SVP wants to see a decisive step taken towards full democracy at federal level, 
through popular elections to the Federal Council. ‘As is the case in most cantonal 
governments and municipal councils, these elections should be conducted via a 
majority voting system, guaranteeing at least two seats for the non-German-speaking 
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regions of Switzerland’ (SVP, 2007).  In this case, unlike parliament, the people will 
elect their government without self-serving, petty-minded scheming, party-political 
intrigues and agreements reached in smoke-filled rooms. Moreover, the media have 
less influence on the citizenry than they do on parliamentarians; this would ensure that 
federal councillors rather than interests, who serve popular decisions, would better 
represent the people’s interests.   
 
On the other hand, SVP suggests that political decisions should be taken as close 
to the citizenry as possible. As the municipality is the smallest political unit and is 
closest to the people, decisions on matters of local concern should be taken at 
municipal level wherever possible. The courts must not go beyond the principles of the 
Constitution and curtail the rights of the citizens. ‘SVP cannot accept the increasing 
restrictions on democratic rights or the growing trend for the judiciary to place itself 
above the democratic process. Municipalities should therefore be allowed to take final 
decisions for themselves regarding the form of naturalisation procedures’ (SVP, 2007). 
 
To sum up, in relation to the sovereignty of the Swiss people, SVP stands 
opposed to the marginalisation of the community through globalisation; demands that 
elected authorities defend the legal system rather than applying foreign laws; requests 
that EU law should not be automatically implemented when this is not in Switzerland’s 
interest; disputes the tendency towards centralisation and the expansion of the 
responsibility of the federal government; supports communal authorities and municipal 
assemblies; rejects mergers of municipalities and cantons; defends the democratic 
rights of the population and opposes the tendency of the courts to place themselves 
beyond democracy; trusts that the Federal Council should be elected by the people and 
demands the reinforcement of freedom of expression (SVP, 2007). 
 
For SVP, Swiss nationality is highly prized around the world and the Swiss 
passport offers protection and many advantages. Citizenship confers unique rights and 
liberties. For this reason, ‘naturalisation can never be anything but the final step on the 
path to integration. Citizenship is not a fundamental right but a political right’ (SVP, 
2007). SVP therefore believes that there should be no automatic entitlement to the 
granting of citizenship, or automatic appeal to the courts if applications for citizenship 
are rejected. Measures should be taken to ensure that naturalisations remain at a 
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reasonable. Above all, for SVP, acquisition of Swiss citizenship should come at a 
price. 
 
In relation to the state and the position of the country in the international political 
scene, SVP believes that the goal of Swiss foreign policy is set down in Article 2 of the 
Federal Constitution: ‘The Swiss Confederation shall protect the liberty and rights of 
the people and safe-guard the independence and security of the country’ (SVP, 2007).   
 
[T]he people are sovereign and determine the fate and future of Switzerland in freedom and 
independence. Their freedom of action is limited only by binding international law. The Swiss people 
and their elected representatives oversee the exercise of foreign policy by the Federal Council. The 
Federal Council and federal parliamentarians undertake, by their oath or vow, to uphold the Constitution 
and the law (SVP, 2007) 
 
The Constitution charges the Federal Council and parliament with taking 
‘measures to safeguard the external security, independence and neutrality of 
Switzerland’ (SVP, 2007).  The same applies to treaties that impose unreasonable 
disadvantages on Switzerland. The Swiss Penal Code states that any person who, as the 
authorised representative of the Confederation, conducts negotiations with a foreign 
government, which are intended to be detrimental to the Confederation, shall be liable 
to a custodial sentence of not less than one year (SVP, 2007). 
 
Based on these principles the party demands, as the ultimate goals of foreign 
policy, the preservation of liberty, citizens’ rights, independence and the neutrality of 
Switzerland. It is opposed to all efforts to join the UN Security Council, and calls for 
the withdrawal of the application to join the EU and the dismantling of the integration 
office.  
 
5.4.2.  Organised campaigns  
 
The logo of SVP is a smiling sun rising from a green landscape  ‘holding’ a 
Swiss flag. The logo is accompanied with the slogan: ‘Swiss quality, the party of the 
middle class’. The colours that predominate in the logo are green red white and yellow. 
The red and white reflect the national colours of Switzerland. Green also reflects the 
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landscapes of the country and the sun and signifies the new start that the party 
represents. Green appears as the most popular colour from among these four, as it is 
used as a background in the official website of the party as well. The logo itself creates 
positive sentiments as green above all represents harmony and balance, and is thought 
to represent life and growth, especially in the company of a glowing sun. As the sun 
rises above the green field, the new Switzerland will rise from the ideals and 
propositions of the party.  
 
 
 
Figure 5:2 The logo of SVP  
 
Apart from policies and ideology that identify the party, one of the main factors 
that distinguish SVP from the rest of Swiss parties is its campaigning and 
communication choices. During the past few years the party has run a recognisable 
campaign concerning anti-immigration policies. One of these was in 2007 where the 
party was criticised for its posters representing three white sheep kicking a black sheep 
out of the country. Similar to the idea of the idiom to describe a disreputable member 
of a group or a family, the so-called ‘black sheep’ campaign, was reflecting the SVP’s 
policy of expelling the foreigner criminals. The initial reaction towards the posters was 
an argument claiming that the posters were aiming to provoke racist and hatred 
sentiments. Just before the general election the campaign poster was released and 
created numerous reactions both in the country and at an international level. These 
posters attracted the condemnation of several associations such as the national anti-
racist commission and the Swiss Jewish community and even the United Nations.  
  
 Apart from official reactions from politicians and national organisations, but 
also draw the attention of the press and the publicity on the issue was significant. In 
order to understand the impact of the campaigns of SVP, it is useful to look at the 
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newspapers of the time. The Guardian reported the party as supporting a ‘oppressive 
deportation scheme that allegedly mirrors a law operated by Nazi Germany' 
(theGuardian, 2007). At the same time the Swiss President, Micheline Calmy-Rey, 
characterised the poster as racist and appalling.  
 
 
Figure 5:3 The black sheep campaign poster  
 
The poster was followed by different slogans, e.g. ‘Make things safer; or ‘For 
more security’ and was displayed on billboards, in newspapers and, was posted by 
party members across the country.  
 
At the same time, a campaign video presenting ‘young hooded foreigners 
committing violent crimes’ was withdrawn after the ‘Swiss youngsters who actually 
took part complained they had been told they were taking part in a crime-prevention 
video’ (Sciolino, 2007 in NYT). In this video, entitled ‘Heaven or Hell’ young men are 
presented sing drugs, smuggling, bullying and harassing women. The video continues 
by focusing on a combination of people of Muslim background living in Switzerland 
(women in head scarves, or men sitting around without working). The video ends by 
showing people going to work during rush hour alongside images depicting logos of 
Switzerland’s multinational corporations, harvesting on farms, experiments in 
laboratories, scenes of lakes, mountains, churches and goats. ‘The choice is clear: my 
home, our security,’ the film states (Sciolino, 2007 in NYT). A court ordering for the 
party to withdraw the video followed its release. 
 
The black sheep campaign was used as an alert for foreigners that have been 
convicted of violent crimes. The party required 100.000 signatures in order to bring the 
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issue to parliament as a potential referendum topic. The poster, which was followed by 
a storm of criticism, turned into a nationwide debate over the place of immigrants in 
the country.  
 
National and international media dedicated several pages to the analysis of this 
political campaign and hosted discussions on the issue. A few days after the display of 
the poster, the BBC presented reaction by Swiss Jewish groups who stated that the 
symbolism of the poster, and its use of colour, was frighteningly reminiscent of Nazi 
propaganda. ‘I think it's a disgusting way to conduct politics,’ said Alfred Donath, 
president of the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities. ‘It is entirely contrary to 
Switzerland's humanitarian tradition, and really not the way we should do things’ 
(Foulkes, 2007 in BBC).  
 
Meanwhile, in the Daily Mail it was reported that the United Nations special 
rapporteur on racial discrimination, Doudou Dien from Senegal, had requested the 
Swiss government to provide an official explanation for the campaign (Daily Mail, 
2007). The reaction from SVP was instant, as the spokesman Matthias Mueller replied 
to Doudou Diene’s statements by arguing that ‘The UN should not be meddling in 
internal Swiss politics […] We have got freedom of speech in our country; obviously 
[Mr Diene] has not understood our culture of democracy. I would suggest he reads up 
on it’ (Foulkes, 2007 in BBC). The poster is, according to the United Nations, ‘a 
sinister symbol of the rise of a new racism and xenophobia in a country where one in 
four, like the black sheep in the poster, are now foreign immigrants to this peaceful, 
prosperous and stable country with low unemployment and a per capita GDP larger 
than that of other Western economies’ (Daily Mail, 2007).  
 
Similarly, in the New York Times Micheline Calmy-Rey, the president of 
Switzerland at the time, stated in an interview that ‘The poster is disgusting, 
unacceptable and stigmatises others plays on the fear factor, and in that sense it’s 
dangerous. The campaign does not correspond to Switzerland’s multicultural openness 
to the world. And I am asking all Swiss who do not agree with its message to have the 
courage to speak out’ (Sciolino, 2007 in NYT). In the same article, interior Minister 
Pascal Couchepin of the Liberal Democratic Party has proposed that SVP’s ‘worship 
of Christoph Blocher, the billionaire who is the party’s driving force and the current 
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justice minister, is reminiscent of that of Italian fascists for Mussolini’. Roman Jäggi, 
spokesman for the SVP, replied to the criticism by describing the poster campaign as 
‘completely fair’. According to him, ‘It is not racist,’ and continued that the big 
problem with violence and foreigner criminals is a big one Similarly, a SVP official 
statement was that the campaign was not racist but just targeting on anticrime. In an 
extended article in the Daily Mail on the 7th of September 2007, Dr Ulrich Schlüer, the 
person who had designed the poster, supported his argument by saying that: ‘in a 
suburb of Zürich, a group of youths between 14 and 18 recently raped a 13-year-old 
girl. It turned out that all of them were already under investigation for some previous 
offence. They were all foreigners from the Balkans or Turkey’ (DailyMail, 2007). And 
be continued: ‘[t]heir parents said these boys are out of control. We say: that's not 
acceptable. It's your job to control them and if you can't do that you'll have to leave'. 
[…] It's a punishment everyone understands’ (DailyMail, 2007).  
 
In the past Schlüer had worked in launching a campaign for a referendum to ban 
the building of Muslim minarets.  He continued ‘… after the war [Iraq, Afghanistan] 
there was huge influx of people we had a lot of problems with. The abuse of social 
security is a key problem. It's estimated to cost £750m a year. More than fifty per cent 
of it is by foreigners. ‘[…] We're not against mosques, but the minaret is not 
mentioned in the Koran or other important Islamic texts. It just symbolises a place 
where Islamic law is established’ (Daily Mail, 2007).  
 
At the same year, 2007, the Egerkinger committee called for a federal initiative 
against Muslim minarets in the country. The committee was launched by members of 
SVP and Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union (EDU). Its main argument was that 
people ‘should be able to block unwanted and unusual projects such as the erection of 
Islamic minarets’. The committee proposed that the building of minarets should be 
banned for the minaret is seen as a symbol of religious-political claim to power. 
Finally, after the initiative of SVP, on September 2009, the Swiss people approved the 
referendum forbidding the construction of minarets.  
 
 148 
 
Figure 5:4: Campaign poster against the construction of minarets  
 
Figure 5:5: Campaign poster against the construction of minarets  
During the campaign the SVP , while claiming that the minarets are ‘symbols of 
political-religious imperialism’ aiming to promote the ‘islamisation of 
Switzerland’,presented two major posters (Figures 5:4 and 5:5). In the first poster, 
there are minarets placed on a Swiss flag and a woman is wearing an abaya and niqab. 
The text says, ‘Stop’, ‘Yes to the minaret ban’. The minarets resemble 
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warheads/missiles, reflecting a hostile environment created by the minarets. The 
instant reaction towards the poster was not positive and several municipalities refused 
to display it. Due to this refusal of posting the original version and presenting it to the 
public, the party prepared an additional in which it was stated: ‘Censorship, one more 
reason to say yes to the minaret ban’. The representation of minarets as weapons 
prepared and waiting to attack cannot be taken to be other than a well-structured 
intention to generate fear and motivate a general reaction by the public.  
 
Reactions to the campaign were not all negative. Significantly, several radical 
right parties across Western Europe e.g. the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, the French Front 
National and the Lega Nord in Italy welcomed it and considered the SVP’s approach to 
the ban as a role model which could be applicable in other countries as well. The Wall 
Street Journal a few days after the referendum reported that ‘…the construction of new 
minarets is banned, but the building of mosques is unaffected, and the vote does not 
affect the four existing minarets in the country’, underlining the importance of the 
respect towards people’ s fundamental right to religion (2009).  The reaction against 
the campaign came from the Swiss government and numerous non-governmental 
organisations across the country. A variety of religious organisations and legal experts 
also contributed to condemning it. An official statement by the Federal Council as of 
28th August 2008, stated that: 
 
[T]he popular initiative against the construction of minarets has been submitted in accordance with the 
applicable regulations, but infringes guaranteed international human rights and contradicts the core 
values of the Swiss Federal Constitution. Such a ban would endanger peace between religions and would 
not help to prevent the spread of fundamentalist Islamic beliefs. […] the Federal Council therefore 
recommends that the Swiss parliament reject the initiative without making a counter-proposal (admin.ch, 
2013) 
 
The Affairs Committee of State (SPC), in rejecting the Minaret Initiative, made a 
similar statement on 27th March 2009, saying that ‘the popular initiative is contrary to 
core fundamental values of Switzerland and violates international law’ and that  
 
 […] the Swiss legal system, regardless of religious affiliation, must be respected fully by people of 
Islamic faith. This requires no minaret ban. On the contrary, this measure would require the integration 
of the Muslim population (parlament.ch, 2013) 
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Numerous SVP members have shown themselves to be critical of Islam by 
having participated in the minaret controversy, during which they pushed for an 
initiative to ban the construction of minarets. In November 2009 this ban won a 
majority vote (57.5%) and became an amendment to the Swiss Constitution (admin.ch, 
2013).  
 
In 2008, SVP presented another xenophobic and racist poster displaying hands 
from different ethnic backgrounds reaching for Swiss passports. SVP argued against 
the ‘mass-naturalisation’ of immigrants in stating that there should be a referendum 
about it.. Nevertheless, in the referendum of June 2008 the population rejected the 
proposition for stricter measures regarding the granting of Swiss citizenship to 
foreigners (see section 5.2 above). The main proposal of the party was that the citizens 
of the communes should be the ones to decide such requests for citizenship. 
 
 
Figure 5:6 Campaign posters against mass-nationalization  
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Figure 5:7 Anti-immigration campaign poster 
 
 
Figure 5:8 Anti-immigration campaign poster 
 
Two other election posters presented by SVP reflect the party’s anti-immigration 
policies. One shows legs of men wearing suits marching across the Swiss flag. Both 
posters were accompanied by slogans reading: 'Open doors for abuse? NO!' and ‘Now 
is enough! Stop mass immigration’. The other shows three crows increasingly 
surrounding Switzerland and pecking at it. What is common to the majority of such 
election posters is the usage of the colours: red, white and black. Red represents the 
Swiss flag as a positive symbolic sign, whereas black underlines the negative message 
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regarding immigrants, minarets, and criminals. Additionally, the red colour signals an 
alerting alerting essence to the posters, e.g. stop.  
 
What is considerably different in the case of SVP is the choice of the focus of the 
campaigns on significant issues like immigration, thus addressing the xenophobic and 
islamophobic sentiments of the audience rather than choosing the figure of the party’s 
leader, or Blocher himself. The communication tactics of the party in promoting such 
issues, which have contributed greatly to the party’s electoral success, works as a 
signifier for the party itself.  
 
5.5. Outcomes 
 
As several scholars highlight (see Albertazzi, 2002, Rensmann, 2006), SVP is 
strongly characterised, a populist party, similar to other parties in the Western Europe, 
originated in the radical right family, e.g. Lega Nord in Italy, or the Front National in 
France. This categorisation as a populist party, according to Betz (2009), has often 
been associated with the capability of the party to incorporate elements of the rhetoric 
of the radical right, e.g. ethno-nationalism along with the ‘centrality to its mobilisation 
campaigns under its former leader, Blocher, from the mid-1990s’  (2009:99). As stated 
above, Blocher is considered the ‘architect of the party’s turn towards populism’, and 
responsible for the party’s radicalisation (Albertazzi, 2009:2, Cranmer, 2011:290). 
 
As Mudde (2004) underlines, one of the approaches offered ‘to the remaining 
actors is to exclude the populist actor(s) from political power’ and simultaneously to 
‘include populist themes and rhetoric’ (2004:563). The classification of SVP as a 
populist party for Cranmer (2011) is based on specific core elements and 
communication of right-wing populist ethno-nationalist sentiments, especially in terms 
of their centrality to its mobilisation campaigns under the leadership of Blocher from 
the mid-1990s (2011:290). For Milic and Scheuss (2006) the SVP ‘moderated its 
communication style during the debates on the immigration and asylum amendments’ 
(2006:18). Following Mudde’s argument, Cranmer (2011) suggests that the adoption of 
popular communication strategies by SVP prompted other parties to embrace a more 
populist communication approach, too, and to use a populist vocabulary, especially in 
relation to issues about the preservation of Swiss tradition (Cranmer, 2011:290-291).  
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Over the time, the SVP has managed to attract media attention and to benefit 
from it. In Udris’ (2012) work on Media attention, issue ownership and party 
strategies in Switzerland, it is argued that SVP has managed to dominate the news and 
the political contest across a wide range of issues included in the radical right agenda, 
like the issue ‘of ownership in highly salient issue fields such as ‘identity politics’ and 
‘law and order’ and it is the party which most often claims new and free-floating 
issues, and that most often ‘trespasses’ on other parties’ issues and, for this, the author 
considers it a powerful threat  to the state’ (2012:19). While Udris (2012) is seeking to 
identify the role that the media play in the political scene of Switzerland, the author 
concludes that not only does SVP stick to its ‘own’ issues, such as migration or 
Europe, but it also ‘trespasses’ political opponents’ issues. In addition, Udris (2012) 
claims that ‘new issues such as media policy or education, expand the scope of its core 
messages and exclusionist, populist frames pitting itself against the political elite and 
against foreigners in a conflict line of ‘SVP versus the rest’ (2012:21).  
 
5.6.  Conclusion 
 
For the past few decades SVP has experienced significant electoral success 
which grew especially rapidly after 1999.  The party has been identified with policies 
and issues regarding immigration, and has organised numerous campaigns, especially 
since 2000, on proposed referendums in order to apply stricter laws on immigration, 
crime and citizenship aimed essentially at foreigners. Faithful to ethnonationalism and 
the concept of a strong Swiss state, SVP, particularly gaining from the support and 
contribution of Blocher, an acknowledged charismatic leader who led the party to 
become one of the most powerful in the country, has managed to present radical right 
ideology to the people in Switzerland and dramatically influence the Swiss political 
scene.  
 
The strength of the party lies in its electoral campaigns, particularly in relation to 
referendums, which mainly concern anti-immigration policies. The posters created for 
these campaigns have caught the attention of the public and have been characterised by 
many people as provocative and racist. The SVP’s approach to the rejection of 
immigration has however, been broadly welcomed and admired by several radical right 
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parties in other European states, some of which are NPD in Germany, or Chrysi Aygi 
in Greece which have even adopted the black sheep poster or part of it in their own 
political campaigns. Nevertheless, the impact of the organised campaigns of the party 
has led to greater public support as the party has managed to represent the sentiments 
of fear and insecurity in an effective way.  
 
In a country like Switzerland, with a strong federalist tradition and a unique 
political system, SVP has managed to increase its support at all levels of the political 
system and to project an alternative, moderated and strong profile of a radical right 
party in Europe. The understanding of the need for an aggressive and effective 
campaign and the prospective potential of communication strategies appear to have 
been successfully adopted by SVP. In so doing, the party’s electoral campaigns have 
become among the most successful in Europe.   
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6.  The case of Alleanza Nationale  (AN) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
  In September 1995, the party in the Italian political arena, most commonly 
linked to the fascist past of the country, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), was 
dissolved. Following a period of great change, MSI was replaced by a newly 
transformed party, Alleanza Nationale which, under the leadership and guidance of 
Gianfranco Fini, continued to experience a period of evolution, from national 
recognition to electoral success and participation in government coalitions. Burdened 
by its long past, the new party struggled to purge itself of its more extreme elements 
and to present a modernised face to the electorate in order to attract and gain votes.  
 
Examined as an additional case study, this chapter tracks the origins and the 
essential features that contributed to building the identity and image of the party. A 
background overview, along with an analysis of the content of the manifestos of 1995 
and 2001 and the electoral campaign posters, adopted by the party within the relevant 
timespan of this research, are used to build a general profile of this radical right party 
and its communication strategies.  
 
6.2.  Background  
 
The story of the radical right scene in Italy is encapsulated in the story of MSI. 
Founded in Rome in 1946 by a group of neo-fascists under the leadership of Giorgio 
Almirante, the party favoured a revival of Mussolini’s brand of fascism, aiming an 
attack on Italian democracy and fighting communism (Ignazi, 2003:35-36). MSI 
managed to be active on the national political scene for almost fifty years, after which 
‘the party embraced democracy’ (Milza, 2002:148). From 1946 until 1951 the party 
was stigmatised by the style of Almirante’s leadership, e.g. his encouraging of 
increasing violent attacks against communists and stating his unwavering devotion to 
the ideals of fascism. In 1951, Augusto De Marsanich, a moderate conservative 
politician, who was in favour of the incorporation of MSI into the mainstream Italian 
political arena, replaced Almirante until 1954, when Arturo Michelini became the new 
party leader. Maintaining a moderate profile, the party managed to raise its popular 
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vote at a national level and developed as one of the most significant post-war neo-
fascist parties, with a continual presence in the Italian parliament. Michelini led the 
party until his death in 1969, and Almirante once again became the leading figure of 
MSI. In the 1972 general elections, MSI having renamed itself as Movimento Sociale 
Italiano–Destra Nazionale (MSI-DN) gained 8.67%, the highest result it ever 
achieved. By the end of the 1980s, its poor levels of electoral support and Almirante’s 
leadership were increasingly challenged by members of the party, especially the more 
moderate ones (Gilbert, 1995:155). By 1987, when Almirante retired, MSI was left in a 
state of division and confusion. After a short period during which Pino Rauti led the 
party, Fini, a protégé of Almirante’s, became the new leader of the party in 1991.  
 
Fini had taken responsibility for the MSI’s youth movement in 1977. At the age 
of twenty-five he was determined to change the official party line: ‘his project 
consisted mainly of reconstructing traditional party identity and reappraising the 
strategy of inserimento8 strategy’ (Ignazi, 2007:701). Fini was to remain the leading 
figure of the reconstituted party from its foundation in 1994 until it merged with the ll 
Popolo della Libertà (PdL) party, in early 2009. He is acknowledged for his media and 
verbal skills, as well as his capability for  ‘staying calm’, all of which have created an 
attractive profile for the voters, in an environment in which there is an underlying   
question of trust regarding the political system and a general fear of the legacy of the 
economic insecurity that Italy has frequently experienced (Gallagher, 2000:160). 
 
As pointed out by Milza (2002), Rauti’s ambition had been to position the party 
as a more liberal entity in order to attract a part of the communist-oriented electorate. 
He saw that this could be achieved by developing a stance which was more anti-
capitalist and anti-imperialist. This was to be altered by balancing a denial of 
identification with anti-immigration sentiments against ‘similar accusations against 
American imperialism’ (Milza, 2002:459). In order to attract independent voters to a 
new label, in 1993-4 MSI promoted a new organization that would work as an 
umbrella, AN9(Ignazi, 1996:702). The party’s electoral campaign against the parties 
participating in the government coalition combined with its populist approach, and 
                                                        
8 Gain acceptance through cooperation with other parties 
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were used in order to tap into the electorate’s dissatisfaction (Gallagher, 2000:161) and 
attract the attention of the electorate.  
 
Embedded in the parliamentary process and determined to be seen to have 
disengaged from anything associated with the era of Mussolini, the former MSI, 
renamed itself and succeeded in coming to power after 1994 by participating in a 
coalition government led by Silvio Berlusconi, where it was allocated five ministers 
and twelve deputy ministers. In January of 1995, at a conference in Fiuggi, MSI was 
officially dissolved. In a period when the electorate was dissatisfied by the range of 
corruption across the political arena, under the government led by the Partito 
Socialista Italiano (PSI) until 1992, the political scene started to transform. For many 
years, because of the fact that MSI was one of the oldest radical right parties in Europe, 
it was almost cocooned from accusations of corruption due to its lack of participation 
in any past government, a fact that proved to be a great asset. 
 
Another factor that played an important role in the development and the 
transformation of MSI was the ‘attack’ against the political system from another 
radical right party, Lega Nord (LN) (Gallagher, 2000:161, Valentini, 1993 in La 
Repubblica). The aggressive rhetoric that the LN had chosen had advantaged the MSI 
and its proposals for more ‘moderate’ policies, which was beneficial when the 
opportunity for the re-establishment of the MSI in the Italian political arena arrived in 
1993 during the peak of the political crisis in the country. The largest parties in the 
country, such as Democrazia Cristiana (DC) and the PSI, were facing accusations of 
corruption and the number of their supporters was diminishing rapidly (Gallagher, 
2000:162). This provided opportunities for other parties, such as MSI, to woo their 
voters. 
 
In the local elections of 1993, Fini had been a candidate for the mayoralty of 
Rome, whilst Alessandra Mussolini, the granddaughter of Il Duce, was a candidate in 
Naples. Each gained a share of the vote that exceeded 40% (Gallego, 1999:13). The 
main argument of the party was that they were never involved in the investigation of 
                                                                                                                                                                
9 The name of the AN is not accidental: it was chosen in order to express opposition to the Democratic 
Alliance, a party formed in 1992 aiming to succeed in building a coalition between the center-left forces.  
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mani pulite10, and Fini also managed to attract the support of Silvio Berlusconi who 
stated that ‘if I was in Rome I would definitely vote in favour of Fini’ (Valentini, 1993 
in La Repubblica).  
 
As suggested above, Fini had decided to take advantage of the dissatisfaction of 
the electorate and work on attracting new voters, a strategy similar to that of radical 
right parties across Europe. In December 1993, he gained the support of the party for 
the foundation of new alliance, one which was apparently more modern and moderate 
in the form of the AN (Gallagher, 2000:163). The new party was promoted as a 
‘shelter’ for all Italians who considered themselves to be conservative’ (Bull and 
Newell, 1995:78) According to Fini this marked a turning point in the political 
development of post-war Italy. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the party, under 
the name of AN, gained an exceptional 13.5% (+8.1% from the previous election) and 
entered the government coalition formed by Berlusconi (1994-1996) (Gallego, 
1999:13). In the same year the party won seven seats in the European Parliament. 
 
The appearance in the mid 1990s of the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi, who 
created Forza Italia (FI), was a factor that contributed to the transformation of the 
Italian political scene. Berlusconi took advantage of the media that he controlled to 
promote FI, a party that created the impression of a new political alternative 
(Gallagher, 2000:165). The opportunity for participating in the government arrived in 
1994 with the success of Berlusconi's FI and his offer of a coalition partnership with 
the MSI (Ignazi, 1996:703). The party entered the coalition with Berlusconi’s FI and 
Umberto Bossi’s LN, with a different image and under the new label of MSI-AN 
(Baldini, 2001:2). 
 
FI managed to establish an alliance with the LN and AN. Thus, FI led to the 
coalition that governed the country after the elections of 1994. In the national elections 
of May 2001 the same coalition under the name of Casa delle Libertà (CdL) 
(comprising FI, LN and AN along with a number of other parties, noticeably DC and 
PRI) won the majority of votes and led the government with Berlusconi as the Prime 
                                                        
10 The turning point for the dissolution of the First Italian Republic was "Operation Clean Hands" (mani 
pulite) which started in 1992 when an investigation into scandals, led by Antonio Di Pietro, began. The 
judges brought to the surface dozen cases of corruption-, first in Milan and then throughout Italy, -
starring politicians and businessmen (Vannucci, 2009) 
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Minister, while Fini became Deputy Prime Minister. Fini also served as Foreign 
Minister from November 2004 to May 2006. 
 
AN managed, at the first general elections in which it officially took part in 1994 
to gain 13.5% of the vote and this increased to 15.7% in 1996. After that, the party 
started losing support but still succeeded in maintaining its place as the third strongest 
party in the country (12.0% in 2001). In 2006, the last election in which AN 
participated as a separate entity, it gained 12.3% of the popular vote, seventy-one seats 
in the Chambers of Deputies and forty-one seats in the Senate. In 2008, Berlusconi and 
Fini founded a new party by merging FI and AN, which was named Popolo della 
Libertà (PdL), and with LN as an ally, PdL achieved a successful electoral result a few 
months later.  
 
Figure 6:1 Election Results since 1994 (AN) 
 
6.3.  Structure and Ideology 
 
In its first official document entitled ‘Pensiamo l’ Italia: Il domani c’e gia’ (Let 
us think about Italy: the future is now) the party rejected any antidemocratic, fascist 
alternative and advocated the reform of what it held to be a flawed representative 
system, but always within the bounds of freedom and liberty which were seen as 
unimpeachable values (AN, 1995). In the introduction to the document, Fini directly 
emphasises the importance of creating a strategy of action in both the short and long 
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term. More specifically, he stresses the importance of ‘future alliances, the fate of the 
legislature, participation in the Berlusconi government, the role of other parties; in a 
word, the whole so-called ‘current affairs’ of the party (AN, 1995).  
 
In the introductory paragraph of the party’s official programme, a presentation of 
the thoughts behind the creation of AN takes place as well as its link to MSI. The 
intention of Fini is to clarify that the new party respects the commitments, the history 
and the political culture of MSI, which have been undertaken as the party’s new 
starting point.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:2 Symbol of AN 
 
It was decided that the symbol of the party was going to be a circle, on top of 
which ‘Alleanza Nazionale’ would be written in white on a blue background, followed 
by a smaller, inset circle containing a tricolour flame on a red trapezoidal base.  ‘MSI’ 
appears in the base, in red, from which the red white and green colours of the Italian 
national flag appear like a burning flame. Although claiming to be post-fascist, the 
party chose to retain the old fascist symbolism of the tricolour flame of MSI, albeit in a 
reduced size, below the party’s name. The party insignia has worked as a signifier of 
what the party stands for, managing to combine the party’s identity from its origins up 
to the newly-launched AN. 
 
It was made clear from the beginning that AN solemnly repudiated all forms of 
dictatorship and totalitarianism, and believed in democracy and freedom as 
insuppressible values together with Christian values; an ‘absolute’ rejection of 
discrimination, ‘a spiritual vision of life and finally, identification with national 
tradition’ (AN, 1995). The intention of AN was to start speaking an old and new 
language at the same time, opening up to civil society, showing Italians in a different 
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light compared to the recent past. For AN, the politics of alliances are no longer an 
alternative to the system (AN, 1995). 
 
The aim of the party is to create 
 
[a] constitution that demonstrates the modernity of the right, its ability to overcome the party form and 
to engage the best energies of the party … inspired by the desire to restore Italy to the Italians (AN, 
1995) 
 
 Finally, the document did not deny the fascist history of the nation and 
maintained a sentimental attachment to the leaders and followers who had fallen in the 
service of fascism (Gregor, 2006:66).  
 
A new beginning?  
At the 1995 party conference the official manifesto, announced in the 
conference, was a declaration against the fascist origins of the party, condemning any 
anti-immigration actions. (Wal, 2010:39, Griffin, 1998). The second chapter of the 
manifesto contains the main values and principles of the party and places emphasis on 
respect for the individual. As previously commented, there is a clear distancing of the 
identity of the party from racism and any form of totalitarianism in whatever form it 
may be proposed (Sznajder, 1998), and puts emphasis on the respect of the individual, 
regardless of his or her origins, religion and social background (Gallego, 1999:13).  
 
Based on its official thesis, democracy, according to the AN, cannot exist 
without respect for the individual and thus, for AN, a way of rejecting racism is to 
reject totalitarianism. ‘Our condemnation of racism, is the condemnation of 
totalitarianism, of force as means of enforcement. It is our belief that without respect 
for the individual and for people there is no democracy, because true democracy is the 
sovereignty of the people’ (AN, 1995). The democratic principle of the party is 
underlined as the preservation and practice of freedom, as a value and valuable asset 
(AN, 1995). It is that which distinguishes the political right from fascism and even 
establishes the break from a direct lineage from it. From this preservation, AN 
proposes, the right of freedom, which is understood as a guideline, follows its concept 
of 
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[t]he state, of society, of economic relations and it is it that inspires the political actions, tense 
affirmation of the human and of the Italian Right (AN, 1995) 
 
For AN, the conservative right should not be considered the result of fascism On 
the contrary the values of the right, for AN, can be located in the ‘Italian history, 
before, during and after the Ventennio (the twenty years of fascism)’ (AN, 1995). 
Similarly, AN claims that the establishment of totalitarianism was not with fascism but 
with the 1917 socialist revolution, and that it managed to endure until the late 1990s 
(AN, 1995). 
 
Sznajder notes that the denunciation of racism and anti-Semitism was generally 
perceived as a progressive effort towards democratisation for AN. As he asserts, ‘they 
saw it as reaffirming the strong revisionist trend in neo-fascism, which divides the 
history of the movement into two periods’ (Sznajder, 1998). In his work, he highlights 
that  
 
[t]he first period is explained as the one ‘of ‘good’ fascism until 1938, when many positive steps were 
taken to strengthen the Italian state, and the second one is the period ‘of ‘bad’ fascism when mistakes, 
such as the alliance with Germany, enactment of the racial laws and entering the war, were made; a 
usual neo-fascist explanation for the racism and anti-Semitism of the past (Sznajder, 1998).  
 
Eatwell also believes that the party distanced itself from all forms of anti-
Semitism, specifically denouncing those anti-Semitic and racist groups, more Nazi 
than Fascist, that still haunted the party (Eatwell, 1997; Gregor, 2006). 
 
Drawing a line between AN and MSI, the party gradually started separating itself 
from its fascist roots and making efforts to approach Jewish groups. This tactic was 
critical for the future of the party, as it provoked the more radical basis to isolate 
themselves from the rest of the party, which allowed it to present a more popular 
conservative image and join the European People’s Party grouping in the European 
Parliament. It could then be placed in the centre-right scale of the political spectrum 
along with FI. In accordance with this, Fini is explicit in his rejection ‘of the shameful 
chapters in the history of Italy’ (Gregor, 2006:66), referring to fascism as il male 
assoluto (‘absolute evil’) (Padovani, 2008:757). The problem is located, according to 
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the party, in the construction of the Second Republic, and primarily it requires an 
appropriate reformation of the institutions. It is the reformation that will question the 
nature of democratic participation and the needs of decision-making policy, resulting 
in a State, which will be a free, open, and pluralistic state (AN, 1995). 
 
As Sznajder explains, this analysis regards ‘the political relationship between 
liberty and authority as governed by the constitutional order of each nation where it is 
claimed that the First Italian Republic favoured oligarchies because of the dichotomy 
between formal political rights and real participation in the proportional representation 
system (Sznajder, 1998). Thus, the purpose of the institutional reform is to achieve 
more efficient forms of direct democracy and initiatives. In doing so, there should be a 
bridge connecting the gap between the political entities and the voters by minimising 
the power of the politicians and by engaging with a ‘majoritarian electoral system and 
making frequent use of referendums so that the citizen votes for ideas and not for party 
machines’ (Sznajder, 1998).  As the manifesto states: 
 
 [T]he AN wants to be considered part of a great, libertarian, pacifist, conservative revolution (AN, 
1995) 
 
Promoting traditional values  
AN's political programme put emphasis on traditional values of family and the 
sovereign territorial integrity of the nation (Gregor, 2006:66). These positions are often 
close are close to those of the Roman Catholic Church (Gallagher, 2000:166). AN 
supports stricter measures to control immigration along with stricter law enforcement 
and implementation of harsh penalties, and finally supports Israel, the US and 
European integration (Ignazi, 2008). The first objective of AN is to promote living 
conditions that enable people and groups to live in freedom and honesty and to boost 
social solidarity.  
 
[W]e feel we are heirs and scholars of Roman civilisation and of Christianity that has its roots in the 
message brought by Peter to Rome and spread in the West and throughout the world. We are so attentive 
to the Church with particular emphasis on its social doctrine and support the Catholic values as they 
reflect the culture and social life of our country 
(AN, 1995) 
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The term ‘social solidarity’ is commonly used in this part of the manifesto, 
emphasising the intention of the party’s policies. Additionally, voluntary organisations 
would be granted ‘responsibility’ while emphasising social solidarity and support (AN, 
1995). These ideas, according to Sznajder (1998), are based on the general idea of the 
essential role of the family ‘as the basic social unit’ along with the principles of the 
Catholic values and integrity. Having said that, the AN recommends anti-abortion 
policies, together with programmes to support families in need and incentives for 
families that care for elderly and handicapped members (AN, 1995). These ideas also 
resonate with the notion of a ‘Big Society’ which was outlined by David Cameron in 
the Conservative’s Party’s 2010 election manifesto, where the aim was to encourage 
groups and communities to take responsibility for a range of activities at a local level11.  
 
These AN policies also have some similarity with forms of corporatism, a system 
where interests are represented directly within the political system in the form of 
organised groups, e.g. ‘corporations’ in Spain during Franco’s period.  In this type of 
system, socio-political organization, economic and social interests are represented 
directly within the political system in the form of organised groupings or the so-called 
‘corporations’. In a similar way the term can be applied in a context in which the 
individual interest groups or ‘corporations’ are defending their own members’ interests 
without taking into account the general public good. In practice, corporatism can be 
detected in Primo de Rivera's dictatorship or in Franco’s regime in Spain, as well as in 
Mussolini’s regime in Italy. Although corporatist systems on the sense of a political 
systematic have now practically evaporated, they still can be detected in periods of 
economic and social crisis where such approaches revive.  
 
National identity 
National identity is one of the major concerns of AN. For the party, national 
identification along with their belief in the importance of Italy's role in the 
international scene and the recovery of its great cultural traditions have been and will 
continue to be the fundamental principles around which the party would design and 
implement a broad and idealistic cultural policy (AN, 1995). For this reason there 
should be a plan of protection and conservation of Italy’s cultural treasures and the 
                                                        
11  For more information look at “David Cameron: PM’s speech on ‘Big Society’” 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-on-big-society  
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many activities that revolve around the cultural and artistic heritage of the country 
(AN, 1995). 
 
When it comes to cultural policy, AN sees the protection and conservation of 
Italy’s cultural heritage as a key principle which is maintained as a primary goal of the 
party (AN, 1995). National identity, the statement of Italy's role in the international 
scene, the recovery of its great cultural traditions, linguistic as well as literary, have 
been and will continue to be the fundamental principles which will be paramount to 
designing and implementing a cultural policy which has a broad spectrum. Protection 
and conservation of cultural heritage, key principles of the many activities that have 
revolved around the cultural and artistic heritage of the country until today, remain 
primary goals. 
 
In addition, education, for AN, is the means by which national unity can be 
maintained. For this reason, a national curriculum and high quality teaching throughout 
the education system are the primary guarantees for the maintenance and growth of 
national identity (AN, 1995). In terms of health care, the party proposes a 
comprehensive reform of health care, protecting the right of everyone to quality 
treatment both in the public and private sectors equally (AN, 1995). 
 
Economic approach  
Furthermore, although the party supports market economics and holds favourable 
views on liberalisation and the privatisation of state industries, AN has a more liberal 
approach concerning economic policies in comparison to FI (Agnew, 1997). For AN, 
the development of poor countries is both an ethical and political matter and should be 
a primary interest for rich countries. Having said that, the party promotes the idea of 
countries with advanced economies transferring part of their capital to poor countries 
in order to strengthen and contribute to their (poor countries) economic development 
(AN, 1995).  
 
At the same time, however, Italy, according to AN, can boast of a large and 
widespread network of small and medium-sized industries which are dynamic, 
competitive and creative - at least in some sectors (AN, 1995). Industries that are 
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already in crisis in Italy should be transferred to countries beyond the Mediterranean, 
like Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco etc, where labour is cheap and plentiful (AN, 1995). 
 
Concerning employment policies, the party proposes a reconsideration of means 
whereby the social needs of workers can be protected, and for this reason it asks for the 
implementation of that part of the Constitution, which deals with trade unions and 
labour relations. More specifically, it wants an overhaul of regulations concerning the 
legal recognition of trade unions. Moreover, the policy of consultation between 
government, employers and trade unions, must be addressed and all social partners 
must then reach a new form of agreement. This would solve problems associated with 
the lack of transparency in industrial relations through a revision of the legislation 
about union representation (AN, 1995).  
 
Law and order, and immigration  
 The AN highlights that the organised crime is one of the major issues in Italy 
and suggests a stricter approach, e.g. forcing severer penalties, implementation of the 
law and a systematic purging of bureaucracy and courts. The law should punish the use 
of all kinds of drugs, prostitution and illegal immigration. More specifically, the use of 
drugs should be prohibited, and severe punishments should be handed out to people 
smuggling drugs into the country and to those telling them to minors. Additionally, 
there should be a new law related to curbing prostitution, which has become an 
alarming issue, which has spread across the country (AN, 1995).  
 
Finally, concerning immigration, according to AN there is also a need for new 
rules, which would replace the ‘ineffective and now, expired Martelli law’ (AN, 1995). 
Having said that, those who have a working contract (or can get one) should be 
allowed to stay, but the others must be expelled. For the party, illegal entry into the 
country should be considered a crime and, as it points out, internal and border security 
is the right of each citizen. It requires more appropriate intervention to support law 
enforcement in order for this to be achieved (AN, 1995). 
 
Foreign policy and EU 
When it comes to the international position of the country the AN emphasises he 
ambition to expand the Italian citizenship and voting rights to Italians around the 
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world. By doing so, the party underlines the significant ‘importance of the ‘nation’, its 
culture and its network of links and loyalties’ (AN, 1995, Sznajder, 1998). 
 
The AN does not oppose the EU, but nevertheless the party declares that the EU 
is a confederation of states and not a federal entity. For this reason, the party advocates 
an EU that is considerate of the cultural identity of each member state (AN, 1995); a 
union which is not based on dirigisme or bureaucratic and technocratic oligarchies 
(AN, 1995). The AN is against integrating the EU economically, and expresses its 
concerns regarding the possibility of Germany dominating in some areas while Italy 
would be left behind downgraded to a secondary position (Sznajder, 1998). However, 
the maintenance of cultural identity is stressed, (AN, 1995, Sznajder, 1998). 
Additionally, the party does not recognise the Maastricht treaty, as it considers it 
an‘agreement between bankers’ bearing in mind the fear of a German dominance in 
Europe’ (Sznajder, 1995:90-91, Gallagher, 2000:166).  
  
Environment and agriculture 
Environment policy and regional planning, in which a rational agreement 
between central and regional authorities is seen as necessary, is an integral part of 
enhancing the development of the country.  AN proposes an EcoTax programme, 
where security deposits would be used as tools that in order to push both producers and 
consumers to take into account the environmental impact of their behaviour (AN, 
1995). Public information about environmental damage needs to be presented in a 
more thorough and timely manner.  Orienting the market, scientific research, 
technology and production methods towards environmentally friendly choices means 
opting for development that values  quality of life and solidarity (AN, 1995).  
 
Agricultural wealth is another policy that AN emphasises. The party proposes 
that state intervention should be aimed primarily at improving production facilities, 
research and testing; technological development to boost agricultural production, credit 
to encourage regular as well as rational relations between primary producers and 
processing industries. For AN, there is a need to change legislation concerning supply 
chain relationships, so that farmers do not remain squashed between the processing 
industry and the needs of large-scale distribution. Instead, they should have the 
opportunity to establish a fruitful relationship based on mutual convenience, so that 
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agricultural products suit better the demands of the Italian and European markets (AN, 
1995).  
 
In the general election of 2001, a joint manifesto was constructed by all the 
forces that participated in the Casa delle Libertà, CdL alliance (FI, AN, CCD, CDU 
and LN). In the document it is stated that the programme of the coalition is based on 
four principles: family, development, devolution, immigration (CdL, 2013).  
 
Family is seen as the main agency responsible for the transmission of moral 
values and civil rights, and as representing the future of the country. Having said that 
,CdL explains that the policies proposed by the alliance, such as those covering tax 
rules for pension funds, nursery provision, employment contracts etc., will be 
approached in such a way as to prioritise support for the family and the children who 
are the future - the face of solidarity, security and hope (CdL, 2013). The document 
blames globalisation, the unions, the green block and taxation for the low level of the 
economic development of the country, and encourages a reformation based on liberal 
principles.  It continues by declaring the need for a thorough reform of the state 
apparatus in order to apply more modern ideas and techniques. Finally, the issue of 
immigration, according to the text, is alarming for the future of the country, as 
uncontrolled immigration produces an insecure and unsafe environment for Italy’s 
citizens (CdL, 2013). For that reason, stricter controls are needed in order to violence 
and xenophobia spreading stop the country. If immigration is controlled and there is no 
more ‘leaking’ stop the borders, the ‘Balkan mafia’ could be controlled. Finally, there 
should be no tolerance of drugs or any form of crime (CdL, 2013). The principles of 
CdL are very similar to those of the AN ,which explains the later incorporation of AN 
into PdL.  
 
Similar to the role played by Karatzeferis in the case of LA.O.S., Fini becomes 
the major iconic sign for the party and its main point of reference. Gianfranco Fini, as a 
moderniser, popularised a new party line by incorporating conservative ideologies, 
such as security, family values and patriotism (Ignazi, 2008). This became one of the 
major foci of the communication tactics of the party. The programmatic conference 
held in the spring of 1998 in Verona represented, for Baldini (2001) ‘the first important 
step towards a clear distancing from the neo-fascist imprint of AN’ (2001:3), due to the 
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fact that in that conference ‘the debate on fascism was dealt with in more depth’; Fini 
himself participated in the debate by condemning once more, as in the conference of 
1995, any form of fascist regime (2001:3). Nevertheless, for Baldini, apart from the 
declaration coming from the leadership of the party, the idea of what is happening in 
the internal basis of AN is less obvious, ‘with survey data on party delegates at the 
Conference, showing that the middle-level élite still has political attitudes very close to 
those of the traditional MSI, both in terms of authoritarian values and in their 
evaluation of the fascist regime’ (Baldini, 2001:3). Nevertheless, until its merging with 
FI the party strongly promoted its democratic identity and focused on encouraging 
traditional values and the need for a strong national identity, as key points of its 
communication rhetoric.  
 
6.4. Organised Campaigns  
 
The party’s poster choices propose a direct and simple message. In many of the 
posters, Fini’s image is set against a landscape accompanied by several different 
messages. The logo of the poster is adjusted, so that in the main circle, below the name 
‘Alleanza Nazionale’, the name Fini is added in yellow capital letters. The selection of 
colours is white, blue, yellow and green. White, yellow and blue, alternating between 
text and background are the colours that the party chooses to use to communicate with 
the electorate.  
 
   
Figure 6:3, 6:4; 6:5 Election campaign posters 
 
 170 
Slogans like: ‘Putting myself forward – to lead Italy into the future’, ‘Italy wants 
to change – with you’ and ,vote for the Italy you love – with your heart’ are aiming to 
the sentiment of the voter (Figures 6:3, 6:4 and 6:6 above). Fini’s figure derives 
sympathy and the puzzle with the missing pieces is a promise that the party can be 
trusted and can get the pieces together, in their right place, in order to get the whole 
image, and create the feeling of accomplishment.  
 
‘More services for the people you care about – On 27th and 28th May vote AN – 
with your heart 2nd October is grandparents day’ (Figure 6:6). The next poster focuses 
on: ‘The right is on the side of the elderly. They are one of the country’s resources not 
a social burden’ (Figure 6:7) These posters, are accompanied by pictures of young 
children and elderly people, always having on the background blue, white and yellow 
colours. In these posters policy on the elderly and childcare appears to be a major 
interest for the party, which should motivate compassion and sympathy in the 
audience.  
 
      
    
Figure 6:6 Election campaign poster AN 
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Figure 6:7 Election campaign poster AN 
 
   
Figure 6:8 Election campaign posters AN  
 
AN often refers to the changes of the system, which are necessary for it to work 
in favour of the citizens rather than for politicians or for the benefit of specific 
interests. The party promises to defend citizens’ rights and stop the exploitation of the 
system and uses slogans like ‘More money to families. Less money to politicians. 
More funding for health services. Our budget will balance the books as is the case with 
your family budget’ (Figure 6:9) and ‘Let’s get a cut’. 10% reductions in the salaries of 
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politicians’ (Figure 6:10), messages that aim to capitalize on the disappointment of 
voters, regarding the political system and politicians themselves.  
 
                              
Figure 6:9 Election campaign poster AN     Figure 6:10 Election campaign posters AN 
 
 
 
Figure 6:11 Election campaign poster AN 
 
The AN suggests that changes such as these will lead to a reformation of the 
country and that  they thus provide the best hope for a change, ‘A hope for Italy’ 
(Figure 6:11), which suggests that there is hope if the AN can succeed, if it has the 
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popular support of the electorate, because together, the party and the people will have 
the power to work towards that change for a better future.  
 
The observations from the analysis of the electoral campaign posters of AN 
suggests that one of their main focus is traditional values and especially the family. 
Worth noticing here is that in the poster on foreign policy and the participation of the 
country in conflicts that took place in the Middle East, Italy’s participation is explained 
as being in the name of peace. This is underpinned by a philanthropic image of Italian 
soldiers helping a Muslim woman, followed by the slogans: ‘Thank you boys’ and 
‘Today like yesterday, you are bringing peace’ (Figure 6:13). ‘Illegal immigration: 
Enough ships have been allowed to dock. Five years are too few to become an Italian 
citizen. No to fast-track citizenship’ (Figure 6:12). The word play on in this poster 
should be highlighted. In the Italian language, approdi refers to a ship that is sinking. 
The colour of the word in the poster is separated in three parts that can be read as a-p-
prodi. At this point, in terms of granting citizenship to foreigners, AN targets the Prime 
Minister Prodi’s policies depicted in this poster with a sinking boat overloaded with 
immigrants. The comparison of the sinking ship, therefore, reflects AN’s perception of 
the Prodi policies that have allegedly failed. 
 
Although the figure of Fini is not as widely used as that of Karatzaferis in the 
case of LA.O.S., in the earlier AN campaigns at least, the posters often contain pictures 
of ordinary people e.g. soldiers, children etc. By placing people as a main priority in 
the party’s strategy, AN aims to stress sentiments concerning security, the value of the 
family etc. The hopes and fears of the electorate have a face that they (the electorate) 
can identify with, and so the campaign is based on a series of personal and family-
oriented messages. Additionally, the party insignia works as a symbolic sing in all the 
posters, often critically placed in the middle of the poster. The colours chosen for the 
posters create a friendly and warm sentiment to the audience. The text that 
accompanies the posters also launches positive and reassuring messages, directed at the 
electorate, emphasising that concern for the voter is the main motivation for the party’s 
policies. 
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Figure 6:12 Election campaign poster AN 
 
    
Figure 6:13 Election campaign posters AN 
 
 After 2001 the communication strategy of AN changes and so its posters are 
focused on the symbol of PdL. Although the symbol of AN is not presented any more, 
Fini continues to be the face on the poster. A knotted tricolour rope stands on a white 
background and in large capital letters different slogans are provided. In one of the 
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posters, a slogan ‘For greater security there is Alleanza. AN for the people of freedom. 
Italy rise up!’ is displayed along with Fini’s picture, the tricolour knotted rope and 
PdL’s logo. In this specific case the communication of these billboards is twofold, as 
evidenced by the play on words of the slogan that offers different reference points. 
Firstly, the poster wants to reassure the electorate of the presence of the party, AN, 
which still exists, despite the disappearance of its individual symbol from the election 
lists and, secondly, the slogan launched one of the themes of the campaign, that of 
safety, an issue that is very dear to the electorate. AN, therefore, is presented as the 
party which will guarantee the principle of security, the fight against crime etc. The 
inscription at the bottom,  ‘National Alliance for the People of Freedom’ under the 
knotted flag, the symbol of a strong national bond, points to the future union between 
the two parties who both have their love for Italy as their fundamental reference point.  
 
 
Figure 6:14 Election campaign posters AN 
 
The second set of election posters of AN, after having clarified and strengthened 
the relationship with its constituents, performs the task of making known the points of 
its political programme. The main themes on which its communication hinges are: 
security, justice and IRS. The slogans that express them ‘More help for families. Less 
taxes for Italians.  For greater security there is Alleanza AN for the people of freedom’,  
‘Never again have illegal immigrants on your doorsteps. For greater security there is 
Alleanza. AN for the people of freedom’ and ‘No reduced sentences. Those who 
commit crimes must pay for them. For greater security there is Alleanza AN for the 
people of freedom’. 
 
Colours and graphics help to make pleasant the whole message, again along with 
selection of white and blue colours, alternating between text and background. The blue 
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and white is a combination of colours broadly used to represent the national sports 
teams of the country, whereas the tricolour knot represents the bond that holds tightly 
the country together.  
 
 
Figure 6:16 Election campaign posters AN 
 
6.5. Success 
 
For Ignazi, the MSI/AN breakthrough can be explained by two sets of factors; 
the first concerns long-term changes in Italian society: it refers to the de-radicalisation 
of political conflict and the ‘historicisation of fascism’ (Ignazi, 2008:703). As Ignazi 
(2008) underlines, the MSI was ‘progressively perceived as a 'normal' political factor 
and this ‘latent acceptance, along with the lack of social tension and political violence, 
'normalised' the vote in favour of the MSI’ (2008:703). For Ignazi (2008), the vote for 
the MSI was no longer undertaken as an action against the system, but it was more like 
a protest vote similar to people’s attitude in other cases of European parties with a 
similar political presence.  
 
The second set of factors which produce evaluations on the factors that 
contributed to the success of MSI/AN, for Ignazi, consist of five short-term elements: 
‘the party's non-involvement in the investigation of political corruption in the 1990s; 
the collapse of Christian Democracy; its unexpected success in the local elections in 
December 1993, mainly in Rome and Naples; the legitimacy offered by Berlusconi's FI 
when the MSI was accepted for the first time as a partner in a coalition and finally the 
excellent performance of Gianfranco Fini in the media’ (see Ignazi, 2008:704). 
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Leadership 
Gregor (2006), profiles Fini as an ‘attractive candidate’ in a political arena awash 
with political scandal; Fini was free of the suggestion of corruption, and attracted the 
attention of Silvio Berlusconi, providing him with more favourable public attention in 
the media than previous leaders of MSI.  Ruzza and Fella argue that Fini has been 
playing two distinct games for a long time. They argue that although he focused on 
retaining the leadership within his party and on interpreting public opinion regarding 
worries about immigration, he has occasionally displayed an intransigent hardline 
stance, while, he has also been playing an individual game in terms of positioning 
himself as the potential heir of Berlusconi (Ruzza and Fella, 2009:158). 
 
According to Sznajder (1998), Fini managed to contribute drastically to the 
transformation of the image of the party from a violent outcast to a ‘soft-spoken’ 
legitimate political party. For him, without Fini’s involvement it would be 
unmanageable to ‘project a semblance of political civility and good citizenship, while 
being actively supported by other individuals and groups within the party’ (Sznajder, 
1998). Sznajder explores Fini's strategy in relation to three core fundamentals. The first 
is a strong statement of encouragement for the values of freedom and democracy, 
followed by a strong disapproval of racism and anti-Semitism and the abandonment of 
‘the corporatist stance of fascism in favour of advancement of the ideas of social 
market economics designed to combine economic efficiency with social solidarity and 
participation’ (Sznajder, 1998).  
 
Having said that, the party tried to project a proposal for a reformation of the 
political system, in order to defeat the disadvantages and flaws of the Italian political 
system. This would be succeeded through a stronger initiative and direct democracy 
practices and less government power, in order to eliminate any potential corruption 
experience similar to the examples of the country’s past. For Sznajder (1998) the main 
perception behind these propositions by Fini was the transformation of AN that would 
manage to attract new voters and become strong enough to participate in government 
coalitions and cooperate with other mainstream parties of the Italian political scene.  
 
Both Ignazi and Sznajder explain the transformation of AN into a radical right 
party which was recognised as an established political factor in the modern Italian 
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scene, leaving behind the heritage of MSI and creating a more moderate and modern 
image reflecting the goal of broadening the party’s electoral constituency (Ruzza and 
Fella, 2009:157). During the programmatic conference of 1998 there was a 
centralisation of ‘many of its organisational elements (the party leader is now called 
President, and has almost ‘absolute power’ over the internal decision-making bodies) 
(Baldini, 2001:3). In terms of populism, the AN has proceeded cautiously. Opponents 
have argued that, beyond the facade of a respectable leader, such as Fini, a political 
group of nostalgic longing for the fascist past still characterises the party (Ruzza and 
Fella, 2009:190). The charismatic leadership of Fini and his contribution to the party’s 
success cannot be underestimated. His politeness and pragmatism inspired respect 
from the electorate that started to show some faith in MSI/AN (Gallagher, 2000:182). 
Fini started his political career as a protégé of Giorgio Almirante in a period when the 
MSI was trying to violently tear down Italian democracy by force. Later, he declared 
fascism as a unique episode in history that cannot be allowed to happen again and 
emphasised his faith in democracy (Gallagher, 2000:182).  
 
6.6.  Outcomes 
 
The transformation of MSI into AN has been accompanied ‘by the adoption of a 
public discourse in which the adherence to democratic values has become more 
explicit, and references to the fascist past more critical’ (Huysseune, 2002:8). This 
observation could have been made in the first manifesto of the new party in 1995. 
Without ‘underestimating the effort to convince the public opinion in Italy of its 
democratic origins’, the party still cannot be seen as ‘liberal and democratic, despite 
the effort in its official documents to avoid extremist and racist language and the 
maintenance of distance from radical right parties at the European level’ (Huysseune, 
2001-2002:8). AN made a great effort to adopt a liberal approach which appeared to 
reject any form of fascism and ‘consigned its former anti-capitalist gestures to the 
history books’ in its rhetoric (Gallego, 1999:13). However, not all members of the 
former MSI accepted the ‘Fuiggi turn’. Rauti, in 1995, founded the Movimento Sociale 
Fiamma Tricolore (MSFT), while, other splinter parties like Fronte Sociale Nazionale 
(FSN) and Forza Nuova (FN) were born in the years that followed (Padovani, 
2008:757). Fini’s decision to visit the Holocaust Memorial at Yad Vashem in Israel 
was seen in a negative light by a number of supporters of AN and as a rejection of the 
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roots of the party. Some referred to Fini as un servo degli Ebrei (a slave of the Jews), 
and a number of Anti-Fini demonstrations took place (Padovani, 2008:757). 
 
Despite these efforts at distancing the party from its past and especially at a local 
level, there still remain some extremist tendencies and nostalgia for fascism. All things 
considered, however, the ‘balance of liberty and authority’, as recommended by the 
AN, would support a restrained form of democracy, expressing favour for a ‘strong 
central authority’ and defending ‘centralist and authoritarian views’ at the same time as 
following a fascist model of government. Additionally, a desire for direct democracy in 
the form of referendums on specific policies could also been taken as an indicator of 
populism (Sznajder, 1998). For Padovani (2008) the coalition of PdL, and later on of 
CdL in which smaller radical right parties were participating, provided AN with the 
opportunity to come ‘to full public light as part of the mainstream political 
establishment’ (2008:758), making former fascist figures ‘respectable’ in the eyes of 
the electorate. Similarly, Gallego (1999) characterises AN as a combination of political 
authoritarianism and economic liberalism, comparable to Mussolini’s fascist discourse 
of 1922 (1999:13).  
 
For Ignazi (2006), AN represents ‘an intriguing case of evolution from die-hard 
neo-fascism to post-fascism and even away from extremism’ (2006:265). As Sznajder 
(1998) stresses, ‘if ideology is an important criterion, AN's theses do not fulfil the 
requirements of liberal democracy. If ideology is not significant, it becomes clear that 
the presentation and approval of the theses were merely a political propaganda 
exercise’. This statement by Sznajder should be taken into consideration when 
assessing the purpose of the communication strategies of AN, as it provides a wider 
perspective on the issue.   
 
6.7. Conclusion  
 
The significant and apparently increasing popularity of AN, after long years of 
isolation from the mainstream national political environment, suggests a complicated 
profile of voting habits in Italy. The new beginning of the AN marked a new period in 
the post-fascist era and levels of radicalism in Italian politics. Italy, a country with a 
strong radical right sub-culture, managed to bring to power, albeit in coalition, a party 
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with a long history and many ideological contradictions. The communication strategies 
of the party, its ideology and its structure revolving around the strong political figure 
of Fini, mark the party as one the most notable representatives of the radical right party 
family in Western Europe.  
 
The chapter that follows focuses on the content analysis of election manifestos 
and public speeches of the three cases that have been selected as primary data for this 
research project. These incorporate interpretations of basic ideological tenets of radical 
right parties. The Computer Aided Text Analysis (CATA) used assists in identifying 
patterns in the communication strategies of the parties in order to support the 
hypothesis that the parties take a common approach in terms of making contact with 
the electorate and conveying their message.  The analysis presents similarities and 
differences in the three cases.  
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7.  The content analysis approach: understanding party preferences  
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Before starting a discussion on the results of content analysis regarding the data it 
is useful to reprise the purpose of this research. As texts are one of the means used to 
examine the manner that the political parties choose to communicate with the 
audience-electorate, the focus of the first part of this chapter will be on the analysis of 
the party manifestos and a selection of speeches, which are seen as individual ‘texts’. 
This analysis is mainly based on content as explained in the methodology chapter 
above (see Chapter 3). The selected data derive from period 2000-2010 and were 
originally delivered by the leader of each of the parties covered in this research. The 
composition of each text is based on the aims of the party at the time it was presented. 
This also took account of the audience the party wishes to addresses. Reflecting on the 
market-oriented perspective (see Chapter 2), since the aim of a political party is to 
satisfy the needs, wishes and expectations of the electorate, these elements, along with 
its ideology and policies can are considered as additional factors influencing the 
official party line. In terms of the structure of this chapter, each case will be examined 
separately followed by a comparative analysis covering all three cases. The content 
analysis undertaken in this research is largely based on Computer Assisted Text 
Analysis (CATA). 
 
The cases of LA.O.S. and SVP are examined as the main representatives of the 
radical right family. Additionally, the case of AN is approached as an additional, 
secondary study, in order to test the hypothesis and, more specifically, to test the 
categories. This is the reason that the data on the Italian case are less extensive and 
comprise just two manifestos of AN. Once the results of the analysis are known, a 
judgement on whether this approach can be used as a research model or method to be 
followed for examining other parties which might be considered as members of the 
radical right party family will be assessed.  
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7.2. The role of content analysis 
 
As explained in Chapter 3 content analysis is chosen in order to address the 
communication strategies by focusing on the semantic and linguistic dimension of 
content. In other words, this chapter explores these strategies, in terms of the issues 
that the parties use in order to build an argument to help them fulfil their general aim 
of gaining electoral support.  
 
Content analysis offers a possibility for looking beyond the immediate context 
within which a text is constructed in order to search for any hidden messages that may 
be implied. The messages that are emitted in written or oral form by a political party 
could be identified in various ways, for example in terms of style, structure, context, 
rhetoric, strategies and motivation of the party (Demertzis, 2002 in Tsiras, 2011:226).  
Through this specific project, the analysis identifies the original message in these texts 
which represent the parties’ ideology and character in depth, and identification of 
radicalism receives major attention across the countries that are examined. In general, 
the process of content analysis can include numerous procedures. In their extended 
work on research methods in the social sciences, Nachmias et al. (1996) underline that 
content analysis provides a description of any special features of the material under 
examination and identifies and records its characteristics. This can be achieved by 
describing the properties of the message followed by inferences about the transmitter 
of the message and the reasons why it was ‘sent’. The recording unit during this 
procedure can be a word, a theme, specific characters or even paragraphs (Nachmias et 
al, 1996:324-326).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the major tools of content analysis is the 
formation of categories in order to provide a more explicit analysis. These categories 
play a major role in determining how the research question can be answered and 
whether the results of the content analysis will be accepted or rejected. The phases of 
the analysis, are described by Kyngas and Elo (2007) and comprise preparation, 
organising and recording of the data, beginning with the selection of the ‘unit of the 
analysis’, followed by the ‘analytic process’ of answering ‘who, where, when, what’ 
and why, and drawing conclusions.  Following these phases of analysis, I firstly 
identified which data should be most appropriate in order to provide effective answers 
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to the questions that surround the hypothesis. After a wide search for appropriate  
material, the research process continued with the organising and recording of the data 
before proceeding to the analysis itself.   
 
As detailed in Chapter 3 there are several steps which need to be taken before 
actually running a CATA. These comprise reading through the source materials, 
selecting the actual data and constructing the categories. After building the categories, 
which includes identification of  key words, synonyms and indicative phrases as 
‘signifiers’ of the main variable designated by each category, the coding scheme (or 
dictionary) is applied by the CATA software. This provides a frequency count for each 
category that is taken as the basis for evaluating its salience. In order to maximise the 
validity of the vocabulary used in the construction of the categories, the initial 
selection of words included terms used not only in the selected documents documents 
of the three cases but also in documents of other parties from across the radical right 
family, as a guide to how such parties communicate with the electorate, e.g. words 
associated with immigration. The creation of the final set of categories was pre-tested 
on a small sample of the documents of LA.O.S. and SVP (see also Polit, Beck and 
Hungler, 2001). 
 
In this analysis, political parties are identified by the way they communicate their 
message to the electorate and on the basis of the selected language they use in their 
official manifestos and in speeches by their leaders. After having identified radical 
right characteristics, which include key elements of the ideology of this party family, 
the intention is to create an accurate means of testing whether parties can be identified 
as members of this family, despite efforts they might make to distance themselves from 
it. At the same time, this offers possibilities for comparison of parties across time and 
space. This represents the main driving force for building the dictionary. 
 
In order to reduce ‘noise’ in the data, the signifiers help in refining identification 
of what the parties stand for. It was also necessary to accurately translate the dictionary 
(which had been compiled in English in the first instance) into the three languages used 
in this study, namely Greek, German, Italian.  In each case, additional signifiers were 
added, based on the specific context of the words used. These related to specific 
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contextual factors which were only relevant to individual parties12. The difficulties of 
this method have to do with the issues for each country, underlining the differences 
and making sure that the vocabulary and the categorisation of the data will be made as 
indicatvie of each specific context as possible.  In terms of the general category titles, 
because all three of the parties under examination are located within the radical right 
family, the assumption was that their agenda, arguments, policies and ideologies are 
similar, and so should be the words they use to communicate their message.  
 
Salience of the individual categories is the first thing to be examined for each 
case. Through this we can gain a deeper understanding of how the agenda of these 
parties was conveyed to the electorate. Additionally, by comparing the documents, the 
significance of the categories is underlined in terms of similarities and differences in 
any specific terms relating back to the main hypothesis. The focus is to understand the 
broader meaning these concepts may have, beyond a straightforward reading of the 
documents themselves, as well as investigating the original messages. For example: 
Does the frequency of references to a given issue change among the texts? What 
message is the party communicating to voters? What are the issues the party regards as 
important? Finally, does the salience of these issues prevail over time? 
 
Bearing these questions in mind, and being aware of the possible difficulties that 
might occur during the process of finding answers to them, the project (as clarified 
above in Chapter 3) uses HAMLET II software along with NVivo software to conduct 
the content analysis and R language for mathematical computation and graphics.  
 
The data comprises LA.O.S. party manifestos adopted for the elections of March 
2004 and 2007. For SVP there are the manifestos of 1999 and 2007, and for AN the 
manifestos of 1995 and 2001. Although the time frame of this project is the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, the documents of 1999 and 1995 have been chosen 
for analysis due to the fact that they represented the official line of the parties, 
maintained within the chosen time frame. Apart from this, there are almost daily 
announcements and press releases, which reflect the official positions of the parties on 
                                                        
12 For instance, when referring to nationalities, all three are addressing to their own ethnic group e.g. 
Italians or similarly when referring to the National Council, in Switzerland SVP refers to it as 
‘Nationalrat’. 
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various issues covering a wide range of topics. In order to produce a viable 
comparative analysis, official leaders’ speeches are also examined in the cases of 
LA.O.S. and SVP, but not for AN since this is not threated as a full case study. The 
purpose of including the speeches in the research is to underline possibly different 
communication approaches between the official line of the party (manifesto) and the 
leader’s own interpretation (speeches), especially given the paramount position of each 
leader within his own party. By this means, I seek to identify the parties’ 
communication techniques, the original purposes of the strategy and the contradictions 
that often characterise the communication strategy of radical right parties, e.g. that of 
the ‘Trojan horse’13for LA.O.S.. Additionally, by comparing the documents I want to 
examine whether there is a correspondence between the categories, while pointing out 
the similarities and differences both within and between the parties in the selected time 
period.  
 
7.3.  Frequencies and relative salience in the CATA approach 
 
At this point, the analysis is focused on the subject of communication and 
identification of salience; that is, the particular topics noted and repeated by the parties 
in the period under examination (2000-2010). After examining the official documents 
of the parties the next step is the categorisation of the data and the identification of the 
key factors that would work towards building a profile of the communication strategies 
of the parties (see Table 1 in Chapter 3 on methodology).  
 
The purpose here is to create a basis by means of which further comparative 
analysis could be made between the cases under examination. Using the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP) (CMP, 2012; Budge et al., 2001) as a guide, a comparison of 
the changes regarding policy emphases over time within the party manifestos is 
undertaken in order to compare both differences in policy positions and emphases 
across parties, and to examine differences across countries. The basic data used for the 
purposes of the project are the proportions of election programmes dedicated to each 
                                                        
13 Radical right parties in Europe are following this ideal application of a dual strategy. The parties 
choose to present a different communicative profile in the ‘outside’ and another on the ‘inside’. 
According to this ‘principle’ the leaders choose to follow a moderate stance when addressing the 
national audience and a harder one when talking to their own. This strategy of the Trojan horse has been 
adapted by George Karatzaferis and is being used as an explanation to party cadres and supporters that 
do not see as radical a profile, as they would like. 
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category in a set of standardised issue areas. This allows for the gathering and creation 
of the best illustration of the topics and issues in the data under examination. The 
classification by means of the categories had been made in order to cover the total 
content of manifestos by identifying the statements of preference expressed.  
 
The coding procedure creates a classification of the kind of statements parties 
make in their manifestos and in their official speeches. By creating categories the 
purpose is not only to observe the similarities or relations within the data but also data 
being classified as ‘belonging’ to a particular group and this ‘implies a comparison 
between these data and other observations that do not belong to the same category’ 
(Kyngas and Elo, 2007:111). The understanding that the parties’ statements are not 
always clear and straightforward, so during the coding stage it is essential that the 
meaning of the word or phrase is coded in terms of the context of the sentence or 
paragraph, in order to avoid any uncertainty concerning the data.  
 
In the pages that follow, a separate over time analysis of each party is discussed. 
Following the qualitative analysis of the official documents and speeches in chapters 4, 
5 and 6 this part of the thesis evaluates the data in a more quantitative way, and 
compares the case studies across the selected time frame. In addition to political 
circumstances (elections, campaigns, policies) and internal changes, which have 
occurred within the parties (leadership, mergers, membership), this chapter will discuss 
the key findings of the content analysis, classify communication material and underline 
the connection of the rhetorical textual strategies within the parties in the form of 
preferences in terms of the established categories.  
 
7.4.  Analysis of the three cases: CATA 
 
7.4.1.  LA.O.S.  
 
7.4.1.1.  Salience of categories in LA.O.S. documents 
 
The semantic analysis of the texts highlights the repetition of a few significant 
themes, which were evaluated as such in order to create the categories. Before looking 
at the results of the analysis, the thesis adopts the approach that the outcomes represent 
 187 
the parties’ focus in relation to their ideology. The choice of topics by the party is, after 
all, the means by which the party presents its political positions and directs the 
attention of the electorate towards a set of issues that are acknowledged as being the 
most important to the party.  
 
In order to handle the data effectively a code in R language was created to 
manage the data analysis and create graphical representation. By using R language, as 
described in Chapter 3, plots are produced in order to present a graphical 
demonstration of the frequencies. The graphs demonstrate the changes in the focus of 
LA.O.S.’s  communication strategies in terms of the themed categories for the years 
2000-2010.  They also make it easier to compare the data both within and across the 
case studies. The first observation based on the analysis of the data concerning the case 
of LA.O.S. is that there are changes within the time frame under examination in the 
themed categories as determined above. An early impression of these changes can be 
identified in the Table 7:1 below.  
 
 
Table 7:1a Frequencies of categories in LA.O.S. documents  
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Table 7:1b: Proportions of categories in LA.O.S. documents 
 
These tables present the frequencies and proportions of the selected categories in 
the texts, which have been put in a chronological order. The documents for 2004 and 
2007 are the official manifestos of the party and the rest are the official speeches of the 
president of LA.O.S.. The first impression of examining the results is that there are 
significant differences within the categories in terms of frequencies that carry through 
each individual document. ‘Politics and democracy’ appears to be the most popular 
among the categories, recording its highest percentage in the manifesto of 2007, 
followed by ‘economy’, ‘nation and national identity’ and ‘law and security’, while at 
the same time some categories barely manage to reach a 0.1 in the total share, e.g. 
‘Europe and EU’ and ‘Environment’ in 2001 or ‘Religion’ in 2009.  
A more balanced representation of all categories can be found in the manifestos 
of 2004 and 2007. This can be explained, as the manifesto itself is a declaration of 
policies and ideas on several issues whereas speeches can be more issue-oriented or 
focused on specific issues depending on the place and the time the speech takes place. 
A more detailed analysis will be presented in the following sections.  
 
After the foundation of the party in 2000, the focus of LA.O.S.’s interest, based 
on the categorised issues, is presented in the figure below:  
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Figure 7:1 Salience of issues for LA.O.S. 2001 (%) 
 
The data from 2001 (presented clockwise in the pie chart in Figure 7:1 above) 
propose a variety of references concerning general ‘politics and democracy’ with 
2.42% followed by 1.57% on ‘economy’, 1% on ‘nation and national identity’ and 
0.90% on ‘society and values’. One of the interesting observations provided by this 
chart is that a party like LA.O.S., with such a strong religious bonds and such a strong 
national identity and anti-immigration stance, might have been expected to 
demonstrate higher percentages in communicating this element of their character. This 
strategy continues in ensuing years, concerning issues around the Orthodox Church 
and illegal immigration, but changes in relation to ‘nation and national identity’. As 
mentioned above, LA.O.S. in 2001 was a newly founded party, without having yet 
polished a communication style and strategy. Bearing in mind that the party had not 
yet participated in any elections this first sample of data creates a rather vague idea of 
what messages are being chosen to be transferred to the audience/electorate.  
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Nevertheless, it is clear that ‘politics and democracy’ is a popular theme for 
LA.O.S.. The party relates to the democratic principles of the country and underlines 
its own democratic credentials. Stressing these is essential, as the intention of LA.O.S. 
is to avoid any overt links with fascism in its ideology or among its members. Another 
trend derived from this category, is reference to the national political scene, LA.O.S. 
often refers to political opponents, the corruption of the system and the incapability of 
the established political parties to address the problems and interests of the Greek 
people. Let us not forget, though, that the party is seeking to reveal deficiencies in the 
foundations of Greece’s parliamentary democracy. Having said that, since the 
established political parties are seen as corrupt, LA.O.S. suggests a more direct form of 
democracy based on referendum procedures. However, ‘nation and national identity’ is 
one of the higher scoring issues, and plays an important role in the party’s 
communication message. Greek identity, along with pride in the nation and its glorious 
history, accompanies the rhetoric of the party across the years. Finally, ‘economy’ is a 
popular category and is mainly related to the dissatisfaction of the electorate, 
especially with economic choices of the last few years, which were made prior to 
Greek entry into the Eurozone, i.e. government expenditure and taxation policies. 
 
7.4.1.2. Comparing issue salience in the manifestos and leader’s speeches of 
LA.O.S. 2000-2010 (%) 
 
In order to understand better any changes that occur within the time frame a 
comparison between the manifesto of 2004 and that of 2007 has been undertaken. 
However, the fact that in 2004 the party did not manage to elect a single representative 
to the national parliament, whereas 2007 is the first year that the party successfully 
entered the national parliament needs to be underlined (see Chapter 4).  
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Figure 7:2 Comparing the manifestos (LA.O.S..)  
 
Figure 7:2 presents in greater detail the change in the communication message of 
LA.O.S. between the two elections of 2004 and 2007. By comparing the manifestos of 
2004 and 2007, useful inferences can be drawn. The party acknowledges its increase in 
electoral support, but also seems aware that changes need to be made in order to attract 
even more voters and gain the necessary popular support in order to enter the national 
parliament. This can be translated into the adoption of a wider spectrum of issues into 
the party’s rhetoric. Indeed several differences are noticeable when observing the 
salience of the categories. The categories that are most distinct in this chart are again 
those concerning ‘politics and democracy’, ‘nation and national identity’, 
‘development’, ‘society and values’ and ‘law and security’. With almost 8% of 
salience in 2007 compared to 4% in 2004, ‘politics and democracy’ is maintained as 
the chief category in the rhetoric of LA.O.S..; ‘nation and national identity’ follows 
with 5.61% in 2007 and 2.78% in 2004, which underpins the radically nationalist 
political identity of the party. In both cases the salience of ‘law and security’ and 
‘development’ increases greatly, especially in the category of ‘development’ since in 
2004 it scored 2.23% and almost doubled this in 2007, reaching 5.55%. When 
examining the ‘law and security’ category, it should be born in mind that other 
categories are linked in terms of issues relating to immigration and international 
relations.  
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 Immigrants are seen as a cause of the rising levels of crimes in the country, and 
Greek-Turkish relations are depicted as being based on a constant conflict with the risk 
to compromise Greece’s national security. Immigration is also linked to the category 
of, nation and national identity, but this will be discussed below. LA.O.S., by 
increasing the salience of their message concerning the dangers posed by immigrants 
and their negative influence on Greek society, seeks to draw on xenophobic sentiments 
in the electorate in relation to the sensitive issue of immigration and illegal 
immigration, in particular, which has increased greatly since the  late 1990s. Illegal 
immigration has remained an issue in the country from 1990 until the present (2014). 
After the fall of the socialist regimes in 1989, a large wave of economic migrants 
entered the country, originating from Albania, Bulgaria and Romania along with 
additional immigrants from Africa and Asia (see Eurostat, 2013). During the decade 
from 2000 to 2010, Greece became attractive to numerous immigrants from around the 
world, resulting in approximately 7% of the population being made up of immigrants 
from outside the EU (see Eurostat, 2013). It is important to note, however, that 
immigrants often consider entering Europe via Greece, because of its geographical 
position as a gateway to the rest of Western Europe.  
 
Having said that, it is worth noting that the majority of instances, where 
immigration is mentioned in the texts of LA.O.S., is accompanied by the word 
‘illegal’, which adds  a negative layer of meaning to the term. As seen above in 
Chapter 4, LA.O.S.’s policies which address the issue of illegal immigration mainly 
take the form of calling for the removal of the law on citizenship with reference to 
immigrants along with several additional (negative) measures that would deteriorate 
their position in Greek society. Nevertheless and despite the fact that the analysis of 
the data does not emphasise immigration, LA.O.S. is clearly an anti-immigration party 
which envisions a country for the Greeks and not for the (illegal) immigrants who are 
considered a growing source of crime. For the party, the prosperity of the country can 
only be achieved by Greeks and the state should be offering social welfare and security 
only on a national- chauvinistic basis (see Chapter 4). 
 
Finally, although LA.O.S. is closely identified  with the Greek Orthodox Church 
and faith is one of the primary principles of the party identity, the category of religion 
is hardly evident in the texts. LA.O.S. does not appear to present a significant focus 
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which stresses its religious identity and thus fails to present evidence of 
communication in this area. 
 
In order to contribute further to the identification of the changes in LA.O.S.’s 
trategy, a comparison between speeches given by Karatzaferis in the years between 
2001 and 2009 is undertaken. During these years the party experienced a degree of 
success like no other in the past, reaching its peak in 2009. All four speeches took 
place at political conventions of the party and are considered as a representative 
sample of the communication strategies of the party, combining rhetoric along with the 
charismatic figure of Karatzaferis.  
 
Figure 7:3 Salience of issues in Leader’s  Speeches LA.O.S, 2001-2009 (%) 
 
At this point several observations can be made, first by comparing the speeches 
and then by contrasting the content with the one of the manifestos. ‘Politics and 
democracy’ remains as the most salient category in all cases with the exception of the 
speech of 2003 when the economy dominates. In addition, although ‘economy’ appears 
to be following in terms of salience in 2001 the image changes in 2006 and 2009 where 
‘nation and national identity’ along with ‘society and values’ are the most salient foci 
in the speeches. Furthermore an important difference can be spotted in the three issues 
of ‘religion’, ‘Europe and EU’ and ‘general IR’.  
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In relation to ‘religion’ the higher percentage for 2001 (beyond the four speeches) 
can be justified by the fact that in 2000, the Greek minister of justice had announced 
the mandatory inclusion of religion and nationality on identity cards. Due to its 
contradiction to the law on the protection of personal data this was to be removed. As a 
result, the Greek Orthodox Church immediately started objecting to the removal of 
religion from the identity cards and under the leadership of the head of the Church, 
Archibishop Christodoulos, organised campaigns and demonstrations. Moreover, the 
Church began a collection of signatures in order to request a referendum on the matter. 
The petition managed in a six-month period to collect over 3.5 million signatures, but 
was declined by the Greek President.  During this period, Karatzaferis himself was an 
ally and supporter of the initiative of the Greek Orthodox Church, something that was 
reproduced in his own rhetoric.  By adopting a strong religious identity during the 
period of its foundation, LA.O.S. managed to create an image based on the values of 
Christianity and Nation. An example can be found in the party’s first conference, 
where Karatzaferis entered the room under the slogan of Hellas Hellinon Christianon, 
which means Greece belongs to the Greeks who are Christians, a slogan that became 
famous during the military junta of 1967-1974. This rather powerful slogan can also be 
linked to the nationalist ideology of the party and its attitude towards immigration and 
foreigners. Nevertheless, apart from the speech of 2001, LA.O.S. appears to have 
chosen not to emphasise issues relating to church and religion.  
 
As far as the categories of foreign policy and EU are concerned, the party 
emerges as highly nationalist and in favour of irredentism. Also, LA.O.S. defends 
chauvinism and appears as an anti-American and anti-European party, rejecting the 
statement that ‘Greece belongs to the West’ as the interest of the so-called West, 
according to LA.O.S., often undermines Greek national interests. As seen in Chapter 4 
on the positions and policies of LA.O.S. the party’s political position on EU is that 
there should be a loose relationship between the country-member states of the EU. The 
party rejects the idea of a European constitution declaring that power should be 
controlled by the national parliaments and the people in the form of direct democracy 
(referendums) (see more detail in Chapter 4).  
 
With regards to other categories, salience of issues regarding ‘education’, 
‘health’, ‘immigration’ and ‘environment’ is very low, apart from the exception in 
 195 
2003 regarding ‘health’ and in 2006 with reference to ‘culture’. These specific 
categories, as observed earlier, generally cannot be considered as ‘popular’ by the 
party and have been underrepresented in the texts. As we have seen above, 
‘immigration’ is an issue directly linked to ‘nation and national identity’ and in the 
same way there are links between ‘culture’, ‘society and values’ and ‘religion’, and 
also between ‘Europe and EU’ and ‘general IR’. The party focuses on what considers 
the most important elements of its rhetoric: the country, the nation and its greatness, 
referencing its past and outstanding history, and constructs an argument around this 
approach. Along with that, Greek society, identified by principles and values like the 
family and religion, contributes to the structure of a general image/idea of what the 
Greek nation and Greek characteristics are, in an effort to present the greatness and 
superiority of the Greek people (see Chapter 4). 
 
7.4.1.3. Outcomes 
 
Looking back to the overall results of the content analysis of the texts of LA.O.S. 
another important factor that needs to be examined is their total word count. As can be 
observed in the 2004 and 2007 manifestos, the word count is much larger compared to 
the rest of the texts which are based on speeches.  In 2007 especially, in comparison 
with the previous manifesto of 2004, the word length almost doubles. The party made a 
clearer and more concise statement of its ideology and identity in 2007, while the 
manifesto of 2004 can be taken as an introduction to what the party stands for. This 
can be explained again following the argument that LA.O.S. had a more limited, issue-
oriented approach in 2004, something that changed in 2007 once the party started to 
gain more power but, perhaps more importantly, also started to change its strategy 
concerning specific approaches to issues that enriched its rhetoric. Attention has 
already been drawn to the fact that after the announcement of the manifesto of 2007, 
the document of 2004 was withdrawn by the official website of the party since it was 
seen as no longer reflecting the party principles and characteristics (see Chapter 4). As 
a general observation, there are numerous differences in most party manifestos in 
terms of length from one election to the next. In addition, the speeches could have been 
expected to have focused on a more limited range of issues. 
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Having said that, it is in 2007 that the party raises its voice on a variety of 
additional issues, concerning a wide spectrum of policies that in the past did not appear 
to figure much in the profile of the party. The increase in contribution by several 
categories in the 2007 text can be explained in various ways. The series of line graphs 
that follows presents a general visual representation of the frequencies in the selected 
categories in order to contribute to a further analysis. The horizontal axis details the 
year of presentation of the selected text and the vertical axis is the proportion of text 
provided by each of the categories.  
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Figure 7:4: Graphs of salience of issues for LA.O.S., 2001-2009 (%)   
  
 
Even a cursory look at the plots above reveals the nature of the manifesto of 
2007. In 2007 LA.O.S, appears to make its rhetoric more strictly political. As 
mentioned above, this could be due to several reasons. The main one relates back to 
the EU elections of 2004. The LA.O.S. election results for this period demonstrated 
that the party was capable of entering the parliament at the next national elections by 
gaining the necessary percentage, but to do so, a change in its rhetoric had to take 
place. As seen in Chapter 4, LA.O.S. was until then linked to a form of radicalism and 
there were fascist individuals among its members. For that reason, in order to achieve a 
better electoral outcome, Karatzaferis realised that a more respectable image should be 
adopted.  For this reason, although elements of welfare chauvinism, anti-immigration 
and nationalism remain, a more ‘politically correct’ form of communication was 
deployed, something that is reflected on the graphs above. Having said that, in 2007 
there is the highest percentage of salience for the ‘politics and democracy’ category, 
reproducing once more the idea of a more legitimate profile for LA.O.S. In the effort to 
relinquish the radical and extreme characterisation, the document makes a declaration 
in favour of democracy and the democratic institutions at both  national and 
international levels (see Chapter 4).  
 
Secondly, there are several categories with low rates, compared to the rest, and 
this does not change throughout the documents. These categories are ‘religion’, 
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‘environment’, ‘immigration’ and, ‘Europe and EU’; for a party with strong religious 
and ethno-nationalist elements opposing the current form of the EU maybe we would 
expect that this would be reflected in the salience of the corresponding categories. 
Additionally, the first outcome of this analysis is the fact that there are several 
contradictions between what the party stands for and what the main focus is in the 
selected texts. Still, several questions have been raised with regard to the fact that the 
radical right ideology that contributes to the characterisation of LA.O.S. as a radical 
right party is not necessarily clear to the Greek people. In terms of the speeches, the 
anti-immigration ideology is not presented directly or in depth; nor is anti-Semitism 
and other similar elements that can be seen as fundamental to the party. In the leader’s 
speeches, as in the manifestos, the focus is on specific distinguishing categories and 
these are ‘politics and democracy’, ‘economy’, ‘nation and national identity’ and 
‘society and values’.  
 
Nevertheless, Figure 7:4 presents an overview of the party’s communication 
strategy based on the CATA of the selected texts, since a rather similar approach can 
be detected. LA.O.S. managed by 2007 to construct a political rhetoric that was 
developed since its foundation, and gain the popular support required to enter the 
parliament. Since the party’s foundation, its the main focus can be located in issues 
related to the categories of ‘politics and democracy’, ‘nation and national identity’ 
along with ‘society and values’, ‘law and security’,  ‘economy’ and ‘development’ 
with the first three demonstrating a precedence over the rest. A more consistent 
approach can be observed in several categories, e.g ‘culture’, ‘religion’, ‘education’, 
‘environment’, ‘immigration’ and ‘Europe and EU’ where the party communicates its 
message throughout the period under examination with similar salience. There are such 
cases as ‘economy’ and ‘law and security’ that there is no consistent pattern drawn 
from the data, but still these categories do appear to have a broader and more complex 
significance in the communication message of the party.  
 
To conclude, based on the qualitative analysis of LA.O.S. in Chapter 4 
concerning its characteristics, its ideology and the policies proposed by the party, one 
might have expected higher percentages of salience for some specific categories such 
as ‘immigration’ and ‘religion’, which the CATA did not support. Nevertheless, the 
need to propose a more legitimate and moderate image of a modern political party, in 
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an attempt to become attractive to a larger group of electors, is the priority of the party; 
as long as this includes emphasis on strong national identity and ethno-nationalism 
which provides the basis for the selection of both manifestos and the leader speeches.   
 
7.4.2.  SVP 
 
7.4.2.1. Salience of categories in SVP documents 
 
Switzerland, as presented in Chapter 5, is a country with strong links to its 
traditions and a hightened sense of direct democracy. The country has attracted a large 
number of foreigners since the early 1980s and by 2009 the proportion of foreigners 
accounted for 22.0% of the population (see bfs.admin.ch). In 1999 the political 
landscape of the country changed, and this year was also a turning point for SVP. In 
1999 the party managed to become the strongest party in the country by gaining 22,5% 
of the vote and entered a new era of success. The turning point for SVP was brought 
about by a change in its communication strategy according to which it adopted a more 
radical and populist approach that focused particularly on anti-immigration and asylum 
policies.  
 
Given that SVP declares faith in the traditional values of Switzerland, and 
participates in coalition governments, it seems difficult to place it in the radical right 
family. But it is Blocher’s denunciation of federal policy concerning foreigners that 
has attracted a large share of the party’s voters (see Chapter 5). SVP regards, its 
success as owing to successful communication strategies. But can this statement can be 
corroborated by results from this analysis? As seen in the previous case of LA.O.S., 
relevant data drawn from SVP’s manifestos and leader’s speeches are analysed in order 
to identify the image of the party’s communication strategy .  
 
By exploring the frequencies of the categories in the case of SVP, a general 
consistency regarding the salience of the data, especially in comparison to the case of 
LA.O.S., can be noted.  
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 Table 7:2a Frequences of categories in SVP documents 
 
 
Table 7:2b Proportions of categories in SVP documents 
 
The data from 1999 and 2007 are drawn from the official manifestos of the party 
and the rest relate to speeches of the president of SVP within the period under scrutiny. 
In order to have a better picture of the salience of the categories that are being 
examined, plots have been created. Before continuing with the analysis, it should be 
pointed out that the manifestos of SVP include a variety of visual material, usually in 
the form of  photographs, something that is not mirrored in the other cases. More 
detailed discussion on this will follow later in Chapter 8.  
 
A first reflection on the frequencies presented in Tables 7:2a and b highlights 
several differences in terms of emphasis but, as in the case of LA.O.S., some 
categories are distinguished from the others, e.g. ‘politics and democracy’, ‘society and 
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values’, ‘economy’ and ‘nation and national identity’. As seen in Chapter 5, the main 
policy emphasises SVP’s focus on foreign policy, immigration, welfare chauvinism 
and restriction on government influences. A lower level of salience concerns the 
category of ‘religion’. The discussion about religion in SVP texts mainly focuses on 
the origins of the Swiss state, which according to the party was built on Christian 
foundations but generally the issue of Christianity does not appear to have a strong 
position in the party’s rhetoric. Additionally, in the case of ‘Europe and EU’, where the 
numbers are lower in comparison to other categories, the explanation may lie in the 
party’s general position on foreign policy.  The party opposes the involvement of 
Switzerland in the EU, while the focus remains on the country itself, as the rhetoric of 
SVP emphasises the supremacy of Switzerland as a country and as a nation rather than 
the EU itself. This might also explain the high rates in the category of ‘politics and 
democracy’ and ‘nation and national identity’. Throughout the texts of SVP there is a 
high exaltation of the Swiss political system and the country’s position in the 
international political scene as a great example of economic and political sovereignty 
(see Chapter 5). This example relates to the statement at the beginning of this chapter 
that the categories can reflect one another. Most of the categories appear to be 
consistent over time, despite minor differences in some cases, e.g. ‘health’ and 
‘immigration’. A more comprehensive view of the frequencies will follow when 
examining the graphs of frequency of salience in the selected categories.  
 
7.4.2.2. Comparing issue salience in the manifestos and leader’s speeches of 
SVP 
 
Similar to the case of LA.O.S., a comparison of the texts is carried out. More 
specifically, the manifestos of 1999 and 2007 are compared in order to track any 
changes in the written message of the party.  
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Figure 7:5 Comparing the manifestos (SVP) (%) 
 
The comparison of the manifestos presents some significant differences between 
the two documents especially with regard to the categories of ‘politics and democracy’, 
‘society and values’, ‘nation and national identity’ and ‘economy’. Although in 1999, a 
major focus was on ‘society and values’ and ‘economy’ (almost 3% and 2.5%, 
respectively) the image changes in 2007, when the focus moves toward ‘politics and 
democracy’ (2.9%) and nation and national identity (2.74%). In 1999 the party projects 
an image based on the traditions and values of Swiss society, driven by social 
prosperity and economic growth. By contrast, the 2007 manifesto is couched in more 
overtly political language emphasising party policies and support for the established 
federal party system in Switzerland, along with emphasis on national origins and the 
protection of the national identity of the country and society (see Chapter 5). The 
category of ‘nation and national identity’ is linked in terms of context with that of 
immigration, as in this case, similar to what was noted earlier in the analysis, this 
category can also be seen as an indirect signifier of issues regarding immigrants; 
‘economy’,  on the other hand, is a category that in the case of SVP refers basically to 
lower taxes and government spending. Additionally, the salience of ‘development’ in 
1999 was around 2%, but reduced to 1.3% in the manifesto of 2007. In the majority of 
the rest of the categories the differences are minor, e.g. ‘culture’, ‘environment’ and 
‘law and security’ that appear more frequently in the manifesto of 1999 than in that of 
2007. Generally, in 1999 the manifesto presents a more homogenous image than the 
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one in 2007, where there is greater emphasis on ‘politics and democracy’, ‘society and 
values’ and ‘nation and national identity’ than on the rest of the categories.  
 
Figure 7:6 Salience of issues in Leader speeches 2001-2010 SVP (%) 
 
In Figure 7:6 the bar chart deals with the leader’s speeches in the period of 2001-
2010. The chart highlights the salience of issues in these speeches and examines their 
similarities and differences. The peak in the salience of the ‘politics and democracy’ 
category occurs in 2003 and 2006 and represents a rise of almost 4% in both cases, 
followed by 3% fort the ‘nation and national identity’ category in 2010. There are 
slight fluctuations in levels of salience for the categories of ‘society and values’, 
‘economy’, ‘law and security’ and ‘general IR’, with the rest of the categories 
demonstrating a greater degree of stability, e.g. ‘health’, ‘religion’ ‘development’, 
‘immigration’. Once more, the categories that stand out from the rest are the ones 
linked to the key ideological and policy positions of the party and contain issues that 
resonate with one another. As discussed in Chapter 5, SVP talks in favour of prosperity 
for the country by maintaining Switzerland’s unique political system and by 
maintaining the principles of sovereignty, direct democracy, the neutrality that 
characterise the country and its federal system, together with requests for tighter 
control of the national budget and lower taxes (see Chapter 5). ‘Law and security’ is an 
issue that appears quite often, especially after 2007, the year in which the black sheep 
campaign was launched. One of the major approaches in this area concerns 
immigrants, who are depicted as criminals; for this reason the party proposes that 
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necessary measures need to be taken, in order to create a safer and more secure 
environment for Swiss citizens  (see Chapter 5).  
 
After 2007, and the infamous black sheep campaign, SVP becomes more radical 
in its communication rhetoric, especially concerning immigration policies, protection 
of the national element, and law and order issues. Immigrants are considered to be the 
major cause of crime in the country. Bearing this in mind, the party starts linking, in a 
more radical way, the issue of violence and crime with the immigration issue. In 
addition, the party starts targeting immigrants, making specific references to the 
Muslims and raising the matter of minarets, all in the name of national prosperity and 
protection of Swiss identity, tradition and culture.  Based on this argument, in a similar 
way to LA.O.S., SVP addresses the issue of immigration both directly and indirectly. 
By referring to welfare chauvinism and asylum policies, the party promotes the values 
and principles that illustrate the distinctive case of Switzerland. This observation raises 
questions about the form of communication strategies of SVP that the thesis is 
addressing and will be one of the foci in Chapter 8.  
 
7.4.2.3. Outcomes 
 
In the case of SVP a compelling comparison between ideology and 
communication message can be identified. During the period under scrutiny the 
rhetoric of SVP regarding such issues as immigration and welfare chauvinism 
developed a specifically radical character, comparable to those of other European 
radical right parties, which has been reflected in the communication strategies of the 
party since the late 1990s. The fact that the SVP has a long history of acitivty in the 
national political arena has allowed it to develop a clearer political message. This is 
reflected in the graphs in Figure 7:7 below. The first impression after analysing these is 
an image of stability across the years and a firm communication approach that is 
reflected also in the salience of preference patterns. More specifically, there are some 
minor exceptions, fluctuations that can be detected in the categories of ‘politics and 
democracy’, ‘society and values’, ‘economy’ and ‘development’. In addition, in the 
category of ‘nation and national identity’ there is a clear trend of increasing saliences.    
 
 206 
 
 
 207 
 
 
Figure 7:7: Graphs of salience of frequencies in categories for SVP (%) 
 
The general impression gained from the texts of SVP reflects the roots of the 
party. Originating in 1971 the party remained active in the political scene, and 
managed to gain the support of the electorate in 1999 when the SVP achieved 22.5% of 
the votes (see Chapter 5). According to the party, this electoral success was based on 
the fact that it managed to address issues it considered important in a consistent way, 
e.g. neutrality, personal responsibility, and lower taxes. The SVP was not a newly-
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formed party, like LA.O.S for instance, and its policies and focus seem to be more 
clearly defined. From the salience levels depicted above, the party follows a consistent 
approach relating to the communication concerning the selected issues and presents a 
comparatively similar level of significance over time. 
 
In relation to what was mentioned above, ‘politics and democracy’ and ‘nation 
and national identity’ are the issues with the highest salience among the selected texts 
and, thus, can help explain the positions of SVP in Switzerland’s federal political 
system. Along with the underlining of the Swiss values and the importance of the 
nation for the Swiss political culture, ‘society and values’ should be regarded in 
conjunction with these two significant categories in terms of salience. In a similar way 
to LA.O.S., the ‘immigration’ category does not appear to suggest a high level of 
salience, although SVP’s position on immigration and asylum is well known. Again 
this can be explained in the way the message is communicated. The focus remains on 
the Swiss nation and the national identity of the country, in terms of an ethno-
nationalism; under this wide perspective numerous policies and issues are being 
approached in a non-direct way.   
 
7.4.3. AN  
 
7.4.3.1. Salience of frequencies in the manifestos of AN 
 
 The final party that is being examined is the AN. The extent of the data is limited 
in comparison with the other two case studies, as Italy is included only  as a secondary 
case study. The texts examined are the two official party manifestos of 1995 and 2001. 
Although 1995 is beyond the boundaries of the time frame for this project, the fact that 
the party adopted its 1995 manifesto for 2001 validates its use in the analysis. Another 
factor that needs to be underlined is the absence of an official party manifesto for the 
AN alone after 2001. This can be explained by the fact that AN became a permanent 
member of the ClD and later merged into the PdL in 2009. It is in 1995 that the party 
created a new identity, leaving behind its fascist roots and moved away from of its 
position of isolation as a pariah. Rather, it has developed as a reliable ally of FI. Under 
this new image AN, is no longer just the successor to MSI, but projects itself as a 
dynamic force in the mainstream Italian political arena, following the traditional values 
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of Italian society and the religious faith of the Roman Catholic Church. The 
frequencies of the categories demonstrate considerable similarity between the two 
documents as they present a high rate of stability. Having said that, the communication 
strategy appears to be maintained at the same level settled back in 1995.  
 
 
Table 7:3: Frequencies and proportions of categories for AN documents 
 
The table above (Table 7:3) presents both the raw frequencies and proportions of 
salience levels for the categories. The salience levels show some differences between 
the two texts. For  the category of ‘economy’ there is almost a doubling in emphasis 
from 1995 to 2001 something that is similarly observed in the case of ‘development’. 
A significant increase can also be found for other categories such as ‘immigration’, 
‘education’ and ‘health’.  In the case of AN, as in the cases of LA.O.S. and SVP, the 
category of ‘politics and democracy’ is the most popular of all. The pattern is different 
however with regard to ‘society and values’, ‘economy’, ‘law and security’  and 
‘development’.  
 
A quick explanation would be that AN, in 1995, created a specific profile that 
was successful enough to bring the party electoral success and to maintain it in the 
years that followed. The basic characteristics of the party remain the same along with 
its rhetoric.   
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Figure 7:8 Comparing the manifestos of AN (%) 
 
Similar to the cases of LA.O.S.. and SVP, ‘politics and democracy’ is the key 
category in the case of AN. With the need to regularly reassure the public of its 
democratic credentials and its rejection of its fascist past, the fact that this is the most 
salient factor is understandable (2.76% in 1995 and 2.61% in 2001). Following is the 
category of ‘economy’ with 1.3% in 1995 and 2.56% in 2001 along with 
‘development’ with, 1.8% in 1995 and 2.4 % in 2001 which reflects the official 
position of the party in which it favours of a market economy based on a neo liberal 
approach. Moreover, AN’s views on national coherence, national identity and 
patriotism can be found in the ‘nation and national identity’ category, measuring 
1.09% in 1995 and 0.99% in 2001. Along with that, there is an increase in the salience 
of the immigration category from 0.16% in 1995 to 0.73% in 2001. The low levels for 
the immigration category can be explained by the fact that AN is not particularly 
associated with radical projection of anti-immigration politics in comparison with other 
prominent radical right parties in Europe.  
 
7.4.3.2. Outcomes 
 
From its foundation AN was trying to prove that, as a party which locates itself  
in the fundamental values set out in the Italian constitution, left behind its historical 
connection with MSI and its fascist past. In its effort to do so, the party attempted to 
address programmes and ideas that presented a new phase of progress towards more 
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liberal policies similar to other radical right parties in Europe (see Chapter 6).  When 
examining the manifestos of the party, attention should be paid to the time the 
manifestos were presented along with the evolution of the political presence of AN in 
the national scene. As stated before (see Chapter 3), although 1995 is not in the time 
frame of this project, the manifesto of that year is essential in order to understand the 
nature of the party. The next document replacing the manifesto of 1995 came in 2001. 
The difference word length should be underlined, for it is similar to LA.O.S. The 
document of 1995 seems to include all the necessary elements of a party manifesto 
created to present a broad image of the political party, its ideology and its policies. 
Since 1995, the party has participated successfully in national elections, but has also 
become member of the wider coalition of CdL (see Chapter 6). Figure 7:9 below, 
presents a clearer idea of the AN communication strategy, while comparing the 
changes between the two texts.  
 
The AN manifesto of 1995 presents the new identity of the party and this can be 
assumed to be one of the main opportunities for AN to use for proposing and 
presenting itself as a well-structured party that highlights its values and ideas clearly, 
while asking for the support of the electorate. Having made this clear, the manifesto of 
2001 does not appear to differ significantly from the one in 1995, something that could 
lead to a speculation that the focus of the party did not change during the intervening 
years. ‘Politics and democracy’ remains the priority issue for AN, rooted in the internal 
effort of the party to distance itself from MSI and present a more respectable image of 
a democratic party of the Italian right, promoting federalism, and a presidential system 
and plurality voting system. ‘Economy’ and ‘development’ reflect the party’s focus on 
liberal market promoting the privatisation of the state industries, policies that the party 
appears to follow intensively. ‘Nation and national identity’ along with ‘society and 
values’, and ‘law and security’, are linked to the traditional values of Italian society 
that the party supports, in addition to stricter security measures to control immigration 
and a call for harsher penalties for criminals (see Chapter 6). Although the party’s 
official position is close to the Christian values of the Roman Catholic Church, 
‘religion’ does not produce high rates of saliences, nor does ‘Europe and EU’. 
‘Immigration’ is one of the categories that seem to grow in importance between the 
years, although manifesting only a low level of salience along with ‘education’. 
Finally, apart from the categories already mentioned, the rest reflect similar levels of 
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salience in both of the manifestos, supporting the ideology and policies of the party in 
terms of issue orientation.  
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Figure 7:9: Graphs of salience of frequencies in categories for AN (%) 
 
Following this examination of the individual cases, a comparison between the 
cases is undertaken, using similar box plots to demonstrate similarities and differences. 
This direct comparison of salience contributes to an identification of the focus of the 
parties as members of the radical right family, and also serves to support the argument 
concerning the role of political marketing in the strategies of the three parties.  
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7.5.  Comparing the content  
 
In order to build a case concerning the communication strategy of radical right 
parties, three separate cases were selected. The comparison between these cases is 
essential, so that any similarities or differences in the way the political parties choose 
to communicate with the electorate through their textual and oral rhetoric can be 
identified. It is this rhetoric that is being examined in order to lead to conclusions 
concerning a general communication profile for the parties. The analysis now moves to 
consider the frequencies of certain categories, as discussed in Chapter 3, in order to 
underline a focus on saliences which inform the classification of the parties’ strategies. 
As seen in the previous sections of this chapter, several differences were noted while 
examining each individual case study. In order to visualise these changes graphs have 
been created where the changes in terms of issue salience within the documents are 
presented in stacked marked lines. Each line denotes a different category. The data 
have been analysed in the same chronological order as above.  
 
 
Figure 7:10 Graphs of salience of issues for LA.O.S., SVP and AN (%) 
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 These graphs summarise the observations made in the previous parts of this 
chapter. The horizontal axis, represents the years of the presentation of the texts 
(manifestos and speeches) and the vertical axis, the percentage references to 
categories. The purpose is to compare patterns of salience in the communication 
strategy of the parties during the years under consideration. In the case of LA.O.S. 
salience is quite variable and somewhat volatile in the case of the most salient issues, 
especially in terms of the category of ‘politics and democracy’.  
 
The SVP also shows a degree of variability, but to a much lesser extent and 
earlier in the decade. Again, ‘politics and democracy’ is both the most salient and the 
most likely to vary in the intensity of this saliency. The other issues do not demonstrate 
much movement in terms of the importance placed on them in the different documents. 
AN clearly presents a stable pattern in terms of issue salience for all categories. Of 
course, since only two texts were used, only dramatic differences would appear. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that some issues were more salient than others.  
 
But what does the comparison show? Can we identify any relationship between 
the three cases in terms of how far they differ in their communication message? The 
following figure (Figure 7:10) offers a clearer picture. The ‘box’ in the box-and-
whisker plot represents the average of the data points of the frequencies. Having said 
that, the horizontal axis refers to the party and the vertical one the percentage of the 
frequencies.  
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Figure 7:11 Comparing boxplots for  LA.O.S,.-SVP and-AN (mean percentages) 
 
 Interestingly the figure above presents several similarities among the three 
cases. The black line represents the average proportion for each category. Seven out of 
fourteen categories appear to have related frequencies in all three cases. The main 
differences are to be found in relation to the categories of ‘politics and democracy’, 
‘society and values’, ‘economy’, ‘nation and national identity’, ‘law and security’ and 
finally ‘development’. These are, after all, the categories with the higher percentages 
of preference over time and the changes occur in a similar pattern with only minor 
differences.  
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The average proportion of the categories presents a slightly different and more 
detailed impression of their salience. ‘Politics and democracy’ even in the average rate 
is the most popular category among all, though the frequency changes in each party. 
LA.O.S. signifies the highest percentage (almost 6%) followed by AN (less than 3%) 
and SVP (less than 2.5%). In the case of LA.O.S. the box plot is comparatively tall, 
something that indicates that there are differences among texts concerning this 
category. On the contrast, in the case of SVP the box is comparatively short, which 
implies that there is a level of agreement within the texts. Finally, in the case of AN, 
the agreement within the texts is almost identical, since the median line does not 
highlight any differences. Similar images occur for ‘nation and national identity’ and 
‘society and values’ categories. Concerning the first, again LA.O.S. gets the higher rate 
among the parties (around 4%) followed by SVP (more than 2%) and AN (around 
1.5%). Once more, there are clear differences among the texts in the LA.O.S. case, 
minor ones in the SVP case, and almost no differences for AN.  In the case of ‘society 
and values’ the differences in the case of SVP comparable to those of the other parties 
are yet the average for LA.O.S. is higher than for both SVP and AN, with the latter, 
presenting greater stability over time. In addition, for the ‘law and security’ category, 
LA.O.S.’s texts demonstrate more consistence than those of the other parties. AN is 
moderately consistent and SVP less so.  
 
‘Economy’ and ‘development’ are the next two categories which present some 
similarities. In the first the impression of a comparable approach the average 
proportion within the parties is close (around 2%). In this category, all three parties 
show only small differences between their texts. On the other hand, for the  ‘the 
development’ category LA.O.S. (with almost 4%) highlights greater differences in 
terms of salience than the other parties where the average, for SVP and AN is below 
2%. ‘Education’, ‘health’, ‘culture’, ‘Europe and EU’ and ‘General IR’ present only 
minor differences between the parties. In some of the cases, the average line of 
LA.O.S. is above the ones of SVP and AN, e.g. ‘general IR’ and ‘education’, but in 
most of the cases the average rates are close in numbers. Finally, in the case of the 
‘religion’ category, there are almost none of the differences among the texts and the 
proportions are equally low for all the parties.  
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Another general observation regarding these box plots relates to the significant 
deviations noted in the LA.O.S. texts, in comparison with a more homogenous image 
for the texts of SVP and AN. The consistency in the cases of SVP and AN point to a 
more stable and clear approach to policies and issues related to the categories, 
something that in the case of LA.O.S. cannot be substantiated. This can be explained 
by the fact that LA.O.S., since it was a newly-formed party, had not decided on an 
official party line at the time of its formation, and for several years the party was in a 
quandary about its identity (see Chapter 4). The historical past of SVP and AN 
contributed to the creation of a more gradual approach that was followed throughout 
the years under consideration. In addition, controversies are associated with the way 
the parties communicate their message to the electorate, e.g. concerning immigration, 
which is an aspect that will be taken up in the chapter that follows.  
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
What can be drawn from the box plots above is that the three parties do adopt a 
similar approach, especially regarding issues relating to the ‘politics and democracy’ 
and ‘nation and national identity’ categories. These two categories, for the reasons 
discussed in relation to the analysis of the three parties separately in the previous parts 
of this chapter, are treated as the major foci both in the manifestos and leader’s 
speeches, despite their different average salience rates. Other categories important for 
all parties are  ‘society and values’, ‘economy’, ‘law and security’ and ‘development’. 
Hence, the CATAs help to identify a similar profile of communication strategy for the 
three parties.  
 
The importance of the categories reflects the policy and priorities the parties set 
in their official documents, i.e .the manifestos and the leader’s speeches. The priority 
mirrored in the salience of proportions and the results of the comparative analysis also 
reflect the way the political parties communicate with the electorate. Their chosen foci 
set the line where policies become strategies and where the communication of these 
policies reflects their marketing techniques. The semantic correspondence between the 
three cases can justify an argument in favour of a common communication strategy in 
terms of official manifestos and leader’s speeches. But are there any other variables 
that can attribute to the analysis?  In the next chapter the discussion picks up key 
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aspects regarding political marketing and branding and the characterisation of radical 
right parties (LA.O.S., SVP and AN) will be related to results from the CATA, along 
with the contribution of images, the leadership figures and the qualitative analysis from 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. In this way the main arguments of the hypothesis regarding similar 
patterns of communication strategy will be substantiated.  
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8.  Reflections on the analysis: Communication strategies and radical 
right parties  
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter the emphasis is placed on reprising the discussion of the material 
in the previous chapters in order to assess how the research fits into the general 
development in the area of communication tactics. The observations and outcomes 
from the case-studies (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) along with the theory of political 
communication, political marketing and branding and the identification of the radical 
right party family (Chapter 2) and the results of the CATA (Chapter 7) are combined in 
order to address the research questions proposed in the introductory chapter (Chapter 
1) and reflect on the hypothesis of this thesis.  
 
The discussion will start with the re-statement of the research questions, reprise 
the theory presented in Chapter 2, and discuss the results of the qualitative analysis and 
the CATA of LA.O.S, SVP and AN, in order to support the argument on 
communication strategies of radical right parties.   
 
8.2. Research questions and hypothesis  
 
The hypothesis of this thesis examines the potential for a common pattern of 
communication strategies of radical right parties in Western Europe. The thesis has set 
out to answer questions linked to communication techniques of radical right politics on 
the basis of three case studies, and to draw conclusions through their comparative 
analysis. Ultimately, it contributes to a better understanding of the emphasis that these 
parties place on their prioritised issues, and how these contribute to the way they 
choose to communicate with the public. How do LA.O.S., SVP and AN choose to 
present themselves to the electorate? What are the communication techniques that they 
use? How can we distinguish between brand and image? And, is there a pattern to 
follow in order to run a successful political campaign, which might serve as an 
example for other political parties of the radical right?  
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8.3. Reflections on communicating politics 
 
The focus of this thesis is based on the assumption that political parties use as 
part of their communication techniques marketing and branding strategies, in order to 
achieve their political goals and increase their presence in their national political 
arenas. Furthermore, it is proposed that parties use a series of techniques which can be 
‘deployed in competitive situations to construct and reinforce a political entity’s image, 
products and persons’ (Osuagwu, 2008;800). Taking into consideration that marketing 
is increasingly being adopted by political parties, and that this is ‘moving beyond 
influencing only tactical matters of communication and presentation, towards playing a 
significant role in policy formulation and long-term direction’ (Butler and Collins 
(1996) in Moufahim, 2007:260).  
 
    Kotler (1982) claims that the marketing of politics will exist no matter what 
the particular methods are used. Nevertheless, O’Shaughnessy asserts that marketing 
strategies are clearly being adopted in modern politics and suggests that candidates 
appear to work on ‘formulating a look and behaviour that match the target voters’ 
perceptions and needs’; however, voters ‘are in need of a certain political character at a 
given time who will champion their hopes and assuage their fears’ (1990:4-5). Having 
said that, the focus of this research is on parties from a distinct political family and the 
electioneering aspects of marketing and branding strategies they employ. Political 
marketing and branding are thus examined as a part of the communication approach 
used in order to attract the attention of voters and to persuade them to support the party 
by entrusting it with their vote.  
 
During the period under examination (2000-2010), the electorate is exposed to 
numerous information from the political parties. This information takes the form of 
electoral advertising campaigns, for example or help for the electorate to familiarise 
themselves with the parties’ slogans and to associate themselves with recognisable 
symbols used by the party. This can be considered as evidence of a particular approach 
to political communication. Or, in other words, as Henneberg describes it, the means 
these specific parties choose in order to communicate with the electorate and the way 
that their candidates ‘adopt a populist ‘follower’ mentality, contributing to the 
disenchantment of the electorate and a resulting cynicism regarding politics in general’ 
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(2002:7).  
 
Following the concepts of commercial marketing theory, O’Shaughnessy, among 
others, suggests that the techniques adopted by the parties do not only reflect the 
product on offer, but actively contribute to the creation of the party’s image (see Lees-
Marchment, 2004; Maarek 1995). Political marketing theory, therefore, focuses on the 
notion that brand images are composed on the basis of individual elements that 
contribute to the understanding of voters’ likes and dislikes regarding a specific 
political candidate or political party (see Newman 1999a; 1999b; Lees-Marshment 
2004; Lees-Marshment and Lilleker 2005).  Needham (2005) listed several criteria for 
successful brands adding to the creation of a trusting relationship between product and 
consumer. ‘Brands act as simplifiers, are reassuring, credible and evoke a positive 
vision of a better way of life’ (De Landtsheer and De Vries, 2012); for Needham 
(2005) it is the brands that add to the creation of a trusting relationship between the 
product and the consumer.  
 
In the following pages a discussion takes place on how the thesis has addressed 
the research questions through content analysis. This approach contributes to the 
identification and understanding of communication techniques, which parties have 
used in order to present their ideology, policies and image to a market-oriented 
electorate.   
 
8.4. The communication approaches of radical right parties  
 
8.4.1. Developing market-oriented theory perspective for party politics 
 
In political communication theory, communication can take many forms, e.g. 
media, political marketing, political branding, and is being used during the effort of 
political parties to gain power and attract the attention of the electorate (see Mc Nair, 
1995). It is through these communication techniques that the image of the party is 
constructed.  The constructed image will follow the party and become a point of 
reference for the voters. Political parties have exploited political communication 
approaches within the last decades, and their practices have developed as a growing 
subject of research in political science.  
 224 
 
In their effort to gain the attention of the voters/audience/electorate, and 
eventually to earn their support, what most influences the appearance of parties in 
terms of strategic communication is the consumption of the product they offer (Chapter 
2). The market-orientation approach is featured in the variety of messages found in 
their ideology, in their rhetoric in official manifestos and speeches and in the images 
they choose to expose (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Although marketing itself is not 
mentioned directly anywhere in official party materials, the aim of this thesis has been 
to identify the elements that justify the characterisation of the parties as market-
oriented organisations. An example of this is the use of anti-immigration campaigns 
and policies. Anti-immigration, apart from being part of radical right parties’ ideology 
and policy, can also be seen as a characteristic brand for them. Reflecting on branding 
theory, a brand can influence the voters’ perception and motivate sentiments like trust, 
reliability, respect, and fear. In this specific case, the radical right parties try to invoke 
negative attitudes by means of particular types of marketing, and their communication 
strategy emphasises the negativity of that sentiment. Additionally, the parties calculate 
thoroughly the way they manage their image and political strategy. LA.O.S., SVP and 
AN have been criticised over the years for their radical views on issues concerning 
immigration, asylum seekers and party systems, along with condemnation of their 
origins being linked to fascism (see Chapter 2). It is for this reason that the parties seek 
to change their approach to connecting with the electorate, while adopting a more 
sophisticated language in order to communicate their message. It is important, 
however, to reiterate that political parties might not perceive the concepts of political 
marketing and branding in the same way as political scientists.  Bearing this in mind, 
questioning these concepts is still a contested area within political science, but 
engaging critically with these approaches will lead to a better understanding of the 
communication strategies of political parties. 
 
 There are several critical approaches since the late 1990s with regard to how 
political communication, including techniques associated with political marketing and 
branding, has been embraced by political parties in terms of candidates and policies 
(Needham 2005; Scammell, 2007; Newman, 1994; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 
2005). Moreover, several scholars have approached the issue directly in relation to 
radical right parties. Among others, Moufahim (2007) in the case of Vlaams Blok, Wal 
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(2010) in the case of AN on immigration, Van Der Valk (2003) on right-wing 
discourse on immigration in France, have used approaches based on discourse analysis. 
Content analysis has been recently used in order to examine the presence of radical 
right on the Internet (see Caiani and Parenti, 2013; Tateo, 2006) and Rooduijn and 
Pauwels (2011) on measuring populism in the manifestos of parties in the UK, 
Netherlands, Germany and Italy.   
 
In relation to this thesis, LA.O.S, SVP and AN, have managed to establish 
themselves in their respective national political arenas during the period 2000-2010 by 
adopting communication strategies that can be explained and analysed in more depth in 
relation to marketing and branding. Hence, well-organised electoral campaigns, 
websites, newspapers, and TV channels can be considered as specific components of a 
general communication technique which has contributed to each party’s success and 
increased popularity. However, a content analysis of the manifestos, regarding this 
political party family was yet to be explored. Responding to this gap in the literature, 
the purpose of this thesis has been to use CATA as a tool in order to identify patterns 
in communication approaches of these parties and relate them to the key concepts of 
political communication theory.  Having said that, it also offers an alternative way of 
examining political parties by using the opportunities offered by content analysis at a 
more explicit level, similar to the work of the Comparative Manifestos Project.  
 
As seen in detail in Chapter 2, the notion of political communication in a market-
oriented party perspective is adopted in order to identify the nature of political parties. 
Following the need for customers to become engaged ‘in arguing their ideology’, Lees-
Marshment (2004:4) claims that parties are motivated into taking action in order to 
maximise support from the electorate. This argument essentially means that the design 
and promotion of a product are based on the idea of satisfying the needs of the 
customer, which will lead ultimately to its consumption. Following the way a company 
seeks to offer customers what they want in order to maximise the possibility that they 
will buy the product, this thesis applies this aspect of marketing to party politics. 
Details of what political marketing is, as part of a broader notion of political 
communication, have already been discussed in Chapter 2 so now it is time to turn to 
the linkage between political marketing and the radical right parties under examination. 
Parties have often adopted a market-oriented approach in order to contribute ‘to the 
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disenchantment of the electorate…resulting in cynicism regarding politics in general’ 
(Henneberg, 2005 in Moufahim, 2007:301). In addition, marketing is undertaken as an 
essential communication technique in politics. For Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 
(2005) the manifestos of the parties are developed on the basis of results of qualitative 
and quantitative marketing studies, which the party elites have undertaken (2005), and 
that political marketing appears to be the successor to ideology as the basis of party 
appeal. Ideology has thus transformed itself into a product created to satisfy the needs 
of a group and get ready to be consumed in the electoral market. The comparative 
element of this thesis, although based only on a small sample of specific parties, 
contributes to the general understanding of communication techniques.  
 
8.4.2. The communication approach in the content of LA.O.S., SVP and 
AN 
 
8.4.2.1. Evidence from the CATA 
 
 As discussed Chapter 3, which deals with methodology, text can take many 
forms, such as manifestos, speeches or images. Content analysis has been used here in 
order to determine characteristic similarities or differences that can act as indicators of 
communication techniques among the parties under examination. The study benefits by 
the analysis of examples of visual material, which are included in the parties’ 
communication materials as well as words. This contributes to the construction of a 
general identity for these parties.  
 
In the manifestos and the selected public speeches of the leader, the ideology of 
the party is presented along with its proposed policies. The information included in 
these texts is extensive and varied, and involves ideas and approaches to general issues 
that occupy the political agenda. As presented in the overview of the radical right 
family (see Chapter 2), within the last few decades and especially since the advent of 
the third wave of radical right parties, the political parties of this family started to 
engage with a variety of issues in their rhetoric, e.g. environment, in their effort to 
leave behind their label of ‘pariah’ and become mainstream political forces at a 
national level. This wide range of themed issues suggests images of more legitimate 
parties, engaging with the well-being of the citizens and addressing the main anxieties 
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of the mainstream voter. In comparison to the second wave of the emergence of the 
radical right parties in the years after the late 1980s, the third wave presented a more 
complete image of political parties determined to compete against established political 
rivals.  
 
Having said that, the approach based on the individual principles of each party is 
what personalises each manifesto and each speech, as it takes on the role of being a 
declaration of what the political party believes and stands for and, moreover, what the 
party proposes as an alternative, i.e. a choice to the electorate in order to gain their 
vote. The logic of this thesis is related not only to the results of a content analysis of 
these texts, but also to the context of the manifestos and public speeches. After 
identifying the ideology and the proposed policies, their salience is used in order to 
highlight issues prioritised in the texts. This focus, on the political marketing context is 
the response to the needs of the electorate. The political parties exploit these needs in 
order to propose an appealing alternative product, ready to be consumed by the voters 
(see Chapter 2), and in terms of issue/policy salience the results point to the 
identification of the product.  
 
The results discussed in Chapter 7 present an image of political parties that have 
a solid perspective of how the world should work and, additionally, they propose 
similar policies in order to achieve their desired result. But is there a distinguishing 
point between the different issues that contribute to the political agenda of a party?  
The issue/policy salience, analysed in the previous chapter, demonstrates that there is. 
A dual impression can be gained from the results of the CATA. Firstly, these results 
underline the priorities and tone in the rhetoric of the political parties and secondly, 
they provide clearer understanding of the way some issues are communicated to the 
public. 
 
The qualitative semantic dimension of the texts from LA.O.S., SVP and AN 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6) along with the content analysis (Chapter 7) have demonstrated 
that various issues have contributed to the way the parties behave towards the 
electorate and, additionally, have created a hint of homogeneity between the parties. 
This homogeneity can be identified in the figures displayed in Chapter 7, where a 
pattern is observable. The analysis based on the categories (Table 3:1) clearly suggests 
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that the parties of LA.O.S., SVP and AN are comparable, since they appear to focus on 
similar sets of issues e.g. ‘politics and democracy’. In order to better understand the 
issue-salience results, presented in Chapter 7, one has to return to the ideology and the 
principles upon which these parties are based.  
 
The manifestos and speeches, used as data in this project, reflect this ideology in 
terms of the form in which it is presented to the electorate. This form can be classified 
on the basis of the proportions of significant issues contained in their texts. A clearer 
appreciation of the documents analysed can be obtained by reference to the two 
categories that differentiate themselves from the rest, in the CATA -   ‘politics and 
democracy’ and ‘nation and national identity’ (see Chapter 7). When looking at the 
results of the analysis several outcomes can provide further explanation to the nature of 
the communication strategies adopted by the parties. Having been criticised for their 
anti-system stances and their references to fascist ideology (Ignazi, 1992, 2003), 
together with their rejection of democratic principles and forms (Carter, 2005, 
Schedler, 1996); for their ethnocentric stance (Rydgren, 2005), their anti-party or ‘anti-
elitist appeal’ (Hainsworth, 2008), and their rhetoric which seems to pose a threat to 
liberal democracy (Mudde, 2004) (see Chapter 2), it seems evident that the parties 
would focus on ‘politics and democracy’ in order to counter such accusations and 
present a more democratic profile. The effort is epitomised by the creation of an image 
of normality, which depicts a party that is mainstream, legitimate and effective.   
 
The high ratio of references to ‘politics and democracy’ in the documents argues 
in favour of this view of the position of radical right parties towards the political 
system, but also towards far right elements at their root. The high percentages in this 
category can also be evaluated in terms of the origins of the party and its policies 
towards the political system. As seen both in theories of the radical right (see Chapter 
2), and also in the qualitative analysis of the case studies (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6) the 
legitimacy of these parties is often precarious, because of their radical ideals. This is 
especially the case for LA.O.S. and AN, since these parties have a direct link to fascist 
ideologies in their origins and are adopting, for the electorate, a portrait which 
proposes a  more conventional and liberal-oriented democratic appearance.  
 
However, the second category that distinguishes itself from the rest in terms of 
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importance for three cases is ‘nation and national identity’. Again, the looking back the 
profile of the radical right family (see Chapter 2), the parties of this family favour an 
ethno-nationalist approach. This approach can be further observed in reference to the 
salience of several other categories, e.g. ‘immigration’, ‘law and security’, ‘economy’ 
and ‘Europe and EU’. Elements of ethno-nationalism can be detected in all of the texts 
and also in the images used by the parties during electoral campaigns (a more detailed 
analysis of the images can be found in the next part of the chapter). Stigmatised in the 
past for being racist and having strong xenophobic roots, the parties, once more, adopt 
different ways to present and communicate their ideas and policies to the electorate. In 
terms of the approach of this thesis, such alternative communication techniques are 
evidence of how the parties market themselves.  
 
The rhetoric on such ethno-nationalist issues rationalises the effort to reject the 
accusations of supporting fascism, but at the same time is also used to construct an 
argument against the established system, which is perceived as weak. A collective 
national identity and crisis of confidence in established institutions along with a racist 
focus on nationalism and a general mistrust of the establish party system are, inter alia, 
ideological criteria for Ignazi (1992:10) that distinguish the radical right parties. These 
elements can be found in the party manifestos and speeches and are evident from the 
content analysis reported above. The parties’ identity is based on these very elements 
and has been communicated in their quest to gain electoral support. For Sartori (1976) 
‘a belief system that does not share the values of the political order within which it 
operates’ (1976:133) is identified as an‘anti-system party’. What is clear from the 
content analysis is that all three parties share common features, such as anti-pluralism 
and antipathy towards the multi-party system, by undermining system legitimacy and 
by trying to foster distrust in the system, emphasising the weakness of the state (Ignazi, 
1992:12).  
 
Similarly, research on the radical right parties so far has emphasised the 
economic programme of such parties, often characterised as neo-liberal, for it calls for 
lower taxes and defends the free market (see Chapter 2), this has often been considered 
as one of the critical reasons that has contributed to their success (see Betz 1994; 
Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). It has also contributed to the wider socio-economic 
programmes of the radical right parties. The emphasis in the texts that were examined, 
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however, proposed a nation-oriented perspective on economics, something that Mudde 
(2007) calls ‘nativist economic’; their strong support for the idea of welfare 
chauvinism can also support this view. Their rejection of the political system and 
strong emphasis on the national element additionally linking to economic programmes 
and policies on development can be identified as a product in marketing terms.  
 
8.4.2.2. Reading between the lines: the outcomes from the CATA  
 
Lees-Marshment (2009) suggests that parties understand and respond to the 
public’s demands, the parties should focus on the needs and wants of the electorate, in 
order to achieve high electoral performances, by being in a ‘nonstop’ electoral 
campaign aiming to satisfy the voter and offering a customised product (Nimmo, 1999, 
Sparrow and Turner, 2001, Kotzaivazoglou, 2010). In this market-oriented system, the 
party constructs a product, taking into account their ideology and prevalent social 
circumstances along with voters’ reactions, and then presents the product to the 
electorate through communication techniques.  
 
For Kitschelt and McGann (1995), the political and electoral support of radical 
right parties is influenced by the political market and competition in periodic elections. 
In this case, the radical right parties appear as a ‘renewal of the established order’, an 
alternative against corruption, scandals and ‘favouritism’ (Betz, 1993:679), proposing 
an ethnically and culturally homogeneous society, (Minkenberg, 1998, Georgiadou 
2004). Furthermore, the increasing number of immigrants, belonging to different 
cultural, ethnic and religious minorities, has created a general concern in Western 
countries about a disappearance of their indigenous cultures. Based on the qualitative 
analysis in previous chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) LA.O.S., SVP and AN, all managed 
to address widespread feelings of discontent and disenchantment, and a growing 
xenophobia and racism in their political cultures; to frame their messages in order to 
respond to the needs of the electorate, that is, perceived need for protection from 
immigrants and foreign influences. It is important here to mention that the parties, 
although they have strong anti-immigration stances (Chapter 2), in many cases they 
project their concerns in an indirect way, through nationalism and perceptions of 
devaluation of national identity and traditions.  
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The results of the CATA (see Chapter 7) underline the salience for radical right 
parties in relation to specific categories, which reflect the main characteristics of the 
radical right parties; ‘Politics and democracy’, as already mentioned above, is one of 
the categories along with ‘nation and national identity’. Emphasis on these categories 
presents a specific common communicating strategy that supports a market-oriented 
perception in the parties under examination. The reasons that distinguish these 
categories are not only their high rates of saliences, but also the fact that they can be 
related to many of the remaining categories. The argument of this project is that by 
projecting these two categories as a marketing technique, the parties manage to 
communicate their more radical ideas on issues relating to immigration, welfare 
chauvinism and anti-system sentiments. In order to test this statement and present an 
effective outcome from the results of CATA, there is a need to return to the ideology 
and profile of the parties under examination (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6) and give a 
theoretical grounding to the results. 
 
In addition to the need to prove their democratic credentials, the element of 
ethno-nationalism is one of the strongest components of the ideology of such radical 
right parties as LA.O.S., SVP and AN. Although the parties talk in favour of liberal 
democracy, the ‘native’ element is a key concept in their rhetoric e.g. ‘Greece belongs 
to the Greeks’, ‘Swiss first’ and ‘Restore Italy to the Italians’ (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
In their rhetoric the parties highlight the supremacy of the nation, in terms of culture, 
language, traditions, values, and principles, among others, they set the alarm on any 
potential threat that might disturb purity of this nation. But slogans like the ones 
mentioned above have a dual meaning. While underlining the importance of the nation, 
at the same time the parties imply a cultural homogeneity based on the nation’s 
principles and traditions, while additionally targeting the external element, i.e. 
immigrants, which is considered to be a threat to this homogeneity (see Chapters 4, 5 
and 6).  
 
Reflecting on the results of the analysis above (see Chapter 7), in order to protect 
the nation, its national identity and the cultural cohesion that characterises their 
countries, the parties ask for stricter measures regarding the number of the immigrants 
entering the country, asylum policies and citizenship for foreigners, among others. 
Furthermore, again in the name of maintaining the purity of the nation, stricter rules, 
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laws and punishments are encouraged. Regarding immigrants as sources of criminality 
and abuse, a harsher legal system is seen as preventing the distortion of the values and 
traditions of the countries. Following this feature, the rhetoric of the parties engages 
with the idea of naturalisation of the foreign element in the name of the protection of 
the nation, which could be achieved by the use of education. The parties underline the 
historical context and achievements of the nation throughout history and structure an 
additional argument for its fortification. This approach can be characterised as an 
enthocratic one. In an ethnocracy, education would be the tool to inform, but also to 
preserve, the traditions and values of the country and maintain the importance of its 
history and culture. The need is to preserve the cultural identity that is also part of the 
nation’s identity.  
 
As previously discussed, despite the parties being in favour of liberal democracy 
(see Chapters 4, 5 and 6) there are strong authoritarian elements to be found in their 
rhetoric. These relate especially to proposed law and order policies which project an 
uncompromising attitude towards criminals (see Chapters 5 and 6) and an increase in 
the number of police (see Chapter 4). The protection of the law, as mentioned in the 
texts, is required for the protection of the ‘state’, and it is in the name of the ‘state’ that 
such policies are promoted.  
 
One of the major principles, examined in the texts is the statement that power is 
on the hands of the people. In this sense, the parties are proposing policies that will 
restrict the powers of government and the political parties/elites, and will transfer the 
power where it belongs, to the electorate. This will work to the benefit of the people as 
the domination by political parties in particular, and political institutions, in general, 
would come to an end. Their populist approach returns political initiative to the people, 
mostly in the form of referendums (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6) and targets the elements of 
corruption and abuse of power in the established political system.  
 
‘Economy’ and ‘development’ are two additional categories that are related to 
both ‘politics and democracy’ and ‘nation and national identity’. The parties’ rhetoric 
on economy involves a restriction of the state’s intervention in the market and argues 
in favour of welfare chauvinism. The argument in favour of a free market underlines 
the need for new opportunities for business. However, LA.O.S., SVP and AN relate 
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their economic programmes to the principle that the economy should work in favour of 
the nation and the ‘natives’. In this sense there is a great mistrust of international 
market relations, in which are widely rejected (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). In addition, 
this approach reflects the Eurosceptic sentiment that is extensively spread across the 
parties. Furthermore, welfare chauvinism is one of the key concepts of the radical right 
family. The welfare state, which originated as a social concept, transforms to a nation-
oriented one. For the radical right parties, the welfare system should work only for the 
‘natives’. All three parties refer to the exploitation of the welfare system by immigrants 
and argue against it, depicting it as a problematic chain of policies instituted by 
socialists (see Chapter 2). LA.O.S., SVP and AN agree on the need for a welfare 
system that addresses the indigenous population alone and can encompass health, 
employment, benefits, etc.  
 
Finally, the salience of ‘society and values’, based on the rhetoric of the parties, 
is centred on the principles and traditions of the countries. Within the texts, references 
to these values and traditions reflect the supremacy of the nation, relate to the values of 
the Christian background of Western democracies, and contribute to the establishment 
of a general cultural identity. Bearing this in mind, the parties underline their rejection 
of multiculturalism, caused by the number of immigrants with different origins and 
backgrounds, especially those from Muslim countries. In the case of SVP the emphasis 
on Muslim minorities is especially located in the referendum campaigns relating to 
stricter asylum policies, the ban on minarets, and the deportation of criminal 
immigrants from the country (see Chapter 5).  
 
The overview above relates levels of saliences, discussed in Chapter 7, to the 
findings of the qualitative analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The relationship between the 
outcomes points to the usage of ‘politics and democracy’ and ‘nation and national 
identity’ in relation to the rest of the categories with reference to communication 
strategies. For the reasons presented above, the parties create an indirect rhetoric to 
address important issues by highlighting the state and the nation as their main 
reference.  
In summary, the populism of the radical right parties can be understood as ‘a 
corruption of democratic ideas’ (Taquieff 1995 in Mudde, 2004:541). Moving away 
from being a protest vote, which used to characterise the second wave of radical right 
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party evolution and part of the third wave (Chapter 2), for Eatwell (1998) the choice 
for an actual change is what motivates the voters of the radical right; anti-partism and 
anti-elitism can provide explanations for the support for radical right parties, along 
with a strong national identity (Eatwell, 1998.27). Thus, the vote for the parties, 
examined on this basis, is ideological in nature, which can explain, according to 
Moufahim, ‘why other parties have attempted to regain voters by competing within the 
same ideological space’ (2007:306). For Lin, radical right parties are using a form of 
focused-marketing in order to survive in the electoral market. According to this 
argument, parties choose a target and decide how to ‘focus all [sic their] efforts’ (Lin, 
2004:2), an approach similar to the tactics of the target market found in commercial 
marketing. Following Kirchheimer (1966), the argument that mainstream parties 
attempt a catch-all approach, Minkenberg (2000) suggests that radical right parties 
attempt to target susceptible voters on the basis of a so-called ‘mix’ of authoritarian 
attitudes and traditional values, resulting from the sentiment of xenophobia, and the 
protection of the social privileges of such voters in the form of welfare chauvinism 
(Minkenberg, 2000, Lin, 2004). This is,  at the same time, like projecting a 
mainstreamdemocratic image.  
 
This theory appears to be relevant to the results of the CATA. The product the 
parties choose to offer is created under these terms, and is proposed to the electorate by 
using labels like ‘the state’ and ‘the nation’. The LA.O.S., SVP and AN are signified 
and identified by this approach which distinguishes them from the rest of the parties in 
their party systems. The radical right parties under examination appear to have the 
capability to disguise their radical rhetoric under the recognisable principles of state 
and nation and in that they all follow the same pattern. Based on the findings presented 
above, the stated hypothesis of a common communication approach appears to be 
relevant. The tactics of the parties proposes evidence of a political marketing 
perspective. The sophisticated approach in the rhetoric of the examined texts (both 
manifestos and leader speeches) points to a more legitimate profile for the respective 
parties, making them more appealing to the electorate and, in addition, increasing the 
possibilities for them to be trusted by the electorate; in other words they are ‘being 
consumed’. In addition to the content analysis, a further discussion of the images of the 
parties will follow in order to examine the function of image in a marketing assessment 
in the cases of LA.O.S., SVP and AN.  
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8.4.3. The communicating perspective of the image in a campaign 
assessment    
 
An analysis of visual data on the basis of posters used in LA.O.S., SVP and AN  
election campaigns has underlined how parties have utilised marketing to improve 
their image and its general contribution to building the  identity that they sell to the 
electorate (see Newman 1999b). During this image management procedure, for 
Newman (2001) ideology is a ‘labelling process’ equivalent to use of branding for 
products. In this case, however, voters have used ideology in order to make a 
connection with them. What the parties do is to persuade the electorate to deliver their 
product in the form of their votes. The labels then become similarly attached to the 
offered services, which specify ‘who and what … [the parties] stand for in the minds of 
the consumers’ (Schweiger and Adami 1999 in Newman, 2001:6). Having said that, 
Newman (2001) concludes that ideology is driven less by party affiliation and more by 
marketing where political parties and individual candidates are defined by the images 
their consultants create for them (2001:6).  
 
Nevertheless, images are a persuasive way to help people configure a better 
understanding of the world and in this case the identity of the political parties. 
According to Borgerson and Schroeder (2005), marketing representations, like images, 
manage to create the impression to the public that ‘they know something they have no 
experience of, and the power to influence the experiences they have in the future’ and, 
in addition, what they think they know ‘can affect how they see, treat and understand’ 
others (in Moufahim, 2007:306-307). Through marketing, these images, whether a 
portrait, a photograph or background representations, such as landscapes, are the most 
direct forms of communication used by the parties in order to create a believable 
impression which will draw the attention of the electorate.  Bearing in mind that the 
purpose of the image is to highlight and strengthen the identity of the parties, for 
Alvesson (1990) the relationship between image and reality is ambiguous, and far from 
presenting an ‘objective reality’ (in Moufahim, 2007:308).  
 
As mentioned above (see Chapter 2), the communication strategies of the 
political parties aim to create a bond between the party and the voter in the same way 
the consumer reacts in a market environment.  Having said that, the electoral campaign 
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is something to identify with and feel part of.  As Keedle underlines, the ‘campaign 
allows a brand to develop its personality’ (1991:179). Taking into consideration the 
idea of the image in an electoral campaign aims to fit in and be part of the ordinary life 
of the potential voter. Additionally, it works as a commodification, a vehicle to attract 
the voters.  In order to achieve this, the images/posters are used in strategic public 
spaces mostly along major roads in order to be seen at times of commuting, in 
shopping malls, or even bus stops. 
 
 
Figure 8:1: Snapshot of SVP posters in use 
 
Considering the electoral posters campaign it is necessary to revisit the content 
analysis framework and media framing theory, where the focus is on the way the 
information is presented to the audiences.  As Entman underlined, ‘to frame a 
communicating text or message is to promote certain facets of a ‘perceived reality’ and 
make them more salient in such a way that endorses a specific problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or a treatment recommendation (1993:51). 
In this case, media framing is incorporated with the political agenda of the parties. 
Reflecting on the methodology (see Chapter 2), content analysis is the best means to 
identify patterns and use of framing across different case studies, in order to provide a 
comparison. 
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The purpose of image management is to create an impression of reality and to 
motivate the sentiments of the audience in order to gain their attention and to persuade 
them to support the parties on the basis of an appealing identity. As presented in 
Chapter 5 images contained in campaign posters of SVP propose an unconcealed anti-
immigrant and racist attitude, where immigrants appear as thieves, criminals, terrorists 
and a threat to the county’s prosperity. By creating a repellent feeling towards 
immigrants and targeting Muslims specifically, the posters include images of minarets 
in the shape of missiles, women wearing veils, a black sheep between several white 
ones, all of which resonate with the growing fear and xenophobic aggression and 
making it attractive to those voters who identify with these sentiments.  Similarly, in 
the case of AN (see Chapter 6), the image of immigrants being compared to a sinking 
ship, attempts to motivate the public opinion in the direction of the party’s perception 
of immigration. Moreover, in the case of SVP, numerous photographs projecting Swiss 
landscapes accompany the manifestos that have been examined, along with images 
relating to Swiss traditions (e.g. traditional clothes, local festivals), party members 
associating with the public. The text in this case, along with the images, plays on the 
nationalism of the audience and on their fundamental attachment to the Swiss nation.   
 
Photographs can be a critical influence on the perception of identity and reality, 
since photographs represent images of how someone thinks and understands 
something. Apart from images reflecting the political messages of the parties, there is a 
visual representation of the party itself, in each individual case, through the portraits of 
the party leaders and occasional group-member photographs. The portrait of the party 
is the face of the political leader, who is the most recognisable face of the party and 
often is thought to be identical to the image of the party. As examined earlier, the 
organisation of the radical right parties centralise power in the leader (see Chapter 2, 4, 
5 and 6). Commenting on the role of the leader in radical right parties, Carter (2005) 
states that he ‘exerts the kind of total control that is often essential’ (2005:65), while at 
the same time Betz (2002) underlines that it is the internal consistency and efficient 
leadership which is essential for a party originating from the radical right family to 
become effective and develop as a strong political factor. For Bos and Van der Brug 
the image of the leader can affect the voters’ trust in the party since  
 
[T]he more a politician is seen as effective and the more he or she is seen as legitimate, the more likely it 
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is that voters will consider a vote for his or her party’ ‘the more a voter believes that a party leader can 
represent their interests, the more they will be inclined to emphasise the factors that cause them to give a 
higher preference to the party, or the more ‘trust’ a voter has in a politician, the more he or she will see 
eye-to-eye with him or her. (2010:781) 
 
As a result of the increasing ability to access information about politicians and 
share opinions on candidate profiles, policies, image and brand, (Farrell and Webb, 
2000 in Bal et al, 2010:313) perceptions based on the leaders’ profiles is prioritised. 
Karatzaferis, Blocher and Fini act as the supreme representatives of their parties and 
their portraits are used as the upfront visual face of the parties. Following the theory of 
charismatic leadership (see Chapter 2), the party leaders play the primary role of 
presenting the product to the electorate in order for it to be consumed. An image of 
strong, responsible and reliable leadership, Karatzaferis, Blocher and Fini appear to 
have the necessary characteristics of a successful leader. Popular figures and 
representatives of political parties that endorse populism, the leaders of LA.O.S., SVP 
and AN succeed to contribute to the integration of the identity of the party. In addition, 
the role of the leader is dual: apart from delivering the message to the 
audience/electorate the leader becomes a portion of the message himself/herself. 
 
One of the major  points in the thesis is that there is a common pattern regarding 
the parties’ tendency to downplay issues such as multiculturalism and immigration, 
which are not clearly emphasised in their manifestos and speeches (see Chapter 7); 
issues that come forward clearly in the parties’ posters and insignia. This can be 
justified through the communication of the posters and images. The level of 
communication points out that there are differences across the manifestos and 
speeches, and equally different are the responses from the electorate. Although the 
poster campaign reflects the manifestos and the ideology of  each party, the message 
can be characterised as more ‘aggressive’ and ‘straightforward’. The images are going 
to be used as signifiers of these messages which are more likely to motivate the 
sentiment of the audience and ultimately attract their support.  Framing analysis 
supports this attitude as the posters target a specific issue and manage to launch it, 
present the reasons for its cause, and a proposed solution to the ‘problem’ all at once. 
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8.5.  Political Branding in practice  
 
 ‘In a business environment, businesses use a variety of advertising strategies in 
order to communicate the product and brand information to customers’ (Biehal, 2007, 
quoted in Bal et al, 2010:314). And although, the product can be identified in 
manifestos and posters, the classification of the brand seems rather too vague to be 
determined precisely. Marsh and Fawcett (2011) link the branding image to the 
knowledge expectations and emotions that are projected onto the consumer, regarding 
the product. Along with marketing, branding is concerned with building a form of 
‘equity’ for products by allowing the consumer to choose with confidence in a market 
place full of variety of choices (Clifton and Simmons, 1996:18), thus, creating an 
identity for the product (see Chapter 2). For O’Shaughnessy and Henneberg (2007), 
political brands combine three individual elements in which the party is the brand, the 
entities are the physical representations of its characteristics and, finally, the policies 
are the offered services (Marsh and Fawcett, 2011). 
  
As already discussed, the idea behind the practice of political branding is the 
consumer and the identification of his/her needs (see Chapter 2). By acknowledging 
this need and by reminding us that the consumers are not steady but can change their 
preferences and develop new skills, the political parties organise their 
branding/marketing strategy in order to create a dedicated culture which provides 
tolerance. The aim is to create a customised product that will work as a bond between 
them. This relationship between the brands and the consumers is the outcome of 
branding management.  
 
The evidence about using political marketing as a technique of communication 
from the parties of radical right created the need to identify the brands the parties used 
during this process, which enhances the branding management in this process. 
Following the theory of political branding (see Chapter 2), this thesis identifies three 
major potential brands: the political parties, the leadership, and the policies. These 
brands do not only stand individually, but also represent collectively the basis and a 
more holistic approach. In this sense they work as a focus for creating a party’s 
identity.  
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The documentation on the parties’ identity includes their historical background 
and the background of the people that have effectively contributed to the creation of 
this identity. By understanding the origins of the political parties, we obtain a better 
comprehension of how they construct their marketing technique occurs. The CATA 
created evidence of a common communication pattern for LA.O.S., SVP and AN. The 
analysis of the brands and the adopted branding management of the parties enriches 
this argument and recognises the overall approach of the parties’ efforts in making 
contact with the electorate. Branding is interpreted in this thesis as another tool 
referencing back to commercial marketing. Identifying the brand and identifying the 
way the brand is managed in the marketing strategy of a political party are both 
features that reflect the identity of the party, its ideology and its principles. The 
understanding of the bond between the brand and the party is dual: understanding the 
brand in relation to the party, but also the party in relation to the brand.  
 
To summarise, political parties seek to create a loyalty bond between the brand 
and the consumers in order to gain their trust and support in the electoral market.  The 
brand proposes a way that political messages are communicated to the consumers, and 
engages with methods of exploiting images and symbolism, apart from the content of 
the manifestos and speeches that was analysed in the chapters above (see Chapter 7).  
 
8.5.1.  The political parties 
 
In political marketing theory (see Chapter 2), parties are viewed as brands and 
the point of sale is the election. For Needham (2005), ‘drawing on commercial 
marketing analogies, an election can be seen as the moment of sale: the point of 
choice, where voters employ the knowledge they have about a candidate or party and 
make their choice’ (2005:346). Bearing this in mind, it can be stated that consumers 
are accepting political parties as brands. In addition, by observing the product the 
parties offer, they are trying to understand the information and the attitudes that this 
product proposes and, finally, try to create a relationship with them. The brand does 
not only identify the party, but also creates a sense of identity for the consumers. In 
addition, Needham (2005) detects six features that contribute to successful brand 
management, this being simplicity uniqueness, reassurance, aspiration, value and 
credibility.  
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The analysis of the political parties of LA.O.S., SVP and AN (see Chapters 4, 5 
and 6) argues that clear messages can be identified in the rhetoric of the parties. These 
often take the form of slogans and memorable quotes that reflect the parties’ ideology 
and imply the nature of their proposed policies, e.g. ‘Standing up for Switzerland’, 
‘Hand in hand because we can’, and ‘Innovation and tradition- for a national alliance’. 
The data also reflect a secondary factor that contributes to the quality of the message 
and this is the direct communication of the message to the electorate and the choice of 
the language when communicating it. Having said that, these messages act as 
‘simplifiers’ (see McDonald et al., 2001:340) that highlight part of information about 
the party, without adding additional and large amounts of information that can cause 
misperception and discomfort to the electorate (Needham, 2005).  
 
The second aspect of a successful brand is its uniqueness. The parties are asked 
to present an alternative to existing political choices, and distinguish themselves from 
their political opponents. A political party’s ideology can be a mixture, which draws on 
different ideologies and concepts. What differentiates similar ideologies from each 
other is often the way the brand is constructed, and what makes it unique in 
comparison to the similar products offered by other political parties: ‘A product can be 
copied by a competitor; a brand is unique’ (King, 1984: iii). For instance, immigration 
is an issue that every political party includes in their rhetoric. The aggressive approach 
to immigration by LA.O.S., SVP and AN, e.g. ‘No’, ‘Stop’, ‘Enough’, among others, 
is the distinctive criterion that separates these parties and provides a means of 
considering their uniqueness.  
  
The reassurance from the parties’ side, that by choosing their product voters will 
feel vindicated fosters voters’ perception that their needs and wishes would be satisfied 
by this choice. This is crucial: the way LA.O.S., SVP and AN address this matter can 
be located in the rhetoric that reflects their ideology. In other words this is the way that 
the parties under examination incorporate their ideology in their proposed policies, e.g. 
stricter measures on immigration, welfare chauvinist measures, initiatives such as 
referendums, among others. The consistency between ideology and the proposed 
policies creates an effective and affective brand. By this, the consumer would be more 
likely to trust in and bond with the recommended brand. Also, this can be reflected in 
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attitudes towards political opponents and government policies that contradict their own 
political positions. In addition, aspiration relates to the ability of the party to convince 
the consumers that the product would keep their promises. The aim of the brand is to 
work for the benefit of its consumers and to create ideal circumstances which address 
the expectations of the consumers. In the cases of LA.O.S., SVP and AN, this can be 
achieved again through the proposed policies in the core areas of immigration, political 
system and economy, along with the values and the principles that the parties support, 
in order to create the environment desired by the consumers.   
 
As stated in the theory of branding (see Chapter 2) the brands represent and 
indicate the values and principles of the company that offers it in the market. The aim 
of the party is to create a product and then convince the electorate to trust it and choose 
it among others. A consistent reference to brand values ensures that the brand is not 
just another alternative, but is a potential choice with depth and context. In this case, 
the parties of LA.O.S., SVP and AN make sure to reflect their principles and values in 
their rhetoric and  invite the consumer to become part of it. By engaging with the 
consumer in their rhetoric, the parties manage to eliminate the distance between the 
party and the voter, and create a common sentiment of shared beliefs. The values of the 
parties are clearly declared in the manifestos and the leader’s speeches that were 
examined above, and were referred to as values of the Western European world, 
notably democracy, freedom, equality, and Christianity. These values propose the 
approach of how the product is developed and what the product represents, adding 
credibility and validity to the brand. Finally, the building of this credibility concludes 
with addressing the consumers’ needs and wants, in other words, the delivery of the 
brand’s promises.   
 
The promise of the brand is the bond feature in the evaluation of the brand [the 
party], to the extent that the party will be able to deliver its promise to the electorate. 
When it comes to the examination of political parties as brands, reliability is a key 
concept in order to persuade the consumer/voters that the product actually works for 
the benefit of the consumer. Communication plays an important role to this stage 
where the parties address the satisfaction of the customers in terms of retaining it. The 
rhetoric of LA.O.S., SVP and AN indicate this necessity by showing a stability in their 
attitudes, actions and commitments towards the electorate. The parties include in their 
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manifestos and speeches references to their actions and the achievements the parties 
accomplished, relating to issues and policies, e.g. call for initiatives concerning 
immigration, call for investigation of government expenditure.  
 
Viewing political parties as brands requires a complex combination of ideology, 
policies, personalities and rhetoric. Among them one of the principal characteristics of 
the party as a brand is its name: L.A.O.S., the popular orthodox rally, SVP, the party 
for the Swiss people and AN, a national alliance. All three include in their title the core 
element identifying their political product. Ethno-nationalism, Christian references, 
national unity, fundamentals of the parties’ ideology, all generate the label of a brand. 
With such strong labels and fulfilling the criteria of successful brands presented above, 
LA.O.S., SVP and AN appear to comprehend the mentality of the commercial market 
and engage effectively with political branding as a key part of their marketing 
technique. The representations of brands in the electoral market create perception of 
how people perceive them, conceptualise them and respond to their messages. The 
parties’ (LA.O.S, SVP, AN) representations contribute to the creation of their images 
and identities. In short, political branding appears to be a mixture of policies, 
leadership and the parties themselves, along with a ‘symbolic identification through 
logo and colour’ (Dean, Croft. and Pich, 2014), in order to create an attractive image 
able to be make the electorate engage with it. 
  
8.5.2.  The leadership  
 
But the party is not the only brand that can be identified in these cases. For Smith 
and Frence (2009) ‘the leader’s and party’s images were more influential in attracting 
voters than the policies they espoused’ (2009:212). Based on the theory of Max Weber 
where  
 
[i]n charismatic relations people no longer obey customs or laws, instead, the followers submit to the 
imperious demands of a heroic figure, whose orders are legitimated not by logic, nor by the hero's place 
in ascribed hierarchy, but solely by the personal 'power to command' of the charismatic individual. 
(Weber, 1946:52) 
 
Hence, the public figure of the leader appears to be one of the most influential 
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factors when it comes to attracting voters. As mentioned above, the personality of the 
party leader is crucial when it comes to the identity of the party, as in the face of the 
leader the voter sees what the party represents. Indeed, in many cases the electorate 
may be more familiar with the figure of the leader than with the political party itself, 
which is something that reflects on the structural organisation of the party – or lack of 
it (see Chapter 2, 4, 5 and 6). 
 
Lack of legitimacy is one of the main criticisms that the parties of the radical 
right family receive. In the cases of LA.O.S., SVP and AN, the image of the party 
leaders can contribute to the way the party is perceived, and offers a genuine profile to 
the party. In this way, increasing the possibilities for attracting the attention of the 
electorate and gaining its trust may be enhanced. After all, the aim is to create the 
impression that the party leader can represent the interests of the voter. This is part of a 
wider perspective which suggests that voters consider political brands as a means of 
identifying characteristics of them in the figure of the leader.  
 
The leader of the party is expected to be committed to its ideology, values and 
principles, and to manage to motivate the electorate’s sentiments by addressing its 
expectations and desires. The rhetoric of the party is central to the rhetoric of the 
party’s leader and represents a turning point where the person of the leader becomes 
the brand itself. The parties of the radical right have been characterised by their choice 
of strong political leaders and references to their leaders often relates to their 
charismatic appeal. Charismatic leadership in this case is the ability of the leader of a 
political party to communicate and to construct a convincing rhetoric, while addressing 
the interests and principles of the party.   
 
The popularity of a political party is inevitably influenced by the popularity of its 
leader. In the case of the radical right parties, and more specifically in the parties of 
LA.O.S., SVP and AN, the public images of the parties can be seen in the faces of 
Karatzaferis, Blocher and Fini. This has a dual negative and positive meaning as 
criticism of the leaders can be transformed into a critique of the parties. Scholars of the 
radical right family often place the success and popularity of these parties as due to 
their charismatic leadership (see Chapter 2). The role of the leader in the parties, as 
seen above, is dominant and the electoral campaigns use the face of the leader 
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extensively. More specifically, the structure of the parties (see Chapter 4, 5 and 6) is 
effectively based on the dominant position of the leader’s electoral campaigns and 
especially in the cases of LA.O.S. and AN, the parties are prioritising the importance 
of their leader  by their choices of figuring the face of the leader as the main theme in 
their posters (see Chapter 4 and 6). The recognisable face of the party’s leader, as 
stated above, encapsulates all the values, principles and ideology of the political 
parties. In the face of the brand leader, the consumer finds an element to identify with 
on a personal basis and all the promises made by the party have a face with which they 
can be associated. 
 
The brand leader is a strong, credible and sensitive figure. Karatzaferis, Blocher 
and Fini contribute to the electoral success of their parties and appear to be charismatic 
demagogues and populist leaders, or at least catalysts for their parties’ success. All 
three parties are often referred to as the party of Karatzaferis or Blocher or Fini, 
placing the personality of the leader at the top of the features which serve to identify 
these parties. The perception of the value of the party leader, and the level of their 
effectiveness in convincing the electorate of their party’s worth, creates a strong brand 
at the disposal of the party’s communication strategy.  
 
 8.5.3.  The policies 
 
The party’s brand can affect the way the electorate reacts to specific policies. For 
the parties under examination, policies can be examined as brands, which they use in 
order to attract the attention of the voters. As seen previously from marketing 
techniques for identifying the message in the selected manifestos, speeches, and 
posters, the ideas and ideals the parties stand for are communicated and form the 
criteria by which the selection of the parties takes place. The policies spring from the 
ideology of the parties, and project a constructive plan for organising and running the 
country when in power.  
 
The CATA results presented salience of specific themes/categories. Additionally, 
the rhetoric of the parties along with the analysis of the parties’ posters contribute to 
the suggestion of a potential brand related to their policies. More specifically, policies 
support the underlined ideology of the party, having a direct link to it, and present a 
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visualisation of the way the parties understand the world, and work in order to create 
the desired environment based on the values they endorse. More specifically, nation 
and national identity can be considered one strong brand for the parties under 
examination, as they construct their policies around the idea of nation and national 
prosperity. In addition, immigration can also be recognised as one,  e.g. in the case of 
SVP, where campaigns are organised on the basis of anti-immigration policies. In all 
three cases, anti-immigration policies are critical to the message they are 
communicating to the electorate. Looking at the results of CATA and the qualitative 
analysis (see Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) understanding nation-oriented policies on 
immigration creates a valid argument. The brand in this case is the policy itself, in 
which the customers relate to sentiments of xenophobia, ethno-nationalism and racism, 
among others. The promise of the brand is to satisfy these needs and show they have 
influence on the political decision processes. Understanding policies as brands is 
widespread among scholars in this field. In this case, the thesis stresses the role of the 
policies identified as being significant on the basis of the analysis, rather than all 
possible policies.  
  
For Needham (2005), brands motivate aspiration among the voters and appear to 
be dedicated to a commitment to a better future; brands symbolise the values of a 
political party and suggest explanations of why the customer should select its product 
instead of that of another party (see Needham, 2005:347-348). Having said that, the 
voters, evaluate the political parties in terms of their policies in which the voter finds 
the desired satisfaction in relation to the image of the ideal society. The policies would 
be the way to create this environment and the political party is the one to deliver it to 
the people. Policies as seen above provide consistency between the party’s ideologies 
and add credibility to the product value. Policies are the guides for achieving the 
expected outcomes, and often characterise the identity of the party. Radical right 
parties are often named on the basis of their policies, e.g. anti-immigration, anti-tax, 
racist among others (see Chapter 2).   
 
8.6.  Observations on communicating politics: A conclusion  
 
Political communication is an approach that stresses the features of the 
customer/voter and the producer/political party. The major motivation in 
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communication tactics lies in customer needs in addition to the satisfaction of the 
producers’ interests (see Chapter 2). The hypothesis of this thesis is based on a general 
profile of communication strategies that the political parties of radical right use in 
order to transfer their message to the electorate. The political message in this case is 
examined in relation to the theory of political communication, as well as political 
marketing and branding, where the message offered is the product that is being 
introduced to the consumers in the electoral market (see Chapter 2) from a market-
oriented perspective.  
 
The thesis has presented an extensive analysis of the way the parties of LA.O.S., 
SVP and AN adopt political marketing and branding techniques in their 
communication strategies. Through a clear understanding of the needs of the electoral 
market, the parties have responded to the demand for a more sophisticated profile 
while maintaining their main principles and ideologies. The outcomes of this market-
oriented perspective can be found in the constructed rhetoric and visual material of the 
parties by examining their ideology in terms of values, policies, images and 
personalities. Following the principle that political parties offer products, based on the 
needs of the market in a specific time period, it is necessary to determine which 
products are needed to satisfy the wishes of at least a part of the electorate. The parties 
of LA.O.S., SVP and AN have generated a common pattern of communication, thus 
validating the principal hypothesis of this thesis.  
 
Although in many cases, the actual policy propositions might appear different, 
especially in terms of those which are selected as most significant for the parties in 
question, the focus of the communicating message remained the same, along with the 
rhetorical base of the parties (see Chapter 7). In addition, the combination of the results 
of the qualitative analysis of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 along with the CATA results of 
Chapter 7 present evidence of similar marketing techniques used by the parties and 
their classified brands. The perspectives on ideologies, leadership and policies of the 
parties under examination create a potential proposition that there is a general common 
profile in terms of communication strategies adopted by parties of the radical right 
family. This profile can be used as a guide in the examination and analysis of the 
radical right political parties’ communication strategies. This application of such 
communication techniques will expand the comprehension of the adoption of political 
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marketing and branding techniques by parties originating from the same political 
family, and contribute to the identification of the nature of their uniqueness in terms of 
what they offer to their electorate. In addition, it will help to understand better the 
consumption of political ideologies in a specific period of time, relating to the third 
wave of the radical right parties in particular, and to classify the reactions of the 
political parties of the radical right based on the needs and wishes of the electorate.  
 
The deconstruction of political ideologies, and their perception as products of 
market-oriented parties, presents an alternative to analysing the modern political 
parties and the aspects of political marketing and branding which have received 
increased attention within the discipline of politics which in recent years, approaches 
to identifying the extent of their uptake are still a work in progress. In the final chapter, 
there is  a conclusive assessment of the findings of this thesis and its contribution to the 
field.  
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9. Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this thesis was to propose an alternative approach to analysing 
the communication strategies of the political parties of the radical right. The concept of 
the adaptation of political marketing and branding as key contributors to the parties’ 
communication strategy is central to its argument. In the following pages an outline of 
the thesis is presented, highlighting the key points and conclusions of the conducted 
research. The outline tracks the development of the thesis from the beginning, when 
the first questions and hypothesis were formed, followed by the literature review, the 
theoretical framework, the methodological propositions and the introduction to the 
case studies, and concluding with the empirical analysis and discussion of the main 
observations and findings. This leads to a statement concerning the main contribution 
of the thesis in relation to the methodological approach and propositions, taking into 
account the outcomes of the analysis. The chapter also addresses limitations of this 
type of work and specifies recommendations for possible future research. The chapter 
concludes with some general thoughts on the subject. 
 
9.1. Responses to existing research   
 
With strong ideological and political fluctuations in the political system (e.g. 
defending the free market, adopting the principles of a welfare state and populist anti-
system rhetoric, while rejecting pluralism) radical right parties have managed to create 
a complex profile, which is both contradictory and complex. These observations are 
common in political parties of the radical right family in Western Europe. Indeed, it 
could be argued that a focus on such contradictions and complexities itself constitutes 
a characteristic of the radical right.  
 
In the second chapter of the thesis, the profile of the radical right party family 
was presented. Despite differences that separate this political family from other 
political parties, there is a common approach to the construction of their political 
rhetoric, i.e. that of ethno-nationalism, enriched with xenophobic sentiments and ideas 
on chauvinism, along with the rejection of established political systems. Such rhetoric 
is transformed into policies regarding, for example, stricter measurements on 
immigration control and support for the idea of a strong nation-oriented state as a 
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response to the perceived threat of a multi-culturalism. In addition, the different 
historical, political and cultural origins of these parties are major contributors to the 
complexity and variety of the radical right family.   
 
The emergence of radical right parties in Western Europe in the late 1980s 
created an interest within the academic community, which sought to analyse the 
phenomenon of the growing success of these parties across Western Europe. Parties of 
the radical right, which until that moment were considered as pariahs within the 
mainstream political system, started experiencing an increase in popularity, and gained 
more opportunities to express their ideas to a broader electorate. With strong elements 
of xenophobia, racism, ethno-nationalism anti-establishment sentiments and liberal 
approaches to the economy, the parties of the radical right began to build bonds with a 
part of the electorate. Moreover, the parties managed not only to acquire higher levels 
of parliamentary representation in many countries across Western Europe, but also to 
participate in coalition governments and occupy positions of power in several of these. 
This offered them extended opportunities to promote their ideology and values.  
 
A review of literature on the radical right family revealed a lack of research on 
the communication strategies of this party family in relation to market-oriented 
approaches.  The limited existing literature on the communication strategy analysis of 
the parties of the radical right created the motivation to look for further evidence 
supporting the argument about the adaptation of marketing techniques by parties of this 
particular political family.  
 
Political marketing, as an understanding of communication strategies embraced 
by political parties, is a concept that is still expanding. The theory of marketing 
techniques has been developing since the early 1990s. In addition, in the same period 
of time, branding techniques were starting to be identified and integrated in the 
perspective of analysis of the communication strategies of political parties. As a new 
perception of analysis, political marketing provides a wider understanding of the 
decisions by political parties on ways to communicate their message to the electorate 
more effectively. Moreover, adaptation of marketing techniques supports the argument 
that politics has become more consumerist and such an approach provides a means of 
gaining essential evidence for this argument. Political marketing theory provides 
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thought-provoking perceptiveness on how the political parties structure their 
communication strategy by adapting their rhetoric.  
 
As underlined in the introduction to the case studies of this research project 
despite the varied historical background of the parties, differences in political systems 
of the respective countries and some dissimilarities in ideologies and policies of these 
specific parties. As demonstrated in Chapter 8, an understanding of the political 
marketing techniques of these political parties has not only provided a better 
understanding of the parties themselves, but has also pointed to a common pattern in 
communication strategies among them. The results of the qualitative analysis along 
with the CATA as established in Chapter 7, has provided evidence of political 
marketing practices by LA.O.S., SVP and AN in their effort to create beneficial 
circumstances and attract the attention of the voters and ask for their trust in the form 
of their votes.  
 
9.2. Involvement in the discussion: The contribution of the thesis 
 
Over the years, theories and methods have been developed in political science to 
provide alternative approaches to the understanding of the political parties and their 
behaviour. A better understanding of the way the parties design their communication 
strategies helps to comprehend the needs and wishes of the electorate at any given 
time. Political marketing helps to identify the thought behind the design of the parties’ 
communication strategy and the purposes it serves. The concept of consumption in 
politics places ideology in a perspective where the political parties create a buy-and-
sell relationship with the electorate. The political parties have to create an attractive 
product and offer it to the electoral market, but at the same time they need to maintain 
the satisfaction levels of the consumer.   
 
The parties of the radical right family have often been criticised for their 
opinions and proposed policies, but also for the level of populism they employ and 
their tendency to create different and often contradictory messages for different 
audiences. The choice of the content analysis approach, used in this thesis, is effective 
in terms of identifying the actual meaning of the message communicated to the 
electorate, but also in terms of recognising the focus placed on the content by the party. 
 252 
At the beginning of this project the aim was to locate the application of political 
marketing techniques in the specific case of radical right parties and to test whether a 
common communication pattern could be observed.   
 
The most significant element that this thesis has to offer is its contribution to a 
developing theory of common patterns of communication. The results of the research 
have identified a similar approach to rhetoric by the parties under examination similar 
of adopting political branding as a marketing technique. The outcomes of the analysis 
highlighted the focus of the communication message of the parties, while at the same 
time identified similarities in their strategies. The proposition of a common pattern in 
communication provides evidence of an analogous behaviour pattern for parties 
originating from the same political family and, by this means; it contributes to a better 
understanding of their identity and profile.  
 
Political marketing, as noted in the thesis, is a scientific approach that is still 
developing, and empirical studies in the field, especially in the case of comparative 
approaches to political families, are yet to develop fully. The political marketing 
approach can provide information on the way political parties are trying build their 
influence on the electorate, especially in terms of guiding their perception and gaining 
their support. Thus, by analysing the message, the real intentions behind the 
communication strategies of othe political parties can be revealed, as demonstrated in 
this thesis. The current proposition, though, of a potential pattern concerning common 
communication strategies of a political family, can be used to not only examine similar 
parties of the radical right family, but also to raise questions concerning comparable 
patterns in other political families, as well.  
 
In addition, the thesis applies a content analysis approach in the examination of 
the manifestos and speeches of political parties as a way to deconstruct the text. 
Through this methodological approach any researcher who is interested can used 
diverted information on the content of the data.  
 
9.3. Research limitations and propositions for further research 
 
Nevertheless, there are some research limitations that arise from this project. The 
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most significant one relates to the methodological approach. As mentioned above, the 
methodology adopted in this thesis was based largely on qualitative content analysis in 
order to detect the political message of the parties under examination, and to identify 
their political marketing techniques. It is likely, however, that a more extensive content 
analysis, along with critical discourse analysis, could provide a fruitful methodological 
approach for identifying the application of political marketing by political parties in 
more depth. In addition, a comparative approach across a wider range of cases could 
enrich analysis of political party families and their characteristics. This would 
undoubtedly provide a more complete understanding of the communication strategies 
of the parties. 
 
For Foucault (1972) language, as discourse, coordinates the ‘social’ word and 
therefore informs social practices. Discourse analysis indicates a detailed analysis of 
language, while its main purpose is to examine the actual use of language in context, 
providing a social dimension to the context. In terms of discourse analysis, then, 
scholars studying radical right parties would not only be able to identify, the linguistic 
elements in the parties documents, but also pay attention to the use of language in 
terms of its social, political and cultural aspects. Along with discourse, a semiotic 
approach on the posters and campaign material of the parties could provide more 
information for an extended analysis. A newly developed form of analysing visual 
material could provide a more appropriate technique compatible with content analysis.  
 
Additionally, in order to understand the message it is also essential to understand 
the identity of the receiver, as well as that of the sender. A detailed analysis of the 
profile of voters of the radical right parties could contribute to the structure of the 
message of the political parties and, moreover, of their communication strategies. The 
product, after all, addresses the needs and wishes of a part of the electorate at a specific 
moment in time. The creation of a profile of the voters and potential voters can assist 
in critiquing the marketing decisions of the parties. Personal interviews with the 
parties’ spokespersons could also be beneficial in furthering understanding of the 
actual intentions behind the selection of specific marketing techniques.   
 
A major difficulty concerning the examination of political marketing has to do 
with how it relates the electoral success of political parties and how this can be de-
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qualified.  It is difficult to find evidence for this in the existing literature, especially in 
terms of demonstrating that the electoral success of a political party may be due to the 
contribution of its communication strategies. One way to overcome this would be to 
undertake a combined analysis of the content, the context, the profile of the voters, 
which would be derived from sample surveys and the role of the media, inter alia, in 
order to provide verification for the actual impact of marketing techniques on the final 
decision of the voters.  
 
Finally, there is an on-going discussion concerning contributes media exposure 
of the parties contributes to their success. In the past, access to the media, for radical 
right parties was limited for various reasons; a factor that has gradually changed in the 
late twenty century. The growing access to the media could be one of the reasons that 
contributed to the emergence and growing success of radical right parties. Evidence of 
the role of the media and their contribution to the increasing popularity of radical right 
parties can be seen extensively in the cases of LA.O.S. and AN. Having said that, 
media rhetoric could be analysed through a frame analysis of broadcasts and campaign 
videos, among others, which could help to identify parties’ messages or  differences 
between their communication techniques in manifestos, speeches and TV programmes 
etc. In addition, social media play a major role in contemporary communication 
processes of political parties. A content and discourse analysis focused on the language 
of the political parties in the social media could enrich perceptions of their profile.  
 
Taking this research forward, application of the theory of common 
communication strategies to other radical right families would be beneficial. In 
addition, adaptation of discourse analysis to the context incorporating as many 
variables as possible would create a complete profile of their communication 
strategies. Along with this, an alternative project would include an analysis of the 
parties’ own perception and awareness of market-oriented approaches, revealing 
choices that contribute to the adoption of specific political marketing and branding 
techniques. The radical right family, especially after the emergence of its third wave, 
attracted the attention of many political scientists. Nevertheless, the analysis of radical 
right parties is still an interesting subject and could be further examined in order to 
gain a better understanding of the attitudes and motivations of the parties. The 
complexity of the radical right family, its unique rhetoric and its contradictions merit 
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further analysis in the field of this particular political family.  
 
9.4.  Where are they are now  
 
Since 2010, a lot of things have changed for the parties that were used as case 
studies for this thesis. LA.O.S. have managed to participate in the coalition 
government formed in 2011, but failed to reach the necessary threshold in the national 
elections of 2012 to maintain its representation in the parliament. Since then, the 
popularity of the party has diminished and many of the party members left in order to 
join the conservative party of ND. SVP, in the federal elections of 2011 experienced a 
minor drop in its share of the vote, but still maintains its position as the strongest party 
in the country. In February 2014, the majority of the voters accepted a proposition for 
the referendum ‘Against mass immigration’, launched by SVP. This decision has 
caused several international reactions, especially coming from the European Union as 
it breaches the mutual agreement on the free movement of population that has been put 
in practice since 2007. Finally in the case of AN, the party was officially merged with 
PdL in 2009, but only few years afterwards, in 2013, the coalition of PdL was also 
dissolved.  
 
9.5. Final thoughts  
 
‘House-trained you'll never be’. These were the exact words of the Danish Prime 
Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, in the Danish parliament when referring to the 
Danish People’s Party and its populist rhetoric on the issue of immigration in 1999. 
Just two years later, in the 2001 elections, the Danish People's Party doubled its share 
of seats in parliament and moved from being a pariah to taking part in the new 
coalition government. Having a very strong need to preserve their country’s cultural 
identity, the radical right parties have taken an uncompromising position against 
immigrants living in their countries, thus making this their signature policy. 
 
For a period of time there was an underestimation of the potential of radical right 
parties, but by the early twenty-first century this perspective changed. The emergence 
of the radical right parties in a short period of time in a wide range of countries across 
Western Europe, and their achievement in carving out a recognised place in their 
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national political arenas is remarkable. From small parties representing ghosts of the 
past, as in the cases of AN and SVP to becoming newly-formed parties and building 
rapid support from the electorate, as in the case of LA.O.S., the radical right parties 
managed to distinguish themselves from the rest.  
 
The concept of consumerism dominates in the most recent analyses of political 
ideologies. By adopting a market-oriented perspective, political parties reestablish 
ways of understanding political strategies and highlight an alternative method of 
perceiving their communication choices. The acknowledgement of more sophisticated 
market-oriented strategies and the perception of a ‘product’ in the political context 
create further interpretations of how political parties comprehend the needs and wishes 
of the electorate and their capability to address these in order to gain the attention of 
the voters. However, the question remains as to whether the message that is 
communicated to the public is actually what reflects the party’s true identity.  
 
The original idea behind this project was to understand the notion of 
consumerism, and highlight the elements of political marketing and branding that 
could explain better the nature of political parties. Distinguishing between political 
ideologies, in the eyes of the electorate, has become a difficult task due to the fact that 
mainstream parties appear to share the many similar positions. This characteristic 
creates a demand for something different, a political party that could make a statement 
and differentiate itself from the rest. In this context political marketing and branding 
are being adopted in order to create an irresistible image that offers a political product 
that is more appealing than the others.  
 
In this era where consumerism seems to be the most appropriate term to describe 
party and voter behaviour, the application of marketing techniques is a powerful tool in 
the development of communication strategies. The multi-dimensional interpretation of 
political messages is a challenge to every scholar, who seeks to identify the original 
message and to understand the logic behind the political marketing and branding 
tactics. Furthermore, to discover the true identity of the political parties of such a 
challenging political family, like that of the radical right, is my personal motivation for 
research.   
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. Crainer, S. (1995). The Real Power of Brands: Making Βrands Work for 
Competitive Advantage. London, Pitman Publishing. 
 262 
. Cranmer, M. (2011). Populist Communication and Publicity: An Empirical Study 
of Contextual Differences in Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review, 17(3): 
286-307. 
. Cwalina, W. and Falkowski, A. (2008). ‘Political Branding: Political Candidates 
Positioning Based on Inter-object Associative Affinity Index’ Paper presented at 
fifth international political marketing conference: Political Marketing: Theories 
meet practice, marketing meets political science. Manchester Business School, 
University of Manchester. March 27-29:2008 
. De Chematony, L. (2001). From Brand Vision to Brand Evaluation. Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
. De Giosa, E. (2011). La comunicazione politica nei manifesti della campagna 
elettorale 2008. Elisabetta De Giosa, ‘La comunicazione politica nei manifesti della 
campagna elettorale 2008’, in: A. Tafuri (a cura di) ‘Annuario 2009-2010 del corso 
di master di primo livello in Analisi e gestione della comunicazione’, Trieste, EUT 
Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2011, pp. 5-42.) EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste. 
. De Landtsheer, C. and De Vries, P. (2012). ‘Branding the Image of a Fox: The 
Psychological profile of EU President Herman van Rompuy’. Journal of Political 
Marketing. 
. Dean, D. and Croft, R. (2001). ‘Friends and Relations: Long-Term Approaches to 
Political Campaigning’. European Journal of Marketing.35(11/12): l197-1216. 
. Denton, R. E. and Woodward, G. C. (1990). Political Communication in America. 
New York: Praeger. 
. Dermody, J. and Wring, D. (2001). ‘Message: New Developments In Political 
Communication And Marketing’, Journal of Public Affairs, 1(3):198-201. 
. Dermody, J. and Scullion, R. (October 31, 2001). ‘Delusions of Grandeur? 
Marketing's Contribution to ‘Meaningful’ Western Political Consumption’. 
European Journal of Marketing, 35:1085-1098. 
. Drucker, P.F. (1973). Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices. Harper and 
Row. 
. Eatwell, R. (2003). ‘Ten theories of the extreme right.’ In Merkl ,P. and Weinberg 
L. eds The Revival of the Radical Right. London: Frank Cass, 47–73. 
. __________ (2000). ‘The rebirth of the Extreme Right in Western Europe?’, 
 263 
Parliamentary Affairs, 53: 407-425 
. __________ (1998). ‘The dynamics of right-wing electoral breakthrough’, 
Patterns of Prejudice, 32 (3): 3-31 
.  __________ (1997). ‘European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence?’. 
London: Routledge. 
. Eatwell, R., and Wright, A. (1999). Contemporary political ideologies. London: 
Pinter. 
. Eckstein, H. (1975). ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science’. In: Greenstein’, 
F.I. and N.W. Polsby eds., Handbook of Political Science. Reading Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley. 
. Ellinas, A. (2010). The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the 
Nationalist Card. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
. __________ (2009). ‘Chaotic but Popular? Extreme Right Party 
Organisation and Performance in the Age of Media Communication’. Journal of 
Contemporary European Studies, 7(2): 209-221. 
. __________ (2008). ‘Parties After Success: Why Some Radical Right Parties 
Persist and Others Collapse’ The Selected Works of Antonis A. Ellinas. Available 
at: http://works.bepress.com/antonis_ellinas/3 
. Elo, S. and Kyngas, H. (2007). ‘The Qualitative Analysis Process,’ Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 62(1): 107-15. 
. Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm. 
Journal of Communication, 43(4): 51-58. 
. Evans, J. and Ivaldi, G. (2002). ‘ Electoral Dynamics of the European Extreme 
Right’, Translation of ‘Les dynamiques électorales de l’ extrême- droite 
européenne’. In Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Juillet -Août 2002. 
. Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research. 
London: Routledge. 
. Farrell, D.M. and Wortmann, M. (1987). ‘Party Strategies in the Electoral Market’. 
Political Marketing in West Germany, Britain and Ireland’. European Journal of 
Political Research, 15: 297-318. 
 264 
. Fennema, M and van der Brug, W. (2006). ‘The Support Base of Radical Right 
Parties In The Enlarged European Union’. Paper for EES, Lisbon 
 
. Fennema, M. (2005).‘Populist Parties of the Right’. In J. Rydgren ed. Movements 
of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism. Halifax: Nova Science Publishers. 
. __________ (1997) ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of 
Anti-immigrant Parties in Western Europe’, Party Politics 3(4): 473–92. 
. Fontana, M.C., Hardmeier, S. and Sidler, A. (2006). The ‘New Right’ Vote: An 
Analysis of the Gender Gap In The Vote Choice for the SVP. Swiss Political 
Science Review. (4): 243-271. 
. Foster S. (2010). Political Communication. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
. Franklin, B. (1995). ‘A Bibliographical Essay’. Political Communication, 12: 223-
242.  
. Franzosi, R. (2004). From Words to Numbers: Narrative, Data, and Social 
Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
. Gallagher, M., Laver, M. and Mair, P. (1995). Representative Government in 
Western Europe. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
. Gallagher, T. (2000). ‘Exit from the Ghetto: The Italian Far Right in the 1990s’. In 
Paul Hainsworth ed. The politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the 
Mainstream. Athens. Papazisi. 149-187 [in Greek].  
. Gallego, F., (1999). The extreme right in Italy from the Italian Social Movement to 
Post-fascism. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials. 
. Geden, O. (2006). Diskursstrategien im Rechtspopulismus: Freiheitliche Partei 
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Appendix 
 
Georgios Karatzaferis, President of L.A.O.S., Faliro September 14 2003  
 
Why? Us Greeks, every day we see happening around us so many things, coming 
spontaneously, almost instinctively and we ask ' why? And we just keep thereby 
reducing day by day the limits of endurance and patience wondering ‘For how long?’ 
Why do we have the worst public services in Europe while we're heavier European 
taxpayers? Why do we have the lowest salaries in Europe while we have the highest 
cost of living? Why do we not have a decent pension and why MPs must only work for 
4 years to retire and we have to work for 35? Why cannot we have good roads while 
paying tolls and vehicle taxes? Why let our children die while using drugs? Is it 
because schools do not educate enough our children? 
 
Why do we not legislate our members in order to protect us from the banks and 
the stock exchange? Is it because our children will be unemployed since 
unemployment rate exceeds 20%, the highest percentage in Europe? Is it because 
Greece does not claim anything? (Imia , Macedonia , Cyprus , the Aegean, petroleum, 
Imbros Tenedos). Why should we vote for a government and opposition political 
parties that they do not differ at all? Why should only 50 families trample the wealth of 
Greeks? Why our borders should be perforated and tucked undisturbed hundreds of 
thousands of illegal immigrants?  
 
Why do they not announce the true cost of the Olympic Games - that 's more 
than triple of the original budget, in order to know about how many years the country 
would be mortgaged in the future? All these and even more ‘Whys’ come 
spontaneously to our mind.  Is there any solution? Yes, if we bear in mind to vote with 
our heart for Greece. Yes, if you stop listening to the media. Yes, if you primarily feel 
Greek and secondly  supporter of a political party. Yes, if we cease to rely on our MPs. 
Yes, if you believe in meritocracy displacing all those who don’t. 
 
Is there such a party? Yes. LA.O.S. Why? Because, we come from the same 
origins as you do. We fight like you do. We know what the poverty means as we grew 
up in poverty, on the sidewalk. Therefore, we know what health insurance, tax office 
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and obligations are, that each one of us has to pay from its income. We are one of you. 
You are one of us. Since, our proposed solutions are simple and feasible, similar to the 
same ones you have been thinking of.  Because we are the only ones that dare to call 
things by their name, in the parliament and outside, no matter the personal cost. Since 
we put the interweaving across.  
 
Because our political word touches hearts of us all and is not made out of wood 
like other policies. It is because we want to feel safe in our houses. It is because what 
we are proclaiming, we make things happen. Our words are our actions.  It is because 
we deserve better. It is because we are proud to be descendants of Alexander the Great 
, Sophocles , Miltiades , Themistocles , Voulgaroktonos , Heraklion , Kolokotronis 
Androutsos Kosmas the Aetolian, Pavlos Melas and so many others. It is because at 
some point, our ancestors should be proud of their successors. It is because we are 
many, and they have made us believe we are the minority.  
 
It is because when we love our country it does not mean that we are chauvinists. 
It is because everyone, together, hand in hand we can change Greece. It is because in 
the question, ‘social democrats, communists, conservatives’ we reply, Greece. They 
have stolen our dignity and our national pride and we want them back. It is because the 
labour rights are constitutional and we want healthy firms and employment, healthy 
agricultural production that will allow us not to import the 75 % of products consumed. 
It is because LA.O.S. welcomes anybody who feels, acts and thinks like Greek.  
 
Greeks! Say: NO to  illegal immigrants and their oppressors ,YES to Greeks, 
Greece and the Orthodox Church. NO to the U.S. and the reliance on European Union, 
YES to a national claims and European nations. NO to imposing reducing solutions 
that lead to de-Hellenization of islands and the growing Turkish domination, YES to 
the union with Cyprus. NO to the promiscuity of the country in domestic and imported 
criminals ,YES in a safe society without crime, without drugs trade , without fear and 
locks. NO to extremes liberalization of drug dealers, YES to capital punishment for 
drug dealers and rapists. No to unemployment and job cover by immigrants, Yes to a 
securing right to work for all Greek citizens of all ages. No to the maintain of  
bureaucracy and class differences over against health issues but YES to the elimination 
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of funds and stamps . In addition, healthcare is an obligation of the state for all Greek 
citizens, holding a Greek Nationality.  
 
Enough is Enough! Greece does not deserve so much misery. We are born for the 
best and we can succeed while hand in hand we thrive claiming our rights. We deserve 
it and we claim it. We owe it to our children and our country. 
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Ueli Maurer, President SVP Switzerland 
 
2007 elections? Hard work! Party program of 21 October 2006 
 
From today, in exactly one-year time, on 21 October 2007, the federal elections 
will take place. These elections are important to our country. You can feel it in spite of 
the media and the general public that are interested in it more intensively than in the 
last elections. Why is this so? 
 
In the next elections, it's all about power. The left coalition, the Social Democrats 
and the Greens want to win the 2007 elections. You want a Federal longer and thus the 
majority in the state government. And they want to deselect Blocher. Note, in addition, 
that the CVP representatives automatically impute your own, left camp at the United 
Left. The initial position to the point to say so for us: in the next 365 days to the 2007 
elections it comes to the question of a left-green or a bourgeois majority in 
Switzerland. 
 
Nevertheless, the Green coalition aims to gain power. Today it is in appearance a 
tame, moderate force of well-paid, rich, state devout companions. Mentally they are 
stuck in the class struggle of the last century. But still, what would happen in our 
country, when the left coalition becomes stronger? 
 
Here are some examples of how a majority left-green policies would develop: 
The state is inflated. Say what you must but do not think. The state thinks for us and 
says what is good. The free citizens degenerate to manipulate mass of the state and 
officials. Switzerland will give up their independence, finish more international 
agreements and join the EU. Switzerland's gates are opened. Everyone who wants can 
immigrate into our country, turning the cities into ghettos. Violence and crime are 
packed to overflowing. The problems in schools are unsolvable. Swiss children are 
everywhere as the minority. Foreign cultures abound, the Swiss have to adapt even 
more and to be silent. In the longer term minarets complement the church towers. 
Naturalizations are for administrative, and it is a matter of time for Swiss citizenship to 
be given away. More and more citizens are connected to the infusion needle 
government funds. Dependent citizens strengthen management and officials. Eight new 
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taxes are introduced, we have to make tens of billions in new taxes. The middle class 
pays the piper and bleeds out. Our social institutions are being plundered: Services are 
expanded, the abuse is not tolerated. Nobody cares about the financing. The next 
generation impoverished. The health insurance premiums are unaffordable and the 
National Health Service is getting worse. Switzerland is distributed more tax money 
abroad and makes it more debt. Our farmers land on the ball mountain. The militia will 
be abolished and replaced by a small professional force. Our soldiers are being used 
somewhere in the world, but not in Switzerland. The Switzerland lands in NATO. 
Motorists wait in traffic jams, foreign trucks clog the road and but the trains cost 
billions. 
 
Aren’t these examples enough? This has to stop. Strong personalities are best 
suited for the fade left to also get hold of something from the public spotlight. Because 
the left does not have a program, you are fundamentally opposed to the SVP and 
shoots at Blocher. You want less SVP. The only thing that is sustainable at this left 
politics is the debt that will be taken to the next generations. 
 
Do we really want that? Can we allow that one to destroy the values of our 
country wantonly? You feel it: elections are not a game or a media spectacle. Elections 
are something very fundamental that something extremely important. We thus 
determine the future of our country and point the way for the future of the next 
generations. Therefore, there is no reason to seat back and relax. The SVP will not 
remain passive. Between you and me: Sometimes I have the feeling that we are good in 
relaxing. Then I want you all to take a minute and take a cold shower. We are also no 
travel company, which is located in the charter aircraft and is looking forward to 
vacation at remote sandy beaches. Election means for us all endless backbreaking 
work. Elections called malice by the media, called disgrace of the other parties. SVP 
takes in purchasing, wants another Switzerland than the United Left. We will work for 
the electoral mandate and compete against this left claim to power. We clean with 
these perverse incentives on, we create order and draw boundaries where they are 
necessary. 
 
What is it in this campaign we open today, a year before the elections? It is 
purely and simply about our Switzerland. We want to feel citizens in our Switzerland 
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home. We want freedom and independence, security and prosperity for all inhabitants 
of our country. It is gratifying that it is thanks to the SVP managed to correct in the 
past years, various grievances and to move business in the right direction. I think of the 
asylum and immigration law, European politics, finance and taxes, the health insurance 
law, disability insurance, etc. But many things that remain to be done. In our choice of 
platform, our major concerns for the next four years are listed and our goals are 
defined. The choice of program is not simply waste. It is a binding promise between all 
of our candidates, elected officials and cantonal parties and - I repeat - all, in their 
support. The SVP must remain the party that is reliable and takes up the unpleasant 
topics and represents it with all his strength. With its voice give us, voters, the specific 
order making it happen. 
 
We fight for a Switzerland that gives the citizens in all areas the greatest possible 
amount of freedom and guaranteed. The state should shade the citizens in everyday life 
not everywhere and supervise bother with buses to supplement the cash and forbid 
rules with the thought and speech. We want to be free. With the 2007 elections paved 
the way for EU accession will be provided. Even if all assure you that this is currently 
not an issue, the EU accession spits further around in the backs of their heads the other 
parties. Only those who choose SVP, has a guarantee that EU membership and closer 
approximations to other international structures such as NATO be prevented in 
parliament in the coming years. 
 
Who wants to feel at home probably needs security. Not only security on the 
road, but also safety at work, safety in social break-ins and security in old age. This 
security cannot be solved with more and more redistribution at the expense of the 
middle class or with more debt at the expense of future generations. We show how we 
want to solve with personal responsibility, a sense of proportion and reason these 
problems. What all goes for us at home, must also have validity for the state: Do not 
spend more than you earn. It is a responsible task to deal carefully and conscientiously 
with the control francs of voters. We will also in future have to repeatedly say NO. No 
benefit of our children! The only way we can preserve our prosperity and afford 
something in the future. 
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To prevent the boundless and irresponsible policies of left-green, it needs a 
stronger SVP. I know that we have grown massively in previous elections. Assessed 
objectively and pragmatically it but not enough to take anywhere to help our policy 
breakthrough. We must continue to grow and become stronger. Who for freedom and 
independence, security and prosperity, can only choose SVP that must be our message 
in the coming months. Ultimately, it's about our Switzerland to our identity. The self-
confidence in a separate, independent Switzerland drops. The knuckle under 
superpowers began with the intended EEA and EU candidate and was continued with 
the ill-fated Solidarity Foundation. Our vouch for Switzerland and its identity is more 
important than before: Automated naturalization, foreign cultures and increasing 
violence are calling on the SVP a dauntless struggle for everything that makes our 
Switzerland. For Switzerland in which citizens can feel at home.  
 
This task requires a stronger SVP. We have our choice of target therefore very, 
very high. But we can and still want to set. Hold on tight. The SVP wants to win a total 
of 100,000 new voters in the 2007 elections. This is a very ambitious goal. Therefore, I 
have overwritten my present thoughts in a single word, with ‘hard work’. Who sets 
high goals, be able to rely on his team. This is our very considerable asset. Together 
we can achieve this goal, which is unique in the Swiss policy. It requires of us in the 
next 365 days everything. Use without ifs and buts for the SVP, with its two-member 
Federal Council. We know that in particular the Swiss target of the united left, 
Christoph Blocher, is compromised. 
 
It is a noble task, which we compete. If the SVP is strengthened so that is a good 
thing. But it's also about much more, it's about our Switzerland and our future. No 
other political party has the power to stand up for this country and its identity. There 
remains only the SVP. We are not looking forward to the cold ashes of yesterday. 
Together we carry the fire of passion for our Switzerland. It does this fire of passion 
for our Switzerland, so in the future, it provides a home with warmth and comfort. We 
do not want impersonal, cold Switzerland in the European structures, the thinking and 
speaking diminishes us. We compete against illusions left. For our Switzerland, for our 
children. 
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Gianfranco Fini- Opening note in Manifesto 1995 
 
A historic congress, such as the one we are going to celebrate to sanction the 
birth of the AN, must concern the reasons for the evolution of the MSI – its 
transformation , the background values of the new political entity , its doctrinal content 
, its strategy , its organization. In the opening session of the Central Committee of 22 
October it was said that the next step would be the last congress of the Italian Social 
Movement, and that it would be a historic congress, because it closes the phase of the 
Social Movement and opens a new one, that of AN. I added, with the almost 
unanimous approval of the members of the Central Committee, that the real test would 
be represented by the coordinates cultural values and programmatic theses conference, 
which we now offer to the debate and approval of the members, in the assemblies 
sectional, and delegates to the provincial Congress. I had already stated in the report to 
the National Directorate of October 10 that we all have a duty to be clear and honest 
with us and to our members, who will be the real protagonists of the debate and 
choices.  
 
Today absolve the duty to involve everyone, from the assembly of the smaller 
and peripheral section in the debate and choices, informing all properly, so that 
everyone can choose freely and rightly so. I confirm today what I said then, with the 
approval of an overwhelming majority of the Executive Board, namely, that they are 
certain, however, that this will happens, because our base, the wonderful human 
community that did, in half a century of sacrifice and struggle, the MSI a unique and 
unrepeatable protagonist of Italian political history, it is very different from what has 
been made for years. The MSI people are a people who think, who has the heart and 
brain in equal measure, which has proved to be able to sacrifice for a cause and an 
ideal that has very clear that the best interests of our country comes before any logic of 
the party.  
 
This was indeed the highest teaching of our founders, whose name - from 
Almirante De Marsanich to Romualdi Michelini - are now written fully in Italian 
history, since they have been such major players. The MSI people, are people in love 
with Italy, not themselves. They are generous people and devoid of selfishness. If, as I 
ask the party, it's time to end the experience of the MSI because of the fact it is already 
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evolved and transformed, not only for electoral support in the AN, will own and only 
the members to decide. To which everyone will be able to pay and to whom I address 
myself first, even now with the certainty of finding a very large membership base.  
 
… The birth of AN as a political movement and the final phase of the process 
began with the electoral cartel with which we presented to the voters in the general 
election and the subsequent and European confederation between multiple distinct 
subjects. This is an important issue, which needs explanation. AN was founded in 
January of this year, when the assembly of the MSI conference welcomed the proposal 
to introduce our candidates in the lists of the AN along with candidates coming from 
the civil society, the categories and also by other parties. Even then, I said clearly that 
ours was a strategic choice, not tactics. It was a cunning election, but the start of a 
precise political project. It was then that the symbol of the National Alliance was born 
at the bottom of the circle containing another smaller circle in which a tricolor flame 
figure on trapezoidal base with MSI written. At the top of the larger circle on a blue 
background words AN. It was then that we decided to close an era in our political 
history.  
 
It was then that we proclaimed that the AN solemnly repudiated all forms of 
dictatorship and totalitarianism and believed in democracy and freedom as values 
irrepressible. It was then that we signed a commitment to support the social free-
market economy in which capital is the instrument through which the work ensures 
social justice. It was then that the MSI -DN began its evolution into the AN, starting to 
speak a language of ancient and new at the same time , opening up to civil society , 
showing Italians with a different face compared to the recent past : the politics of 
alliances and no longer an alternative to the system, the reconstruction of Italy and not 
the demolition of the regime , the right of government and no longer the right of 
opposition. It was then that Italians began to believe in AN as demonstrated in March 
and then in June. Italians gave us their trust because they believe in our sincerity when 
we said that AN was not a camouflage of MSI, but the only real big news of the 
Second Republic , which the MSI gave an essential contribution. Today we can not go 
back. Today we can not disappoint those who believed in our sincerity. Let us, 
therefore, the official and definitive what the voters have already done : close the 
political history of the MSI -DN and open to AN .  
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…The circles today are born about two thousand and bear witness to the great 
power of attraction that exerts the National Alliance on civil society, and highlights the 
strong desire for participation that animates many of our new voters and supporters. 
Now it is necessary that the delegates at the Congress of the MSI can and in such form 
as broad as possible, be expressed in this way, expressing their support for our 
transformation in AN and our union with the circles of AN. This will happen naturally 
in due form, with the prior vote of the statutory changes needed to adapt to the new 
reality, the original legal and organizational structure.  
 
And in this sense, called the statutory powers recognized in the National 
Congress, which the Assemblies of Section and the Federal Congress engage their 
elected delegates because they where called - pursuant to art. 21 of the Statute - to 
participate in the work of the National Congress, to proceed in such a place prior to the 
reform of the Statute of the necessary parts with effect from Congress to enforce 
already in progress)  in order to determine the merger with the National Alliance and 
are then continued and completed the congress with the participation unit , with the 
right to vote and be elected , delegates expressed by the Presidents of the Working of 
AN . The final step of this journey will be the continuation of the extraordinary 
congress, attended by all the delegates of the newly formed political party, which will 
have the task of approving the guidelines also statutory provisions, the new political 
movement as well as to elect the governing bodies of power. A constitution that 
demonstrates the modernity of the right and its ability to overcome the party form, in 
direct connection with the society and to engage the best energies of the same. Under 
the cultural union, youth, voluntary. The thesis , though inspired by the desire to make 
maximum clarity on the future of the Right , however, can not be exhaustive of the 
many aspects that politics today assumes , nor to be regarded as unchangeable . I 
therefore hope that the conference will enrich the sectional and provincial to make the 
‘content’ of a modern and successful Right, finally able to ‘restore Italy Italians’, 
which we want to be and in part we have already proved to be. 
  
 
 
